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here is a heated debate under way between
government agencies on the question of classification of
some research data an issue bearing on national security
and scientific inquiry. Part of this complex dispute directly
affects marine science.
The classification dispute concerning the
oceanographic community centers on mapping the 200
nautical miles offshore that fall within the U.S. Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) created in 1983 by President
Reagan (see Oceanus, Vol. 27, No. 4). The National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) wants
to publish a series of systematic, detailed topographic
charts of the EEZ. The mapping will be carried out by
ships equipped with Seabeam a declassified,
commercial version of a sonar system developed many
years ago by the U.S. Navy and sophisticated
navigational systems. The Department of Defense (DoD)
wants to classify the data generated by the survey on the
grounds that such detailed maps could be useful to
commanders of enemy submarines.
The Seabeam system is already installed on
several foreign and U.S. ships, among them the Woods
Hole Oceanographic Institution's Atlantis II. In general
terms, it consists of narrow-beam sonar instruments
mounted on a ship's hull that, by computer analysis, can
produce extremely precise topographic maps of the
ocean floor. However, it's not just the precision of the
Seabeam maps that is causing the problem. The DoD
fears that the NOAA Seabeam charts, with their highly
accurate control, might be matched with echo-sounding
data produced by foreign submarines, which could with
bathymetric correlation give precise (longitude and
latitude) navigation fixes for missile guidance systems
tracking U.S. hardened military targets. As mentioned,
several foreign ships already are equipped with the
Seabeam technology. And it should be recalled that
President Reagan specifically said in establishing the EEZ
that the United States would not assert jurisdiction over
marine research in the zone. Classification of U.S. data
thus might prompt similar action by countries with EEZs
of scientific interest to the United States.
Economically, the Seabeam charts could be
valuable for such activities as mineral prospecting, siting
of seabed structures, or locating promising fishing areas.
In science, Seabeam-produced data are already used, for
example, in detailed studies of the interaction between
currents and sediment deposition which is one of the
principal factors in the dispersal and fate of wastes in the
ocean.
The dispute which pits the Navy and the
Defense Mapping Agency as well as the DoD against
NOAA was put before the Naval Studies Board of the
National Academy of Sciences in January for resolution.
At this point, members of the oceanographic community
found themselves in somewhat of a "Catch-22" situation,
as the Department of Defense's reasons for objecting to
the mapping were themselves classified, which made it
difficult to respond openly to the DoD's concerns.
In late March, however, an ad hoc committee of
the Naval Studies Board, chaired by David W. Hyde,
reached the conclusion that there is a legitimate potential
danger to U.S. national security interests in mapping some
areas of our continental shelf. The committee, however,
suggested that the charts might be released openly to the
public if the data in critical topographical areas were
"filtered" or smoothed of relief details in the 10 to 1,000
meter range. In a letter accompanying the committee's
report to Frank Press, President of the National Academy
of Sciences, Hyde wrote:
"After reviewing NOAA's plans and the
National Operations Security Advisory Committee
(NOAC) concerns, the committee agreed with the
specific contention that the proposed depth contour
resolution (10-20 meters) and geodetic precision
(50-100 meters) of the EEZ regional bathymetric
charts would, if openly disseminated, provide a new
option for precise navigation fixes by foreign
submarines. . . . With this capability, missile firing
submarines could potentially threaten the United
States from broad areas inside the EEZ . . .
"Conversely, the committee was less
convinced by the other more general arguments for
classification. However, given this specific concern,
the committee concluded that a conflict exists
between a significant national security interest, and
academic community interests in open dissemination
of these charts ... for legitimate research of potential
national benefit. Hence, some form of data
management and dissemination control will have to
be agreed upon between NOAA and DoD in order
to balance the possible compromise to security
against the benefits accruing from legitimate
unrestricted use of the data.
"The committee also believes that an
administrative mechanism must be developed to
provide for the selective release of ... raw data from
limited specific sites to support valid geophysical and
oceanographic investigations or industry explorations.
We envision that the wide range of possible requests
will dictate the need for a case-by-case review
procedure, where the benefits of the investigations
requiring the data are assessed against the security
concern.
"Adopting such restrictions is contrary to the
general principles of free exchange of information, on
which the scientific progress of the United States is
largely based. However, the committee noted during
its deliberations that controlled, selective
dissemination of environmental data has been
successfully administered in numerous other similar
instances. While academic interests may be
somewhat impeded by this compromise, a useful
balance can be struck which adequately protects
national security."
In a letter sent with the committee's report to George A.
Keyworth, Science Advisor to the President, Press noted
that the Navy's concern might diminish with time, and
recommended that the classification issue be reviewed at
2-year intervals. We heartily endorse the idea of regular,
periodic reviews of this impediment to science and to the
economic development of the EEZ for the future benefit
of all.
Paul R. Ryan
Editor, Oceanus
Introduction:
The U. S. Navy
A Functional Appraisal
by Admiral James L Holloway III, USN (Ret.)
/Vlost rational people would agree that the United
States needs a navy. But what kind of a navy should
it be? And how large? In recent times, with the
exception of strategic arms discussions, this has
probably been the most important national security
issue debated in the high policy councils of the
federal government.
For example, in 1979, President Carter, in an
unprecedented action, vetoed the Military
Authorization Bill solely because it included a
nuclear powered aircraft carrier that had not been
contained in his naval shipbuilding program. This
decision and the action of Congress the following
year restoring the carrier (with sufficient votes to
override a Presidential veto) are indicative of the
strong feelings and differing views that surround the
questions of how the fleet should be structured and
how large it should be.
Unfortunately, in most cases, the wrong issues
are argued: nuclear power versus oil, vertical take-off
aircraft versus conventional carrier planes, projection
forces versus a sea control fleet. These are largely
peripheral questions, stemming from programming
decisions and philosophical positions. The key
questions relating to fundamental issues have been
obscured.
The key questions should be: Why does the
United States need a navy? What kind of a fleet is
required to fulfill that need? To answer these
requires an examination of fundamental national
maritime requirements, and then development of
these abstract concepts into actual operating forces.
The first question can be answered by a
simple statement the United States needs a navy to
insure maritime superiority for our nation and our
allies. As long as the United States remains a leader
of the free world, it must be able to keep its friends,
support its allies, defend its own interests, and
maintain free access to the world's markets and
sources of raw materials and energy.
To do all this means that the United States
must be able to use the high seas whenever and
wherever it finds it necessary. To assure continued
access to world seas requires a navy that is powerful
enough to deter or defeat any threat to that access.
This is maritime superiority.
These principles and this logic are not new.
They are so basic that they constitute the operative
phrases of Title 10, U.S. Code, which sets forth the
mission of the U.S. Navy: ". . . To gain and maintain
general naval superiority ... to establish and
maintain local superiority . . . ."
The Navy carries out its mission within the
framework of a national strategy that is, in joint
operations with the U.S. Army and Air Force, and in
combined planning with our allies.
For the execution of these responsibilities, the
Navy requires ships, aircraft, and people. It requires
warships and combat planes capable of prevailing
over the most modern and advanced weapon
system technology that may be available to a
potential enemy. Prevailing includes consideration of
the Soviet Union's penchant for using surrogates to
fight its wars with first-line Soviet equipment (such as
advanced surface-to-air missiles, which, in Syrian
hands, shot down two U.S. Navy aircraft in 1984
during Sixth Fleet operations off Lebanon).
The Navy must be staffed with competent
professionals who can not only operate complex
weapons systems, such as supersonic all-weather
fighter aircraft and nuclear submarines, but maintain
and repair them as well.
Then there must be enough of these modern
and capable warships and aircraft to constitute an
operating fleet able to defeat any naval threat, the
largest of which is the Soviet Navy.
Detailed determination of specific naval
requirements that is, the military characteristics of
individual ships and aircraft and the numerical force
levels (which as a whole equal what is called "force
structure"), is based on two fundamental
considerations: our national military strategy and any
potential hostile threat. The basic formula thus is:
naval requirements are those resources needed to
support the force structure that in turn enables the
U.S. Navy to carry out its responsibilities as
expressed by the overall military strategy of the
United States, especially as regards any threat
represented by the maritime power of the Soviet
Union and its allies.
The National Military Strategy
The United States has adopted a forward military
strategy. In the Western Hemisphere, North America
is virtually an island. The United States shares the
continent with only Canada, Mexico, and Central
America. The main body of our nation has only two
international borders, without a potential threat to
our basic security behind either one. On the other
hand, two of our 50 states, all of our territories, and
40 of the 42 nations with whom we have treaties or
security arrangements lie overseas.
The U.S. forward strategy thus uses the
oceans as barriers in the defense of our homeland,
and as avenues for extending our influence abroad.
It exploits the principle that in general war we intend
to engage an enemy closer to his border than to
ours. This forward strategy depends on overseas
allies, forward deployed military forces, and the
mobility to respond to crises around the world. We
want to be able to resolve minor crises before they
become shooting conflicts, and a full-blown threat to
our national security.
The Navy's roles in a forward collective
defense are three-fold: First, to provide the sea-
based segment of the strategic triad ballistic missile
submarines (their virtual invulnerability makes them
a credible strategic retaliatory force). Second, to
provide the naval arm for the U.S. armed forces
deployed overseas, such as the Sixth Fleet in the
Mediterranean, and the Seventh Fleet in the
Western Pacific and Indian Ocean. And third, to
protect the sea lanes the lines of communication
between the United States and our overseas allies,
and our own forward deployed forces.
In addition to the 40 overseas nations with
whom we maintain national security arrangements,
the United States maintains four Army divisions in
Germany, another in Korea, and a Marine Division in
japan. In time of war, our allies and our overseas
forces need to be reinforced and resupplied. The
remaining 13 active U.S. Army and Marine ground
divisions are located in the United States. Should war
break out, they most likely will have to be
transported overseas.
Thus, the United States must be able to
control the seas not all seven-tenths of the Earth's
surface that is covered by water, but those ocean
areas needed for the specific requirements of our
national security plans.
For our strategic forces, only a minimum of
sea control is necessary, just enough to deny hostile
anti-submarine units easy access to ocean areas,
where, if they were concentrated in strength, they
might harass or inhibit our own patrolling ballistic
missile submarines.
For those general purpose naval units
committed to the support of U.S. and allied ground
troops, such as the Sixth Fleet in its North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) role of Strike Force
South, control of the sea must be initially established
to provide relatively secure operating areas from
which air strikes can be launched against targets
ashore, or amphibious operations conducted, such
as sending Marine units into battle.
Finally, the United States must be able to
control vital sea lanes: in the North Atlantic between
the United States and Western Europe; in the
Mediterranean between the Atlantic approaches and
the southern NATO powers (Italy, Greece, and
Turkey), and Israel and Egypt; along the East and
West Coasts of North America; along the East and
West Coasts of South America in the event that the
Panama Canal were to be disabled; to Japan from
the United States; and between the Persian Gulf and
Western Europe.
Naval Functions
Clearly, if our national military strategy is to succeed,
the main function of the U.S. Navy must be to gain
and maintain control of certain key ocean areas. All
other responsibilities of the U.S. Navy, except for
strategic warfare (which is a unique and one
time case), are not only subordinate to the sea
control function, but can only be effected after
control of the sea has been established. Sea control,
a term often used and too frequently misused,
deserves a brief explanation.
Sea control is the prevention of another
power from interfering with our use of the seas. It is
accomplished by eliminating all threats to our use of
the sea, either by destroying hostile submarines,
surface ships, and aircraft, or by deterring (by threat
of attack) hostile craft from entering those ocean
areas we intend to protect.
In wartime, destruction rather than deterrence
is the preferred course of action. Destruction
eliminates the enemy's resources for waging war at
sea. Deterrence simply holds hostile forces at bay
and does not necessarily prevent them from being
used at another time or another place, or for other
military purposes.
The destruction of enemy ships and aircraft is
most efficiently accomplished by striking them at
their bases where the ships are immobile, the
submarines on the surface, and the aircraft on the
ground. The effectiveness of the Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor and the Israeli strikes against the
Egyptian air bases in the Middle East wars are classic
demonstrations of this fundamental principle of
warfare. Obviously, there is a great advantage in
engaging enemy naval forces before they reach open
ocean areas, where they must be searched out.
Physical seizure of hostile bases is the ultimate
extension of this principle, providing a double edged
advantage: denying the base for the enemy's use,
and making it available for our own exploitation. The
striking of enemy forces at their bases and the
destruction or seizure of the bases themselves is an
essential strategic element of sea control. For
example, the U.S. island-hopping campaigns in the
Large aircraft carriers, such as the nuclear-powered Dwight D. Eisenhower (shown above), form the core of the battle group, the
basic unit of the U.S. fleet. (U.S. Navy photo)
Pacific in World War II were not for the ultimate
purpose of taking territory, but for sea control: to
gain control of the approaches to the Philippines and
Japan.
Global Considerations
How does the concept of a forward strategy
influence the shape of the U.S. Navy? First of all,
because of U.S. global political commitments, naval
forces need to be continually deployed in overseas
areas around the world. At any given moment, about
a third of our ships are deployed overseas. For
example, there are routinely more than 40 ships
assigned to the Seventh Fleet, the operating area of
which extends from the Western Pacific to the East
Coast of Africa, an expanse of ocean three times the
breadth of the United States.
To conduct sustained operations in such
remote areas as the Indian Ocean, where the U.S.
maintains only a single base at the island of Diego
Garcia, our ships must be able to carry enough fuel
to steam independently for 4,000 to 6,000 miles
without refueling. They must have large magazine
compartments to carry the missiles and munitions for
sustained combat operations, because the nearest
reload port may be 2,000 miles away. They must
have the sea-keeping qualities to ride out long
periods of bad weather; international politics are not
seasonal, and there may be no friendly refuge ports
in the vicinity of a crisis. And finally, our far-flung
fleets must carry their tactical air power with them,
because most of their time will be spent operating
beyond the effective range of tactical air fields
available to U.S. combat aircraft. If there is one
lesson history has taught us, it is that naval forces
cannot survive a modern air threat without local air
superiority. As a result, the U.S. fleet tends to be
characterized by relatively large warships with good
range and combat endurance, organized around the
aircraft carrier, which furnishes the tactical air power.
Modern Naval Warfare
War at sea became three dimensional with the
advent of airplanes and submarines. Naval warfare is
no longer limited to the oceans, given high
performance jet aircraft and sea-based long range
ballistic missiles. The naval battle field is now global
in extent.
This means that naval warfare has undergone
a permanent change from the days when naval
battles consisted of fights between individual surface
ships or opposing battle lines. Naval warfare in the
future will involve ships, aircraft, submarines,
missiles, and land-based forces. These systems may
engage one another simultaneously over enormous
areas. In a single small theater of operations, such as
the Mediterranean, one could expect virtually
simultaneous engagements among surface ships,
Only recently has the Soviet Union begun to develop sea-based air power. Shown here is the aircraft carrier Novorrossiysk on
her maiden voyage in 1983. (U.S. Navy photo)
carrier-based aircraft, land-based aircraft, land-based
missiles, and submarines, as well as amphibious
assaults against shore bases. In addition to this
panoply of conventional forces, ballistic missile
submarines would be ready to launch their strategic
missiles in the event the conflict escalated to nuclear
war. And there would be antisubmarine warfare
forces of both sides held in reserve to attack the
strategic submarine forces should the chance of a
nuclear exchange become imminent or inevitable.
Naval warfare has become incredibly broad
and complex since the early days of naval history
(Table 1) when the objective of a naval battle was
simply to send the hostile warship to the bottom by
destroying its water-tight integrity. Naval warfare
today is divided into a number of individual warfare
"areas" and "tasks," which relate to both the primary
and peripheral missions and functions of the Navy.
Different kinds of weapon systems and platforms are
utilized in these areas of naval warfare.
Some weapon systems and platforms, such as
the aircraft carrier, may have a number of
applications. Others, such as a mine counter-
measures ship, may be very limited in capability.
Ideally, multi-purpose weapon systems would
appear to be the best investment. However, to be
able to do all things at all levels of warfare can be
very expensive. Therefore it has proved useful to
have in the fleet a variety of platforms and weapon
systems. In generating the composition of the
combatant fleet, one theorem seems to govern.
Table 1. The multi-dimensional nature of naval warfare.
STRATEGIC MISSILES
Land-Based Ballistic Missiles:
TITAN 23
MINUTEMAN 1,000
Total Air Force 1,023
Sea-Based Ballistic Missiles:
POSEIDEN 496
TRIDENT 144
Total Navy 640
GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
TACTICAL AVIATION
(Fighter/Attack Aircraft)
Air Force
Active 1,782
Reserve 864
Total Air Force 2,646
Department of the Navy
Active Navy 967
Reserve Navy 120
Active Marine Corps 422
Reserve Marine Corps 92
Total Department of Navy 1,601
Source: Annual report to Congress by the Secretary of Defense for
FY '85.
Although a general war with the Soviet Union is less
likely than a limited war such as Korea or Vietnam,
the conflict with the Soviet Union is the one that we
must win. Therefore a navy must be designed to
Table 2. Naval warfare tasks and principal types of ships.
Warfare Tasks
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The Trident submarine Michigan undergoing tests in Croton, Conn. (U.S. Navy photo)
prevail over the Soviet Navy to the extent required
for the attainment of our own national security
objectives. This has one important corollary: if we
design a navy that can defeat Soviet maritime forces,
then we should have a navy that is capable of
handling all of the lesser intensity conflicts and
situations that might arise.
Table 2 illustrates naval warfare tasks and the
principal types of ships. From this table, it can be
understood why the aircraft carrier is today the
centerpiece of the fighting forces of the U.S. Navy.
The U.S. Fleet
The organization of fleet battle strategy reflects the
mission, functions, roles, and deployment of the U.S.
Navy. Primary among these considerations is the
ability to maintain maritime superiority for the
United States and its allies in the face of the growing
Soviet threat at sea. This is the main responsibility of
the combatant ships and aircraft of the U.S. Navy. To
accomplish the principal objective of the fleet, these
warships and aircraft are organized into battle forces
and battle groups that are integral parts of the task
force organizations of the deployed fleets, such as
the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean and the Seventh
Fleet in the Western Pacific.
A battle group consists of a carrier, surface
combatants, and submarines, operating together in
mutual support with the task of destroying hostile
submarines, surface, and air forces within the battle
group's assigned area of responsibility. Battle groups
are defined as integrated task groups capable of
conducting offensive operations at sea against the
combined spectrum of hostile maritime threats.
There must be enough of these battle groups
to prevent Soviet maritime forces from disrupting
allied lines of communication in both the Atlantic
and the Pacific theaters. That does not mean the
U.S. Atlantic and Pacific Fleets must each be able to
defeat the total Soviet Navy standing alone. It is
recognized that if the Soviets concentrate their naval
forces in the Atlantic, we can do the same. We can
in fact redeploy our naval forces more quickly than
the Soviets because of their restrictive geographical
situation.
Today the Navy's objective is to have 15
carrier battle groups. In addition, the active fleet
must include the specialized and non-combat forces
necessary to support these 15 battle groups. This
means we need about 600 ships to carry out the job.
Table 3 shows today's force levels and the
composition of the fleet when the 600-ship Navy is
achieved.
The Soviet Threat
The territory of the Soviet Union, spanning a
continent, dominates Eurasia. On its southeastern
flank lies the People's Republic of China; a border
guarded by troops on both sides and prone to
incidents. Arrayed along the western border are the
countries of the Warsaw Pact, considered buffer
states by the Soviet Union. Further to the west, still
on the same continent, lie the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization nations of Western Europe. Thus it is
possible for the Soviet Union to defend itself from
Chinese communists, support its Warsaw Pact allies,
and invade Western Europe, never having crossed a
major body of water. Why then do the Soviets have
the largest navy in the world?
The answer, this author thinks, is to oppose
Table 3. The Navy's deployable battle forces today and projected through 1990.
Deployable Battle Forces
(End Fiscal Year)
Lessons Learned from the Falklands
/\ Ithough there will probably never be a full
agreement on the significance of the British
experience in the Falklands, it is nevertheless
clear that the principal lessons learned relate
directly to our own naval policies.
What was the British experience in the
Falklands? They fought a war 8,000 miles from
home and 4,000 miles from their closest base,
and they won it just barely. According to
statements made by the British military
commanders themselves, there were two critical
areas in which success could have turned to
failure with just a slight shift in the fortunes of
war. These two critical elements were air
superiority and logistical support.
Although the British were able to turn
back the Argentine air strikes eventually, it was
not until six British ships had been lost. The
margin of success was so thin that the
commander of the British forces has said that if all
of the Argentine bombs that had hit his ships had
exploded, the damage to the invasion fleet would
have been so severe that the British expeditionary
force would have had to withdraw.
Without conventional aircraft carriers as
we know them in the U.S. Navy, the British had
to rely on a small number of VfSTOL "jump jets"
flying from a helicopter carrier and a through-
deck cruiser. The small number of fighters, their
limited performance, and the lack of radar
warning planes so constrained the effectiveness of
the fleet's fighter cover that the Argentine air
strikes were able to penetrate with almost fatal
success.
If local air superiority turned out to be the
vital tactical factor, the most critical strategic
consideration was sealift. There was no way that
the British could mount an expeditionary force of
the war fighting capability to even threaten the
Falklands without total reliance on sealift. The
troops and their weapons, and their sustaining
combat supplies, could only be moved by ship.
Air was out of the question. The nearest airfield
was 4,000 miles away at Ascension Island.
Everything would have to be brought in initially
by ship, and the British did just that.
So the principal lessons learned from the
Falkands campaign are:
If a nation is to exert a military influence in
an area of the world remote from friendly
bases, the operation must be carried out by
naval forces.
To conduct successful military operations, a
naval force must have clear-cut air superiority.
These two lessons learned from the
Falklands confirm two important facets of our
own naval policy:
The renewed emphasis on sealift that
prompted the Secretary of the Navy in 1 984 to
expand the two original functions of the
Navy sea control and power projection to
include the third function of sealift.
The Navy's carrier program that maintains a
force of large deck carriers capable of operating
and supporting tactical aircraft with weapons
systems superior to their potential adversaries
so that local air superiority can be assured for
whatever naval operations are contemplated.
JLH
fuel was required for every ton of military cargo
delivered to Tel Aviv in support of Israel.
Prepositioning is not the answer. With today's
reconnaissance techniques, the concentration of war
materiel in the confined areas of Western Europe
makes those depots vulnerable targets to Soviet
tactical rockets and aircraft. It is the Navy's
responsibility to move our combat forces and their
support overseas. It is up to the U.S. fleet to protect
the sea lines of communication and to prevent
Soviet submarines, surface ships, and aircraft from
interdicting our sealift. The Soviets clearly recognize
this and have predicated their naval program on a
seagoing force designed to defeat the U.S. Navy to
the extent that we will be unable to defend the sea
lanes and our overseas lines of communication.
The Soviet Navy
From a historical perspective, the Soviet Navy was
originally designed for the defense of the homeland:
antisubmarine forces to blunt the nuclear threat
posed by our ballistic missile submarines; and long-
range, land-based aircraft and a massive submarine
fleet to defend against carrier airstrikes into
European Russia and the Soviet Pacific bases. Then,
in a technological sense, the Soviets scored a break-
through. The development of anti-ship cruise
missiles (air, surface, and submarine launched) met
with considerable success. Soviet naval strategists
were quick to realize that if the main battle forces of
the United States could be neutralized with the anti-
ship cruise missile, then the unarmed tankers, cargo
carriers, and troop ships that constitute the overseas
lines of communication through which we support
our allies and our own army and air forces abroad
would fall prey to their fleet. If the U.S. Navy's
protective cordon could be breached, the large
numbers of torpedo firing diesel submarines in the
Soviet naval inventory would take on enormous
added significance in the role of sea lane
The Soviet Navy. From top: A nuclear powered guided missile cruiser; a Kiev-c/ass aircraft carrier with Yak-36 aircraft on board; a
Sierra-class nuclear powered attack submarine; an amidship view of the cruiser Slava showing cruise missile launch tubes; and a
Charlie-class cruise missile submarine underway. (All U.S. Navy photos, except Sierra-class submarine courtesy of the Royal
Norwegian Air Force)
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U.S. Navy F-14 Tomcat fighters on patrol. (U.S. Navy photo)
interdiction. So today, although the emerging naval
strategy still affords protection of the homeland, the
interdiction of the NATO lines of communications,
achievable only through the neutralization of the
U.S. Navy's battle forces the carrier groups is a
strategic objective of rapidly growing emphasis.
In a comparative sense, the Soviet Navy is
larger in numbers but lesser in individual unit
capability than the American Navy (Table 4). But
qualitatively, the Soviets are improving. Their ability
to operate large modern warships, capable of waging
three-dimensional naval warfare with the most
modern weapons technology, in areas more and
more remote from the Soviet heartland, is growing.
Today the Soviet Navy has the ability to exercise
control of the sea in areas contiguous to the U.S.S.R.
and its allies. As sea-based tactical aircraft are added
to the Soviet naval order of battle, as they are doing
with Forger Vertical Take Off (V/STOL) aircraft on
the Kiev-class carriers, it becomes only a matter of
brief time before the Soviet Navy will have the
ability for offensive sea control and the projection of
power ashore. It is evident that Soviet ambitions are
to develop a navy that can serve as a powerful
instrument of national policy, as ours has for the past
three decades, as well as a formidable threat to the
validity of the United States concept of a forward
collective security.
Table 4. Soviet Navy active ships (1985).
Submarines
Ballistic missile (nuclear) (1)
Ballistic missile (diesel)
Attack (nuclear)
Attack (diesel)
Auxiliary-Research
Aircraft carriers
Helicopter carriers
Cruisers
Destroyers
Frigates
Light surface combatants
Fast patrol craft
Amphibious ships
Mine countermeasures ships
380
64
15
114
164
23
3
2
35
68
32
180
410
78
135
A U.S. Marine AV-8A Harrier light attack jet lifts off from
U.S.S. Tarawa flight deck normally used by helicopters. (U.S.
Navy photo)
Unless the U.S. Navy can assure the
movement of reinforcements and resupply overseas
to our allies and our own forward deployed forces,
our strategy of a forward collective defense will fail.
If we were to lose naval superiority, the Soviets
would be able to cut these strategic lines of
communication, and our alliances with NATO,
Japan, and Korea would be unsupportable. Then, the
Soviets would have the opportunity to defeat us all
on a piecemeal basis.
Unfortunately, the Soviets would not have to
go to war to take advantage of a shift in maritime
supremacy. If it were simply perceived by the
Soviets, ourselves, or our allies that the balance of
military power had shifted to the Soviets, both sides
would know that our strategy of a forward collective
security was no longer valid. Our alliances would
crumble and U.S. national security would be in
jeopardy.
Admiral lames L. Holloway III is a former Chief of Naval
Operations (1 974- 1 978) and member of the joint Chiefs of
Staff. He is presently chairman of the Council of American
Ship Operators in Washington, D.C. During an illustrious
service career. Admiral Holloway, a naval aviator, served in
combat in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, serving two
tours of duty in the latter country as commanding officer of
the U.S.S. Enterprise, the Navy's first nuclear powered
carrier, and as commander of the U.S. Seventh Fleet. He also
has had crisis assignments in the Middle East and has been
awarded six Distinguished Service Medals.
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Naval Research and
by Rear Admiral J. B. Mooney, Jr., USN
Chief of Naval Research
lo measure the importance of U.S. Navy research
and development (R&D) programs and their
relationship to national security, one need only
reflect on a statement made in the mid-1970s by
Soviet fleet Admiral Sergei G. Gorshkov at a time
when the flag of the Russian Navy had begun flying
over the oceans of the world:
. . . the disruption of the ocean lines of
communication, the special arteries feeding the
military and economic potentials of those [the
enemy] countries, has continued to be one of the
most important of the [Soviet] Navy's missions . . .
sooner or later the United States will have to
understand it no longer has mastery of the seas.
What makes these statements critical is that
they fly in the face of the mission of the U.S. Navy
to keep the sea lanes and lines of maritime
communications open. They were said at a time
when the Soviets were devoting more of their
economy toward R&D than was the United States.
For the U.S. Navy to be properly equipped to
face such challenges, to protect our national
security, and to maintain the open channels of the
oceans, it must rely on the technological predictions
and achievements of our scientific and engineering
resources, principally those of the Office of Naval
Research (ONR) where scientific ideas take shape.
That's been the business of ONR since it was
created on August 1, 1946, to act as a contracting
agency to bring scientific research skills together
from around the nation to meet urgent goals of
national security. Scientists were encouraged to
apply their talents and skills to whatever research
projects interested them. Not until sometime later
were proposals required to aim for technology and
products of special interest to the Navy.
Supported by ONR funding, academic
institutions expanded and strengthened national
research capabilities, opening the way for dramatic
new advances in technology. Since that auspicious
beginning, ONR has remained at the cutting edge of
science and technology, in service to the Navy and
to the nation. It has funded research carried out
under contract by universities, industrial
Admiral Mooney
establishments, nonprofit organizations, and by Navy
laboratories, including ONR's own laboratories the
Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) in Washington,
D.C., the Naval Oceanographic Research and
Development Activity (NORDA) in Bay St. Louis,
Mississippi, and the Naval Biosciences Laboratory
(NBL) in Oakland, California.
The Chief of Naval Research (CNR) reports
directly to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Research, Engineering and Systems [ASN/R,E&S]),
and provides R&D advice and financial services for
management of the Navy-wide R&D budget. The
CNR also oversees the Navy's Patent Program and
administers the Naval Research Advisory Committee,
a group of 15 eminent civilian scientists and
engineers who advise the Secretary of the Navy, the
Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the
Marine Corps, and the CNR on science relevant to
the needs of the Navy and national security.
At ONR headquarters in Arlington, Virginia,
some 30 naval officers and 400 civilian scientific
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National Security
Arctic native drops by for a visit to an ONR research camp on an ice floe. (U.S. Navy photo)
officers and support personnel, the managers and
custodians of the Navy's basic research program,
make up the ONR staff. As a team they manage
about $350 million annually of R&D funding that
Congress appropriates to the Navy for scientific
research, research based on long-range Navy
objectives and national security needs.
More than half of ONR's budget 56
percent goes to the support of basic research
conducted at universities in the United States.
Thirty-six percent supports research at Navy
laboratories, and the remaining 8 percent supports
research at nonprofit institutions or industrial
organizations. This commitment to the advancement
of science and technology through support of basic
research has the potential for improving naval
operations and enhancing national security.
The policy of ONR is to use flexible contract
and grant procedures in carrying out its program.
Unsolicited proposals from qualified organizations
help meet its mission objectives.
Through a Contract Research Program (CRP),ONR plans and supports basic research at the
frontiers of science. From such advancement, ONR
provides the knowledge necessary for the Navy to
make informed decisions about further exploratory
development. That, in turn, provides the technology
base from which naval capabilities are drawn. In this
way, ONR's Contract Research Program is the
source of the best creative ideas and information in
the physical, mathematical, environmental,
engineering, and life sciences needed to optimize
future naval operations.
Support for the Contract Research Program
comes mostly from Navy research Category 6.1
funding, and indeed the CRP is responsible for
managing about two-thirds of the Navy's Category
6.1 resources. The program has two components:
Core Programs and Accelerated Research Initiatives,
with resources split about evenly between the two
components.
The Core Programs consist of long-term
programs in the traditional scientific disciplines.
Heavy weight is given both to scientific merit and
technical approach, with particular emphasis on
"new" science. The Core offers the possibility of
examining new and burgeoning high-risk science
areas. The Core also maintains a level of effort in
scientific areas that are broadly associated with all
areas of science, technology, and naval needs.
Accelerated Research Initiatives are designed
to concentrate resources in specific areas of research
that offer a particularly attractive opportunity for
gaining significant advancement by increasing
funding for the program. These programs are neither
more applied nor more basic than the Core
Programs; they represent an accelerated or
enhanced program in a basic scientific area that is
potentially attractive to future naval needs.
The strength and vitality of ONR's Contract
Research Program depends, ultimately, on ideas
originating from the research community primarily
through unsolicited proposals from U.S. universities.
Those ideas are focused within the four areas
mentioned previously: mathematical and physical
sciences, environmental sciences, engineering
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A scanning electron micrograph of a cross section of an electrochemically made polymer. The view on the right shows the
ductile character of the material which gives improved strength. (U.S. Navy photo)
sciences, and life sciences.
Mathematical and Physical Sciences
As an engineering-oriented service, the Navy is
involved in mathematics and physical sciences on a
broad scale. Mathematical sciences programs focus
on such areas as mathematical analysis,
computational architectures, and statistical
methodologies.
Because of the nature of mathematics,
research carried out by ONR investigators has broad
implications for national security. A portion of the
analysis program focuses on mathematical inverse
problems. Mathematical inverse methods can be
used to reconstruct ocean bottom profiles based on
sonar data and even to reconstruct images that
appear hopelessly blurred or noisy.
Other portions of the analysis program are
focused on control methodology. Application of
modern control theory to both aircraft and ship
design results in vehicles with better performance
and stability.
Statistical methods for signal processing have
resulted in significant improvement in detection
capability for undersea surveillance. Indeed, these
methods have made sonar operation in the coastal
margin and Arctic possible. Application of statistical
methods to remote sensing data analysis has
suggested ways to achieve improvement in handling
large masses of surveillance data from space and has,
in effect, sharply increased resolution from imaging
sensors through improved image-processing
techniques.
In addition to the previously mentioned areas,
fundamental work is being done in discrete
mathematics with particular application to
communication networks, in the mathematical
decision sciences with application to command and
control, and in mathematical optimization with
application to logistics, scheduling, and
determination of force mixes.
Our research efforts in physics focus on
optics, high-precision spectroscopy, atomic and
molecular physics, surface and interface physics,
physical acoustics, plasma physics, and radiation
sources.
Three major thrusts are radiation sources,
atomic clocks, and high current compact
accelerators. Three regions of the spectrum for
coherent radiation sources are short wavelength
ultraviolet to soft X-ray, near infrared (IR), and far IR
to microwave.
One approach to realizing a short wavelength
laser involves the creation of highly excited ionized
atomic species and subsequent stimulated
reemission. Such sources could have application to
lithography and the study of material properties.
An electrooptic countermeasures Accelerated
Research Initiative that we are working on is
designed to develop broadly tunable laser sources in
the 3 to 6 micrometer region of the spectrum.
Basically, two approaches are being considered. One
is color center lasers and the other is semiconductor
diode lasers. These new semiconductor lasers
appear to have very interesting band gap properties
that may make them tunable out to 20 to 30
micrometers. The application here is for decoying
missiles that use infrared detectors for homing.
Approaches to realizing high power coherent
radiation sources in the far IR to microwave region
involve such concepts as free electron lasers and
gyrotrons. These have important implications for
surveillance and characterization of targets or other
objects.
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New concepts for atomic clocks based on
trapping and cooling of neutral and ionic atomic
species are being investigated. The search for
trapping and cooling atomic ions has already
produced ionic "clouds" cooled to milli-degree
Kelvin and a crude stored ion clock of approximately
the same accuracy as current state-of-the-art cesium
beam devices. The Naval Observatory is now
evaluating a stored ion atomic clock device. The first
demonstrated cooling and trapping of neutral atoms
was performed by ONR research. Applications of
precision timing include high precision navigation
and high-data-rate secure communications.
In the area of high energy compact
accelerators, the primary concept being investigated
is the modified betatron. The types of accelerators
being considered here are to be distinguished from
those of interest to high-energy physicists in that the
latter accelerators involve micro- to nanoamperes,
whereas those of interest in the current ONR
research have 100 to 10,000 amperes or more. This
means that collective phenomena, plasma
instabilities, and new injection/ejection techniques
must be evaluated. There are two possible
applications. One is as endoatmospheric directed
energy weapons, such as might be used in anti-ship
missile defense. Another is as an electron beam
source for free electron lasers.
Our efforts in chemistry focus on four major
areas polymeric materials, solid state and surface
chemistry, synthesis and mechanisms, and
electrochemistry.
Polymer research includes synthesis,
characterization and processing work on high
strength, environmentally stable structural materials,
as well as materials for electronics applications, such
as communications.
The solid state and surface work emphasizes
the chemistry of electronic materials. Synthesis and
mechanisms studies include research on
decontamination of chemical warfare agents and
routes to new antifouling coatings.
Finally, electrochemistry research emphasizes
studies on materials for new high-energy, high-
power density battery applications as well as solid
state electrolytes for applications such as all-solid-
state displays.
In the area of electronics, researchers are
studying solid state materials and devices, systems
theory, antennae, and propagation that might apply
to advanced military systems, such as radar,
communications, and electronic warfare.
Future needs for most, if not all, Navy
electronic systems call for smaller, faster, and more
reliable hardware. We are addressing this need
through our solid state research by studying
fundamental problem areas, such as defects in
semiconductor materials, electrical contacts, and thin
insulators.
We also need to know more about scattering
of radar signals by targets. For instance, the radar
detection problem intensifies in the face of stealth
technology, which makes things harder to see on the
radar scope. We need to know what happens to the
signal when it hits a stealth target and we need to
know how to recover information from the radar
Cooling neutral atoms. This technique is part of the research
under way in the development of atomic clocks. Here atoms
are being stopped by a laser beam at the end of a solenoid.
(U.S. Navy photo)
return, using electronic signal processing techniques.
Another facet of electronics research is space
environmental factors in which we are measuring
radiation effects that have great influence on satellite
communications.
Environmental Sciences
The Office of Naval Research's work in
environmental research covers three areas ocean
engineering, ocean sciences, and geophysical
sciences.
Ocean engineering research is developing
solutions to Navy and Marine Corps problems,
including location of sunken platforms, such as ships
or planes. Basic research in this area is focused on
devising a method to detect chemical plumes of jet
fuel, transmission fluids, or other lubricants that leak
from submerged ships or aircraft.
A second ocean search program is an ONR
initiative known as Argo-jason. This deep
submergence system, capable of searching to 6,000
meters, combines acoustics and optics technology in
a single towed system called Argo that can "ground
truth" in real time a search area through a
combination of acoustics and high-resolution, low-
light television. The system covers a 5-kilometer
swath acoustically and a 200-meter-square area
visually with its TV cameras. The Jason vehicle
includes a closeup stereo TV camera and advanced
manipulator arms that can maneuver dexterously
(see Oceanus, Vol. 25, No. 1, p. 30).
To ensure that the fleet can get to sea, ocean
engineers, through the Navy's Depth Assurance
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Program, study harbor flow and sedimentation
processes to develop systems that will minimize
harbor dredging maintenance requirements and
improve harbor safety.
We are studying open ocean processes for
leads to help us develop better predictive models of
the ocean and the marine atmosphere. Here major
advances are often dependent on new instruments.
These are funded at about 1 5 percent of the total
program but always under the direction of an
investigator who needs the instrument to test a
hypothesis and who will supervise its design,
construction, and at-sea tests. Satellite remote
sensing techniques play a major role in all programs.
Research in physical oceanography is
conveniently divided into space scales. On the large
ocean basin scale of more than 1,000 kilometers,
studies include the dynamics of western boundary
currents, such as the Gulf Stream, Kuroshio, and
Agulhas, and of the central gyres, including
thermocline ventilation. This work is required as the
basic building block for numerical models of the
ocean.
Mesoscale variability studies, at scales of 10 to
300 kilometers, look at the generation, evolution,
and interactions of fronts and eddies, including
topographic and atmospheric effects. This space
scale is particularly important for predictions to
support tactical naval sonar operations.
Small-scale phenomena with dimensions
down to those of molecular dissipation include
surface and internal waves, surface and bottom
mixed layers, horizontal fine structure, salt fingering,
and turbulence. These small-scale phenomena are of
interest in exploring the potential of various non-
acoustic antisubmarine warfare techniques. Although
emphasis is on the open ocean, the effects of coastal
boundaries, including beach processes, are studied
on all scales.
The chemical oceanography program includes
studies of the small-scale distribution of trace
elements, such as copper, zinc, nickel, iron, gaseous
hydrogen, and dissolved organic matter in the ocean.
The photochemistry of the ocean's oxygen system
and the related reactive species initiated by
absorption of sunlight, are also under study.
Ubiquitous organic slicks on the sea surface that
potentially can affect satellite microwave remote
sensor signals are also of particular interest.
Biological oceanographers are examining the
processes controlling the distribution of biologic
phenomena, such as bioluminescence, plankton,
zooplankton, and fish. They also are investigating the
processes that initiate and control biodeterioration
and biofouling and the processes by which biological
elements influence sea-floor properties and sea-floor
morphology.
The meteorological program emphasizes the
marine environment, including the marine planetary
boundary layer and the development of improved
forecasts for the three or four storms each winter
that unexpectedly intensify to severe gales within 24
hours. A small program concentrates on the
evolution of marine clouds. A new program will seek
to develop better forecast tracks for tropical
hurricanes.
Research in the geophysical sciences includes
marine geology and geophysics, underwater
acoustics and optics, and a multidisciplinary program
in the Arctic. Again the emphasis is on the
development of improved predictive models with
major advances usually dependent on the
development of new instruments and new
techniques, such as remote sensing.
In marine geology and geophysics, our
emphasis is on understanding low-frequency
acoustic and seismic propagation in the marine
sediments and the ocean lithosphere. This includes
lateral and vertical measurements of the
compressional and shear velocity using ocean
bottom seismographs/hydrophones, towed arrays,
and borehole sensors. To extrapolate these field
measurements to other areas, the concepts of sea-
floor spreading are validated using magnetic,
altimeter, and gravity techniques. Sea-floor
morphology is studied using multibeam echo
sounders on academic research vessels equipped by
ONR and by studying the effects of high-velocity
bottom currents controlling bottom sediment
formations.
In underwater acoustics, there are two basic
thrusts quantifying the fundamental limitations
imposed by the ocean on the use of underwater
acoustics, and the search for new or improved
acoustic systems techniques. Both seek to improve
the Navy's antisubmarine warfare capability. In the
first area are programs in ambient noise, propagation
through random media, volume reverberation,
coherent surface scattering, inverse methods, and
acoustic tomography. In the second area are studies
of the turbulent boundary layer, new transducer
systems for active target classification or high power,
and sensors for high-speed vehicles. A new thrust
will tackle the shallow water acoustic prediction
problem in both a deterministic and statistical
approach.
Researchers in ocean optics are developing
improved models for optical attenuation in surface
waters. They conduct field experiments that
combine knowledge of wave forcing to provide
nutrients from below and insolation causing
phytoplankton blooms that define light properties as
Research in propeller hydrodynamics. Lasers are used to test
hub and tip cavatation. (U.S. Navy photo)
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This cyclonic eddy was photographed during the 1 984 Marginal Ice Zone Experiment (MIZEX). The center of the eddy was
located at approximately 7840 N and 2W. Remote sensing instruments as well as in situ observations indicated this eddy had a
lifetime of approximately 30 days. The diameter of the eddy is 30 to 40 kilometers. The convergence of the ice floes (50 to 700
meters in diameter) in the center of the eddy suggests that geostrophic effects are important. (Photo by Dr. R. A. Schuchman,
Radar Science Laboratory, Environmental Research Institute of Michigan.)
a function of depth and position. This leads to more
light and a stabilized density gradient until the
phytoplankton are grazed off or wave forcing brings
up more nutrients from below.
Research in the Arctic is focused on
developing a complete understanding of that
environment. ONR interest originated with the use
by the Soviets of the marginal ice zone (MIZ) as an
operating area for their large strategic submarines.
We need to learn more about the sea ice and
oceanographic processes in the MIZ. These include
the effects of waves, the atmosphere, ocean
currents, and thermal stresses on the ice and on
ambient noise in the MIZ. Data gathered during
MIZEX (MIZ experiment), a recent extensive 2-year
international measurement program, should give
answers to many questions about the MIZ (see
Oceanus, Vol. 26, No. 2, p. 55).
Engineering Sciences
Engineering sciences, ranging from materials to
mechanics and computer science, are researched by
the Navy for diverse applications.
Scientists are in search of special metal alloys,
for instance, that will add strength to sea and air
structures. Others work to understand how
microstructure affects such alloys, which might be
used to develop high-strength aircraft landing gear,
lightweight wings, and aircraft support structures.
Still others seek to improve the magnetic properties
of materials. A recent development in this area now
allows motor transformers, like those used in
torpedoes, to last longer.
The art of welding is of paramount
importance to the Navy, since it is the principal
method of fabrication for ship structures. As a result
of recent research, laser welding may find renewed
competition from standard gas tungsten arc welding.
Materials research in tribology (understanding
the effects of friction and lubrication) has led to ion
implantation, chemical and organic lubrication
compounds, and laser annealing. Researchers at the
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Massachussetts Institute of Technology are working
on a "thin film process" that may advance the
science of tribology significantly.
Ceramics and glasses are among other solid
materials being studied, including the area of solid
dielectrics. At The Pennyslvania State University,
researchers are developing highly reliable
components that will work continuously without
error in such critically sensitive systems as missiles
and hydrophones. Such research may lead to smaller
integrated circuits and more reliable capacitors.
We are principally concerned with two areas
in solid mechanics research. The first is the problem
of dynamic buckling of underwater pressure hulls
due to operations at deep depths and to underwater
explosions. The other concern deals with reducing
the signature of submersibles caused by radiated
sound generated by hull vibrations. Fundamental
structural dynamics research, coupled with new
advances in materials science, is being applied to this
sensitive area.
The objective of the propulsion and energetic
materials research is to make weapons more lethal
by creating new explosives and propellents that will
be safe for Navy personnel to handle in shipboard
and aircraft environments. As more dense and highly
energized materials are created, the problems of
safety and stability become more critical. New
advances and breakthroughs in polymer sciences are
being pursued and achieved to meet this objective.
In the world of computer science research
A drag reduction concept for a submarine utilizing polymer
or microbubble injection through the hull.
N " V. '..' \- v .,.. >.".
Impacting directly and indirectly on the
design and performance of a wide variety of Navy
vehicles and weapons and, coincidentally, on the
nation as a whole, is mechanics research. Mechanics
research at ONR concentrates on three main areas:
fluid dynamics, structural mechanics, and
propulsion/energetic materials.
The Navy has essentially the sole
responsibility for ship research in this country. To
maintain and extend whatever technological lead it
has had in this area in the past, the Navy is
increasing its research in ship hydrodynamics.
The other foci in fluid dynamics research are
drag reduction and flow noise reduction for Navy
vehicles and weapons. Drag reduction is important
to increase the speed of platforms both to increase
their offensive capabilities and to enhance their
ability to survive attack through evasive measures.
Self-generated flow noise both limits the
performance of our acoustics sensors and increases
our detectability by hostile sensors. Therefore, it is
critical to eliminate or reduce the sources of self-
induced, flow-generated noise.
In drag reduction, we have fundamental
research in dilute polymer and microbubble
injection into turbulent boundary layers near the
surface of ships, submarines, and torpedoes. This
technique reduces turbulent skin friction drag and
thus permits higher speeds at the same power
output. Related techniques are equally effective for
suppression of self-generated noise.
some 30 years ago, ONR led the nation in computer
development and since then has contributed
significantly to the computer's further advancement.
Today, software is critical to virtually all naval
systems. It defines system capabilities, provides
control ("intelligence") and the flexibility to respond
to changing threats and requirements. Because of its
importance, software has been identified by the
Defense Science Board as a technology most likely
to provide dramatic improvement in future weapons
systems.
National security is dependent on information
gathering. Our Artificial Intelligence Program is
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New Navy Thrusts in Oceanography
(Oceanography as a whole is receiving special
attention at high Navy management levels. For
example, Secretary of the Navy John Lehman said
last year that "because of the explosive growth in
research and exploration in the world's oceans,
and the rapidly increasing dependence of U.S.
national security on the seas . . . it is now time for
a major reinvigoration of Navy efforts in
oceanography.
"
Admiral I. D. Watkins, USN, Chief of Naval
Operations, also signed an "Oceanography Policy
Statement" stating that the ocean, as the Navy's
unique operating environment, "must be
measured, studied and understood," and that the
Navy should "provide increasing support to the
most promising initiatives" in ocean science.
Secretary Lehman defined a 15-point
program with two major thrusts to execute his
"reinvigoration" concept. The first affects
academic research oceanography and includes
research funding increases, establishing Navy
research chairs in oceanography at selected
universities, increased Navy graduate research
fellowships, increased use of naval deep
submergence assets, such as the 6,000 meter
depth capability of Sea Cliff by academia, the
construction of a major new academic research
vessel, and development of a long-range
replacement plan for construction of research
vessels.
The second thrust is to strengthen the
utilization of oceanographic knowledge in naval
weapon systems procurement and to upgrade the
quality of oceanographic predictions provided to
the fleet. This includes strengthening the career
path and training support for oceanographers
designated naval officers, establishing an Institute
of Naval Oceanography with a focus on ocean
modeling, and enhancing the position of the
Oceanographer of the Navy with a direct
reporting chain to the Chief of Naval Operations.
The new oceanographic research vessel to
be used by the civilian academic research
community has a target completion date of 1991.
This major floating research lab will have the
speed and endurance to meet worldwide ocean
research and data collection requirements year-
round. It will be a state-of-the-art ship capable of
operating in moderately high seas. It will berth
about 30 scientists, and have combined deck and
laboratory space of more than 7,500 square feet.
While both SWATH (Small Waterplane Area Twin
Hull) and monohull designs are proposed, serious
consideration is being given to building a large
SWATH vessel.
The Navy is also actively involved in
demonstrating how manned space flight can
advance knowledge of the ocean. Paul Scully-
Powers, a civilian oceanographer with the Naval
Underwater Systems Center, flew onboard space
shuttle mission 41C in October, 1984. This was
viewed by the Navy as a major opportunity to be
shared by both the Navy and civilian
oceanographic research communities (see page
84).
Importantly, this flight demonstrated the
role of manned space flight in advancing our
knowledge of the ocean, while also emphasizing
the need for an ocean satellite system. Taken
together, manned space activity in oceanography
and existing environmental satellites complement
each other in important ways. Our space
oceanography efforts are continually giving us
new insights into the complex nature of the
ocean (see page 22).
Our space oceanographic efforts are
revolutionizing ocean science for both the civilian
and Navy research communities and serve to
demonstrate the importance of the Navy's role in
space to exploit our unique operating
environment to strategic and tactical advantage.
IBM
developing computerized natural language
techniques for summarizing narratives, such as
newspaper reports. These can be helpful in
detecting patterns either within individual
documents or through an accumulation of
documents gathered over time. The ability to detect
such patterns in great masses of documents is
important to intelligence techniques.
An artificial intelligence system known as an
expert system can provide advice and problem
solving skills relative to military decision making,
crisis alerting, and maintenance of weapon systems.
Basic research is being done to expand on such a
system's capabilities. It is likely that in the future,
military decision making will have to be supported
by networks of many such expert systems working
cooperatively. Our objective in this area is to
determine how to design expert systems that will
function well in such a dispersed environment.
Basic research intended to improve the expert
system and natural language system capabilities
mentioned previously is directed at the fundamental
issues of knowledge representation and automated
reasoning. Research in knowledge representation
seeks to determine how best to express and organize
information within the computer. Research in
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automated reasoning seeks to determine how that
information can be manipulated in order to both
duplicate and extend human capabilities for
deductive reasoning, inductive reasoning, reasoning
by analogy, and common sense.
Progress in producing intelligent aids to
human decision making will lead to designing
intelligent robots. Such robots with autonomous
capabilities for reasoning and navigation and
manipulation have the potential to be deployed in
almost any environment. Specific missions related to
national security could include surveillance, search,
and recovery.
Life Sciences
As the Navy becomes more dependent on high
technology, its men and women will perform within
increasingly complex and challenging environments.
One research focal point is on computer-assisted
instruction to make the Navy's training programs
more efficient and effective.
Tactical decision-making research is a
program designed to develop scientific models to
measure decision-making effectiveness in command
control environments where one set of decisions
impact on a complex array of other problems,
related to such elements as space, resources, and
information.
On the biological scene, through a special
immunological defense program, researchers hope
to learn how to enhance the response of the
immune system. Such natural biological defenses are
needed to protect Navy and Marine Corps personnel
against agents that may be used in chemical or
biological warfare, natural infectious agents, toxins,
and other noxious materials that may be
encountered in operational environments.
Related research is studying the complex
interactions between the brain and the immune
system to understand how environmental and
emotional stresses affect the health and performance
of not just Navy and Marine Corps personnel but
everyone in general.
Educating Scientists and Engineers
As the last half of the 1980s approaches, the Navy's
research and development momentum is increasing
in the face of Soviet developments. But caution
should remain the order of the day. The U.S.
qualitative advantage should not be taken lightly.
Needs remain to produce not only the best
technological Navy in the world, but to provide the
means to develop new legions of young scientists to
join and follow after those who have made the U.S.
Navy second to none.
ONR strives to enhance scientific
development in several ways, in addition to direct
university research support. Following are ONR-
supported programs that tie the Navy's R&D efforts
to academia and directly or indirectly contribute to
the development of scientists and engineers:
Navy Science Awards Program: High school
students across the nation who exhibit projects at
regional and state science and engineering fairs are
eligible to compete for Navy-sponsored college
scholarships ranging from $1,000 to $10,000 as well
as other awards, including trips to Navy laboratories
and to an international science-oriented gathering in
London.
ONR Young Investigator Program: This new
program supports young independent academic
researchers who received their Ph.D.s (or equivalent)
after January 1, 1980. The basic research support
award is $50,000 a year for three years with the
possibility of greater support through matching
funds.
U.S. Navy Summer Faculty Research Program:
Science and engineering faculty members from U.S.
universities spend 10 weeks at Navy research and
development centers working with professional
peers on research tasks of mutual interest.
ONR Graduate Fellowship Program: The
purpose of this program is to increase the supply of
Ph.D. -trained U.S. citizens in disciplines of science
and engineering critical to the Navy. In particular,
this program increases the pool of scientists and
engineers available for potential employment by
Navy laboratories. At present, ONR is supporting
106 fellows in nine disciplines. Each fellowship is
awarded for three years.
ONR "Bridges" Program: This new program
involves senior university faculty and their graduate
students in research activities of interest and
importance to Navy labs in areas of strong national
interest. It provides a structured setting to encourage
cooperation among ONR contractors and the labs.
SECNAV Research Chairs in Oceanography:
The Navy expects this year to create oceanography
chairs at three universities to stimulate and broaden
the oceanography scientific pool and strengthen and
retain the best scientists to work on Navy problems.
Up to now, the only chairs in support of Navy
oceanographic research have been two at the Naval
Postgraduate School (Arctic Science and Underwater
Acoustics) and one at the U.S. Naval Academy
(Remote Sensing).
Selected Research Opportunities (SRO)
Program: The SRO Program is designed to improve
national defense over the long term by involving the
academic research community in selected
fundamental research areas, and by fostering
stronger linkages between this community and the
Navy. Contracts are awarded to universities for up to
three years.
Bunting Institute Program: The Mary
Ingraham Bunting Institute at Radcliffe College
provides opportunities for women to advance their
careers in many of the humanities, arts, and
sciences. ONR has for the last few years supported
science scholarships there. During a one- or two-
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>Flow visualization using reactant dyes to investigate the turbulent structure of disturbed and undisturbed mixing layers.
(U.S. Navy photo)
year fellowship, the science scholars work at one of
the universities in the greater Boston area, often
reestablishing themselves in their discipline and
leading to career advancement. Sixteen Bunting
Science Scholars have completed their fellowships
with ONR support.
ONR Objective: National Security
As the scope of the nation's scientists and engineers
expands through such educational programs, so
expands the significance of the Office of Naval
Research as a major focal point in the world for basic
scientific research. ONR enhances U.S. national
security in its broadest, most comprehensive sense.
That enhancement translates to strength in the
national economy, international commerce, and
military defense through advancements in
mathematical modeling, through improvements in
materials and engineering evolution, and through
better understanding of communications and the
environments that surround us.
Science and technology provide the ideas and
the hardware that make these strengths renewable
and capable of sustaining national security. ONR
continues to work at building technologies necessary
to maintain and protect our national security well
into the next century and beyond.
Rear Admiral I. B. Mooney, Ir., is the 15th naval officer to be
designated Chief of Naval Research, a Presidential
appointment. Formerly Oceanographer of the Navy, he holds
the distinction of being the fifth person to qualify as a
Hydronaut (Deep Submergence Vehicle Operator) in the
Navy. He was at the controls of the Trieste II when, in 1964,
it located the hull of the sunken submarine U.S.S. Thresher
on (he floor of the Atlantic at a depth of 8,500 feet. In 1980,
he completed an Executive Program in National and
International Security at Harvard University.
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The Navy's
Mission
in Space
The Vanguard I satellite rises from the first complete satellite-
launching facility at Cape Canaveral. (U.S. Navy photo)
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by Peter A. Mitchell
I he U.S. Navy's present missions sea control,
projection of U.S. power worldwide, establishment
of a political presence through deployment of the
fleet, and strategic deterrence are essential to our
national security. To support such global
commitments requires that our ships and submarines
be able to navigate throughout the world. Similarly,
control of a global navy requires secure, reliable
communications. Today, the U.S. Navy relies on
navigational and communications satellites to
provide these essential services.
Perhaps still more importantly, we are in an
age of rapid technological advances in weapon
systems, tactics, and detection of the enemy. To
make effective use of these sophisticated
technologies and at the same time nurture strong
research and development programs, knowledge of
the environment becomes increasingly important in
all aspects of naval operations. This knowledge is
being provided largely by satellites.
The nucleus of this age of electronic
navigation, communication, and sensing of the
environment was created in the late 1940s and
1950s by the U.S. Navy.
Early Efforts
In October of 1955, the U.S. Navy, through its Naval
Research Laboratory (NRL) in Washington, D.C., was
delegated the responsibility to build, launch, and
place into Earth-orbit an artificial satellite carrying a
scientific experiment. The program was dubbed
Project Vanguard, and was a continuation of an NRL
program started after World War II that used
instrumented German V-2 rockets to probe high into
the Earth's upper atmosphere.
As the supply of V-2 rockets dwindled, NRL
began development of a new, large, liquid-propelled
rocket, the Viking. Twelve Vikings were launched by
NRL between 1949 and 1954, establishing many
milestones: first measurements of temperature,
pressure, and winds in the upper atmosphere; first
measurements of the electron density in the
ionosphere; first records of the ultraviolet spectra of
the sun; and first high-altitude (approximately 100
The first high-altitude picture of a hurricane was taken in October of 1 954 from an NRL Viking rocket. Although shown here in
black and white, this was the first color photograph successfully taken from such altitudes, and initiated the interest of the
weather service in high-altitude weather reconnaissance. (U.S. Navy photo)
miles) photographs of the Earth (in both black and
white and color).
After the Naval Research Laboratory was
selected for Project Vanguard, the laboratory, with
the aid of a contractor, began development of a 3-
stage launch vehicle patterned after its successful
Viking rocket. This new series of rocket later became
the basis for the design and fabrication of such
launch vehicles as the reliable Delta series, which
was used extensively by the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA) for many
communication, meteorological, and scientific
satellites. With no suitable satellite launching
facilities available, NRL constructed the first
complete facility at Cape Canaveral, Florida. Since a
suitable satellite tracking system did not exist, NRL
developed the world's first satellite-tracking system
(called "Minitrack") in 1956.
The Vanguard-l satellite was successfully
launched into Earth orbit on March 17, 1958.
Although it was not the first U.S. satellite successfully
launched (the Explorer satellite was placed into orbit
on January 31, 1958), Vanguard-l attained the
highest altitude of any man-made vehicle to that
time. It still orbits the Earth today and will remain in
orbit well into the 22nd century. Soon after launch of
Vanguard-l, NASA was created (July 1958) and
Project Vanguard along with some of its personnel
was transferred to the new agency. The project
became the core of NASA's space flight activities.
Vanguard-l I was placed into orbit on February
17, 1959, and was the first satellite designed to
observe and record the cloud cover of the Earth. As
such Vanguard II was the forerunner of future
meteorological satellites. Vanguard-Ill, the last of this
series, was successfully placed into Earth orbit on
September 18, 1959.
Sufficient personnel from Project Vanguard
remained at NRL to develop a naval satellite
program. This program grew throughout the 1960s,
1970s, and 1980s, and developed navigational and
environmental satellites for scientific purposes,
military intelligence, and to assist with the Navy's
operations.
Navigational Satellites
Modern navigation is said to have started with the
three epic voyages of Captain James Cook to the
Pacific Ocean between 1 768 and 1 799. With the
first reliable chronometers (time pieces designed to
keep time with great accuracy), nautical almanacs,
adequate charts and map projections, and the first
reliable compasses (along with an understanding of
magnetic variation), Cook and his contemporaries
were able to accurately determine their latitude and
longitude and fix their position on the high seas.
The next great leap in the field of navigation
came with the application of electronics. In 1904,
the transmission of radio time signals permitted the
mariner to check his chronometer at sea. Radio
broadcasts, beginning in 1907, provided navigational
warnings of foul weather, icebergs in northern
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shipping lanes, and submerged hazards. During the
decade prior to World War II, work on early
television and cosmic counting devices allowed the
development of radio aids to navigation based on
the time of transmission of radio signals from three
or four different transmitting stations. If these signals
are closely synchronized, the difference in
transmission times would establish a position fix. This
work in turn led to the development of the radio
navigation systems in use today such as Loran-C,
Omega, and the Decca Navigation Systems, which
provide reliable reception at distances ranging from
300 to 1,200 miles.
With the arrival of the space age, it became
possible to provide an accurate worldwide
navigation system for all naval surface vessels,
aircraft, and submarines. Scientists at the Applied
Physics Laboratory (APL) of Johns Hopkins University
discovered the fundamental concept of such a
system when they were monitoring the beeps being
transmitted by the Soviet Union's Sputnik I in 1957.
As they monitored Sputnik's signals, the scientists
found that the change in the signals' frequency as
the satellite moved toward or away from them
(Doppler effect) could be used to describe the
satellite's orbit. They then concluded that, inversely,
if the satellite's orbit was well known, the Doppler
effect could be used to determine one's position on
Earth. Based on API's work, in April 1960 a
prototype navigation satellite was successfully
launched and demonstrated its operational potential
by providing navigational fixes to within a quarter of
a mile. A second prototype satellite was launched in
June of 1960.
By the beginning of 1964, a complete satellite
navigation system, known as the Navy Navigation
Satellite System (NAVSAT) or Transit, was providing
Navy operators with global two-dimensional
positional information with an accuracy of better
than a tenth of a nautical mile. Conception and
development of the Transit System were
orchestrated by the APL, but the daily operation of
the system was placed under the control of the U.S.
Navy Astronautics Group located at Point Mugu,
California. The Transit System was developed by the
Navy primarily to provide accurate position
information for its Polaris submarine forces.
Today, the Transit system consists of a
constellation of polar-orbiting satellites (a minimum
of four satellites is needed for system operation) at
altitudes of between 450 and 700 nautical miles; it
still meets its objective of providing continuous
global coverage under all weather conditions to both
U.S. ballistic missile submarines and naval surface
ships. Many foreign countries, especially those of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), use
Transit information for the navigation of their military
forces. Other U.S. government agencies, such as the
Defense Mapping Agency, use this information for
precise geodetic surveying.
In 1967, the Navy released information to the
public about the satellite message parameters,
procedures needed to calculate a position, and the
detailed technical specifications needed for the
fabrication of a receiver capable of obtaining data
from the Transit satellites, opening this global
navigation system (at the time, the only one in
existence) to the worldwide maritime community.
Since then, the interest of the private and
commercial sectors in the system has grown
substantially. Non-military users of the Transit system
include: commercial fishing vessels, private pleasure
vessels, commercial shipping companies, offshore oil
drilling companies, and oceanographic and
hydrographic (dedicated to charting waters) research
vessels.
Time has been important in navigation from
the earliest chronometer design to the present. To
improve the accuracy of the data from satellite
navigation systems, NRL embarked on a program in
1964 to develop high-precision timing devices
necessary for use with a passive ranging system. The
project was called TIMATION, for TIMe
navigATION, and was an outgrowth of the Applied
Physics Laboratory's effort to develop practical
methods to track satellites by measuring distances
through the use of synchronized receivers and
transmitters. The first satellite of the program
(Timation-l) was launched by NRL in May of 1967
and demonstrated that a surface vessel could be
positioned to within two-tenths of a nautical mile
and an aircraft to within three-tenths of a nautical
mile using range measurements from a time-
synchronized satellite. Timation-ll, featuring a two-
frequency ranging system (to compensate for the
bending of radio waves as they pass through the
ionosphere) and an improved clock, was launched
two years later into a nearly identical orbit. Results
from these two experiments led to further
improvements in satellite timing devices and
demonstrated that it might be possible to design a
satellite system that could give positions
continuously in three dimensions using range
measurements. NRL's Timation program was merged
in 1973 with a U.S. Air Force project that was
investigating similar techniques.
From this merger, the NAVSTAR or Global
Positioning System (GPS) Project was created; it will
eventually replace the Transit system. From 1978
through 1984 several prototype NAVSTAR/GPS
navigation satellites have been placed into orbit (at
this writing there are five) for concept validation
testing and have demonstrated that a passive radio-
navigation system can provide very accurate
positional and time information continuously in three
dimensions on a global basis.
When fully operational at the end of this
decade, NAVSTAR/GPS will consist of an 18-satellite
constellation, and its primary objective (as with the
Transit system) will be to support the Navy's Fleet
Ballistic Missile Program. The user community will
again include civilian as well as military users, but
data available only to the military will allow much
more precise positional information.
The GPS system is being developed by a
joint management team whose members include
personnel from the Navy, Air Force, Army, Defense
Mapping Agency, Department of Transportation, and
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It is currently
planned that GPS will be operational for five years
before Transit is entirely phased out in the mid-
1990s.
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Communications Satellites
With segments of our naval fleet located in all the
major oceans of the world, communication links are
essential not only for day-to-day operations but also
to insure a quick response during international crises.
Since its very beginning in 1923, NRL has conducted
the Navy's principal in-house research program in
radio communication. The programs and
achievements attained at NRL in the areas of very
low frequency (VLF), high frequency (HF), very high
frequency (VHP), ultra high frequency (UHF), and
super high frequency communications (SHF) are too
numerous to list here; however, the Navy also has
conducted pioneering work in satellite
communication.
During the 1920s, the Naval Research
Laboratory determined the frequency above which
radio waves could penetrate the Earth's atmosphere
and propagate through the vacuum of space. It was
not until 1949, however, that NRL demonstrated that
radio signals originating on Earth could be beamed
into space and returned from an orbiting satellite. At
that point in time the only orbiting satellite available
for this feat was the one that has always brightened
the night sky, the moon. In July of 1954, NRL
accomplished the first round-trip transmission of a
human voice to the moon and back. This was
quickly followed by the first demonstration by NRL
of transcontinental and transoceanic satellite
communication (via the moon) in 1955 and 1956,
respectively. In January of 1960, the Navy publicly
demonstrated the world's first operational satellite
communication system when messages were
exchanged between the Chief of Naval Operations
in Washington, D.C., and the Commander-ln-Chief
of the Pacific Fleet at Oahu, Hawaii, through the
moon relay system. The first transmission of pictures
via this system also was demonstrated at that time.
With the launch of the ECHO-I satellite (a 100-foot-
diameter, aluminum-coated, plastic sphere) in
August of 1960, the Navy showed that
communication signals could be relayed through a
passive, Earth-orbiting satellite. Further work on the
moon relay communication program demonstrated
the feasibility of one-way shore-to-ship
communication in 1961, and two-way
communication in 1962, thereby establishing the first
operational worldwide satellite communication
system.
In parallel with work on its moon relay
communications program, the Navy, through NRL,
proposed a research and development program
directed at using satellites acting as transponders* to
relay communications over long distances. A Joint
Navy, NASA, and Army project was established to
develop this technology in 1962. NASA developed
the satellite, the Army provided the ground
terminals, and the Navy supplied a ship equipped
with an experimental ship terminal. Using NASA's
SYNCOM-I (Synchronous Communication) satellite,
which was launched in February 1963, a Navy ship
(U.S.S. Kingsport) became the first ship to transmit
and receive a voice message via an active satellite. A
total of three SYNCOM satellites was launched in
1963 and 1964; they were used extensively (along
with later satellites developed by the Air Force) by
the Navy to develop the necessary operational
equipment (antennas, shipboard and ground satellite
terminals, and so on) and to insure that
communication satellites being developed would be
adequate to meet the Navy's operational
requirements.
Today, space-based, naval communication
systems permit the automatic transmission of naval
communications worldwide (between the latitudes
of 70 degrees North and 70 degrees South) via an
extensive array of satellites. The Navy Satellite
Communication (SATCOM) System provides
communication links between surface ships,
submarines, aircraft, and the shore. In 1976, three
communication satellites were placed into geo-
synchronous* orbit over the Atlantic, Pacific, and
Indian Oceans. These satellites, called GAPFILLER by
the Navy, were procured and are managed by the
Communication Satellite General Corporation
(COMSAT). The Navy has leased three UHF
channels on these satellites through 1985. A second
operational communication satellite system is also in
use with four satellites in geo-synchronous orbit over
the continental United States and the Atlantic,
Pacific, and Indian Oceans. This second system is
known as the Fleet Satellite Communication
(FLTSATCOM) System.
The next generation of communication
satellites to be used by the Navy will also be on a
leased basis. This system is known as LEASAT and
will serve as a replacement for the GAPFILLER
satellites currently in orbit. In August and November
of 1984, the first two of a planned system of four
LEASAT satellites were placed into orbit from the
space shuttle and are presently undergoing testing.
The remaining two satellites will be in place by 1986.
Environmental Satellites
The ships and aircraft of our modern naval forces
travel through an ocean of air and on a sea of water.
Their travel and the tactics used are greatly
influenced by the ever-changing natures of the
ocean and atmosphere. Knowledge of the
environment in which our fleet operates never
before has been so vital to the fleet's safety and
choice of operating tactics. Amphibious and
antisubmarine warfare, search and rescue, and
salvage operations particularly benefit from this
knowledge.
Navy operations require, as a minimum:
tactical weather forecasts for ship-routing and aircraft
operations; forecasts of sound propagation
*
Transponders receive a signal and then retransmit it to
another transponder or the final receiving station. Since it is
constantly being renewed, the signal can remain quite
strong over long distances. Satellites functioning as
transponders are called active satellites.
*
In a geo-synchronous or geo-stationary orbit, a satellite
revolves around the Earth in the same direction as the
Earth's rotation once each day. Thus a satellite in such an
orbit appears to remain stationary above a single point on
the Earth.
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parameters for antisubmarine warfare; forecasts of
tides, waves, and currents for mine laying and
sweeping operations, as well as for search and
rescue missions; and ice forecasts for both surface
and subsurface navigation.
Immediately after World War II, naval warfare
technologies (developed out of necessity to defeat
two strong enemies) were rapidly improved. Soon
very complex surface and subsurface weapon
systems, sensors, platforms, and corresponding
tactics* were added to the Navy's arsenal. For these,
new hardware and tactics to perform their tasks
effectively, whether located in relatively shallow
coastal waters, in the deepest ocean basins, or on or
within ice-covered polar waters, accurate and
immediate knowledge of the environment is
needed. The Navy also recognized the need of the
platform and weapon systems designers for a clear
understanding of the environmental parameters that
affect the performance of their creations.
With the increasing use of aircraft in naval
operations, it became possible for the naval tactician
to expand his knowledge of the environment, from
that small portion which could be seen from a ship's
bridge or measured by instruments lowered over the
side, to very broad expanses of the ocean. It also
meant that the mariner needed information not only
concerning the state of the surrounding ocean but
also concerning the state of the atmosphere in his
operating area. As with the technologies developed
in spaceborne navigation and communication
satellites, many of the advances in instrumentation
made in airborne remote sensing were refined and
applied to sensors on satellites. These satellites
extend the mariner's vision to encompass entire
oceans (Table 1).
The value of imagery from space was evident
from the first photographs taken at high altitudes by
cameras on the Navy's Viking rockets in the early
1950s. The first environmental satellite (TIROS-I),
with television and infrared sensors on board, was
placed into Earth orbit in April 1960 by NASA for the
National Weather Service. This meterological
satellite returned to Earth images of constantly
changing cloud and storm systems, ice moving
through the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and of snow
accumulation. When it was demonstrated from these
early images that the white tones of clouds could be
distinguished from those of snow and ice, the
science of spaceborne oceanography was born. This
fledgling science was further nourished when
astronauts on board the Project Mercury and Gemini
missions returned to Earth with photographs showing
never before seen perspectives of extensive areas of
the world's oceans. (At this point we cannot discuss
the Navy's role in space without a mention of the
fact that the first American in space, Captain Alan B.
Shepard, Jr., was a naval aviator.)
Even before spaceborne oceanography
became a reality, physical oceanographers proved
*
Weapon systems actually launch and deliver explosives to
enemy targets; they include guns, missiles and missile
launchers, torpedoes, and the like. Platforms carry weapon
systems to the scene of battle; they include ships,
submarines, and aircraft.
the importance to naval operations and tactics of
environmental parameters, such as sea-surface and
subsurface temperature gradients, winds, sea states,
currents, oceanic fronts and eddies, and the location
and extent of sea ice.
With no dedicated spacecraft of its own
during the early years of satellite oceanography, the
Navy exploited the ocean measurements made by
both experimental and operational global weather
satellites developed by NASA and the National
'
Weather Service, respectively. Even though
measurements of oceanic data were not the primary
objective of these satellite missions (meteorological
measurements were paramount), valuable
information was received and used for operational
missions, and research and development. With the
development and testing of sensors operating
outside the visible portions of the spectrum and
extending into the infrared, a whole new way of
looking at the oceans emerged and became standard
equipment on subsequent environmental satellites.
Other satellites in the TIROS series and the
ESSA I and II satellites were launched between 1963
and 1966. These carried uncalibrated, low-
resolution, visible and infrared detection systems.
Data from these systems were used by Navy sea ice
forecasters to improve and verify their forecasts.
These satellites enabled the relay of information
concerning the location, extent, and movement of
sea ice to Coast Guard ice breakers and resupply
ships navigating in the Arctic and Antarctic.
The next generation of environmental
satellites was developed in the early 1970s and
included the Improved TIROS Operational Satellites
(ITOS) and the Defense Meteorological Satellite
Program (DMSP). The rudimentary sensors of the
previous generation were replaced by calibrated,
scanning, high-resolution radiometers. It then
became feasible for the naval oceanographer to
process the infrared data differently from the
meteorologist and make quantative measurements of
sea-surface temperatures. With these new
measurements, it became possible to delineate
thermal patterns on the ocean surface that were
characteristic of oceanic fronts and eddies
Table 1. Operational and experimental satellites used by the U.S.
Navy for ocean monitoring.
Satellite
IWH
Space-borne environmental sensors support many elements of U.S. naval t'occes.
invaluable to the Navy researcher working on
antisubmarine warfare. From this early data,
mathematical models useful in antisubmarine
warfare were developed and tested by collecting
ground-truth data coincident with remotely sensed
data.
Modern naval remote sensing programs from
their inception have received a major impetus from
the Office of Naval Research (ONR); even the term
remote sensing was coined at ONR in the early
1960s. The first remote sensing symposium was
sponsored by ONR at the University of Michigan's
Willow Run Laboratories in February 1962. Since
then, these yearly symposia have become
international in scope, attended by hundreds of
scientists from all over the globe.
In the early 1970s, ONR assumed a leadership
role in spaceborne oceanography by commissioning
the U.S. Naval Oceanographic Office to perform a
study of coastal oceanographic processes with
DMSP imagery. This study provided near real-time
information on the position and structure of sea-
surface temperature gradients, as well as a means of
estimating temperature differences between water
masses.
The DMSP program was developed by the Air
Force in the early 1970s to provide weather data to
its forces in Southeast Asia. It is presently a joint
armed forces program that is managed by the Air
Force with naval liaison officers stationed at the
central DMSP sites. Its complement of environmental
sensors includes a scanning visible/infrared
radiometer and a vertical atmospheric temperature
profiler on board two polar-orbiting satellites. The
system can directly transmit data in digital form on a
daily basis to tactical receiving sites, some of which
are on aircraft carriers. Many others are transportable
and can be deployed to U.S. Navy and Marine Corps
facilities or operating areas within hours.
Through the early 1970s, the satellite sensors
and systems developed had as their primary mission
the study of meteorological phenomena. However,
that began to change as interest in the measurement
of oceanographic parameters grew in both the
military and civilian commercial sectors. New sensors
to concentrate on oceanic parameters were rapidly
developed. For example, sensors designed to collect
data in the microwave (beyond the infrared) region
of the spectrum were used to measure both
meteorological and oceanographic parameters.
These sensors were flown between 1972 and 1975
on NASA's experimental satellites, such as NIMBUS
5 and 6. Unlike infrared radiometers, these sensors
could map the ocean surface through cloud cover.
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With such data, naval sea-ice forecasters
could map the extent, concentration, and type of ice
at the poles despite the extensive perennial cloud
cover day or night. With the Arctic region
developing into an important strategic area in this
day of missile-carrying submarines, this capability
became vital to our defense strategy.
These new sensors also could determine
atmospheric temperature profiles and atmospheric
water content. Such information is used in numerical
weather forcasting models being developed for (and
in use at) naval facilities, such as the Fleet Numerical
Oceanography Center (FNOC) in Monterey,
California.
The technologies developed for these early
microwave radiometers were applied to the
development of a new microwave sensor, the
Scanning Multichannel Microwave Radiometer
(SMMR). This sensor was added to the suite of
experimental sensors of NIMBUS 7, launched in
October 1978. Thus, NIMBUS 7 could measure not
only the parameters mentioned above but also two
very important parameters to oceanographers, sea-
surface temperatures and near-surface winds.
Technology from the experimental SMMR has
been applied to an operational imager soon to be
flown on a DMSP satellite. This sensor, the Mission
Sensor Microwave Imager (SSM/I) is being
developed jointly by the Navy Space Systems
Activity, the Naval Research Laboratory, and the Air
Force Space Division as an all-weather
oceanographic and meteorological sensor. Data from
the SSM/I will be processed by the FNOC to obtain
precipitation maps, sea-ice morphology, sea-surface
wind speed, atmospheric liquid water, and soil
moisture percentages.
In the early 1970s, a parallel program was
initiated to exploit different types of microwave
sensors. All of the sensors described previously are
known as passive sensors: ones that measure the
natural radiation emanating from the objects being
observed. These new sensors were active they
would send out signals and then measure the
returning signals, or echos, from the objects under
investigation. The first of these sensors, a
combination microwave radiometer/active radar
scatterometer and active radar altimeter instrument,*
was flown from May 1973 to February 1974 on the
manned space station, SKYLAB, from which
astronauts (two-thirds of whom were Navy
Department officers) conducted the first
experiments in gathering oceanic data using
microwave sensors.
The radiometer/scatterometer sensor data
demonstrated that passive microwave radiometric
temperatures could be used to correct for the errors
* A microwave radiometer measures the intensity of the
electromagnetic energy that an object radiates in the
microwave region of the spectrum. A radar scatterometer
measures the roughness of the sea surface, from which the
direction and magnitude of the wind can be determined. A
radar altimeter precisely measures the distance from a
satellite to the surface of the earth, and can be used to map
the true shape of the globe (or geoid).
introduced by the intervening atmosphere and that
the scatterometer backscatter measurements, after
correction, could be used to determine wind speed
and direction over the ocean. On SKYLAB, a second
microwave radiometer verified theoretical
relationships between its measurements and the
oceanic parameters of salinity, surface wind, and
sea-surface temperature.
Data from SKYLAB demonstrated that the
Earth's geoid could be measured from spacecraft
altitudes. From the data, oceanographers could infer
information vital to naval tactics concerning ocean
fronts, currents, and eddies. An accurate geoid is
becoming increasingly vital in the targeting of
ballistic missiles and in the production of accurate
maps and related charts. The SKYLAB altimeter also
could measure wind speed and wave heights.
Although the altimeter was designed for ocean
observations, scientists at NRL analyzed the signals
returned from terrain features and established the
altimeter's capability to characterize different types
of terrain from spacecraft altitudes.
Success of this prototype altimeter led to the
launch of a second altimeter on board the GEOS-3
satellite in April 1975, and produced the first
extensive operational measurements of geodetic and
oceanographic parameters. An improved altimeter
was designed and placed into orbit on board the
SEASAT satellite in June 1978. This altimeter
performed its mission outstandingly by measuring
distance to the Earth's surface to a precision of less
than 10 centimeters. It provided global observations
of sea bottom topographic features, thereby
contributing to the accurate mapping of underwater
features necessary for subsurface navigation. Success
with the altimeters from SKYLAB, GEOS-3, and
SEASAT led to a Navy altimetry mission, GEOSAT.
The GEOSAT satellite was launched on March 12,
1985, and carries only one sensor a radar altimeter.
Its primary mission is to derive an accurate geoid in
support of the U.S. submarine ballistic missile
program. A secondary mission will be to use this data
to obtain environmental information on waves,
winds, currents, fronts, eddies, and sea ice, and
other phenomena.
The SEASAT satellite mentioned previously
was the first environmental spacecraft dedicated
exclusively to the all weather measurement of
oceanographic parameters by microwave sensors.
Along with the altimeter, its sensor complement
included a scatterometer, radiometer, and a
synthetic aperture radar (SAR)* (see Oceanus, Vol.
24, No. 3, Oceanography from Space).
Although, as the result of a massive power
failure, the SEASAT mission lasted only a little more
than 100 days, all of the microwave sensors
performed within specifications or better and
* To obtain high resolution imagery from space with
conventional radar would require an extremely large
antenna due to the distances involved. A SAR uses the
motion of the spacecraft to form a "synthetically" long
antenna by recording data over a period of time.
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\ visible light image taken by a satellite of sea ice in the
lering and Chukchi Seas. (Photo courtesy of NOAA)
An image of pack ice in the Beaufort Sea from the synthetic
aperture radar aboard the SEASAT satellite. (Photo courtesy of
the let Propulsion Laboratory)
provided a wealth of data to both military and
civilian oceanographers. The extensive analyses of
the SEASAT data sets conclusively demonstrated that
^ital oceanographic parameters could be measured
by microwave sensors from space.
No data set excited the oceanographic
community more than that of the SAR, which
produced imagery at resolutions comparable to
those of optical systems. Until pioneering SAR work
at NRL between 1973 and 1975, there was much
concern that SAR, although enjoying great success in
imaging terrain features, would not work well when
imaging the ocean surface. The SAR not only imaged
expected oceanic parameters, such as waves
(surface and internal), boundaries of major currents,
Gulf Stream eddies, and along shore currents, but
also imaged some that were not expected. One of
the most interesting of these was the imaging of
patterns on the ocean surface that correlated with
sea-floor topography. With this capability, the Navy
now possesses a new hydrographic surveying tool
useful in locating and positioning uncharted or
mischarted hazards to navigation and for updating
nautical charts. During the 1970s, NASA and the
Defense Mapping Agency also demonstrated that
another on-going satellite series, LANDSAT (which
was designed to study agricultural and geological
features over land) could be useful in the study of
shallow water bathymetry. Data from this high-
resolution optical system are presently being used to
locate and chart worldwide hazards to navigation.
In the late 1970s, as rapid advances in
spacecraft oceanography were being made
(especially with the then planned launch of SEASAT),
the Navy formulated the Navy Environmental
Remote Sensing Program (NERSP). It had become
evident that conventional measurements from ship
and airborne instruments were insufficient to provide
timely and accurate global oceanic environmental
data and forecasts in support of our naval forces. As
part of NERSP the Navy was directed by the CNO to
prepare a statement of operational requirements
needed for each of the Navy's primary mission areas.
These requirements were reviewed and certified by
the CNO, and early in 1977, a Navy Satellite
Measurement of Oceanographic Parameters
Operational Requirement (SMOP-OR) was formally
established (Table 2).
Based on the requirements of the SMOP-OR,
and following the success of SEASAT, the Navy in
concert with NASA and NOAA proposed a follow-on
oceanographic satellite to SEASAT. This satellite was
designed to carry sensors that would, in conjunction
with dedicated ground control and data processing
systems, insure the delivery of remotely sensed data
to meet the operational requirements of the fleet.
This proposed follow-on was called the National
Oceanic Satellite System (NOSS). A radar altimeter,
Table 2. Satellite measurements of oceanographic parameters
operational requirements (SMPO-OR).
Parameters
Horizontal
Resolution* Accuracy*
Surface-wind
Speed
Direction
microwave radiometer, radar scatterometer and a
visible and infrared color scanner would measure
global winds, waves, sea-surface temperatures, sea
ice, and oceanic chlorophyll concentrations.
Unfortunately, the price tag for NOSS was too large,
and it was cancelled.
However, since the need to satisfy the
operational requirements still existed, the Navy went
back to the drawing board, cut costs, and proposed
the Navy Remote Ocean Sensing System (N-ROSS)
satellite. This satellite was to carry four microwave
sensors (a radar altimeter, a radar scatterometer, a
microwave imager, and a microwave radiometer) to
measure wind speed and direction, wave heights,
geoid, sea ice, precipitation, and sea-surface
temperatures. The N-ROSS program was approved
and is now scheduled to be launched in 1990. As
presently planned, the N-ROSS will fulfill the
requirements laid out in the SMOP-OR. N-ROSS-II is
already on the drawing board, with the addition of a
SAR to its sensor payload being considered.
Naval Remote Sensing Community
The data collected through the various
environmental satellites is useless unless it reaches
those who need it. To this end, the Navy remote
sensing community is organized under the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Research, Engineering, and
Systems into three distinct commands: 1) the Chief
of Naval Research (CNR), who oversees basic
research in remote sensing and ocean science (see
page 12); 2) the Chief of Naval Development, who
tests applicable basic research results through field
experiments or in the laboratory; and 3) the Chief of
Naval Operations (CNO), who supervises the
transition from experimental results to operational
systems. Since the Navy is the largest tactical user of
space-based systems, the Naval Space Command
was established in 1983 under the CNO. The
Command's principal mission is to provide direct
space systems support to the Navy worldwide. A
Naval Space Technology Center was established this
spring at the Naval Research Laboratory to preserve
and enhance the Navy's strong space technology
base and provide expert assistance in developing
and acquiring space systems that support the Navy's
missions.
Space-Science
With complex navigation and communication
satellites orbiting the Earth and manned spacecraft a
common occurrence, the Navy recognized the need
not only to look down at the Earth but to look up
and out into space to measure its environment as
well. Our sun is frequently beset with storms that
hurl large volumes of gas and electric energy fields
into space. When directed toward Earth, these
phenomena can cause communications blackouts
and are a potential source of danger to man as he
works outside the protective envelope of the Earth's
atmosphere.
The Navy's Solar Radiation (SOLRAD) satellite
is an example of a space-science program developed
to keep the Department of Defense's (DoD's)
worldwide communication links open. SOLRAD was
conceived late in the 1950s at NRL and was
designed to continuously monitor all aspects of the
sun's activity. Special attention was given to the
effects of radiation on the ionosphere, which had
critical importance to communications. Armed with
SOLRAD information, DoD communicators were
able to select those radio frequencies that allowed
them to best avoid solar interference. SOLRAD was
the nation's longest continuing series of satellite
projects dedicated to a specific research program,
with satellites launched between 1960 and 1976.
Presently, solar data are being supplied to DoD users
through the NOAA geostationery meteorological
satellite series.
Through its continuing work in space
research, the Navy has played a major role in the
field of space-science research since the 1940s. The
Navy's role in solar and stellar physics enables it to
provide much expertise for the space-science
programs being carried out by other government
agencies, such as NASA.
The Future
With extensive expansion planned for the U.S. fleet
and with today's naval warfare scenarios becoming
more and more complex, the Navy will need to
maintain a role in space for many years to come.
It has been 25 years since the first visual
observations of the oceans were made from a
satellite in Earth orbit, and during the intervening
years the Navy has depended primarily on
operational and experimental meteorological
satellites (which were designed to observe clouds,
not through clouds) for oceanic environmental data.
The design and development of multi-sensor, all-
weather satellites, such as N-ROSS, will ensure the
collection of the vitally needed oceanographic data
that will not be available from any other planned
U.S. remote sensing program.
Although no one sensor or satellite system will
provide all the data needed by both operational
commanders and research scientists, the data from
N-ROSS, combined with data from the DMSP and
civilian meteorological satellites, will make up a
global environmental data set to support our naval
forces wherever and whenever the need arises.
Peter A. Mitchell is a physical scientist with the Space Sensing
Branch, Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, D.C.
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The carrier U.S.S. Midway and her battle group underway in the Indian Ocean. The U.S.N.S. Passumpsic is on the Midway's
starboard quarter; a replenishment oiler is on the port quarter. She is flanked on port and starboard by the destroyer U.S.S.
Elliott and the guided missile cruiser U.S.S. England. Protecting her bows are the destroyer U.S.S. Robinson to port and the fast
frigate U.S.S. Downes to starboard. Carrier-launched fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters protect airspace to several hundred
miles and provide an extended antisubmarine screen. Nuclear attack submarines patrol beneath the battle group to protect it
from both submarine and surface ship attack. (U.S. Navy photo)
Antisubmarine Warfare
by Robert C. Spindel
I he security of our nation and the balance of world
power depend on the submarine. Long an important
part of naval warfare, the submarine's modern role is
unprecedented. Fast, deep-diving, nuclear attack
submarines (SSNs) form the major offensive unit of
the Soviet Navy, and in the U.S. Navy serve to
defend the carrier battle group, the basic unit of U.S.
seapower.
The nuclear ballistic missile carrying
submarine (SSBN) is a mobile, covert, almost
invulnerable launch pad for long-range missiles.
Because the submarine is so crucial to national
security, many of its activities are necessarily kept
secret, making it difficult to assess its ultimate
importance. However, the United States and the
Soviet Union are devoting impressive financial and
technical resources to submarine technology and to
the expansion of their submarine forces.
Both nations consider the submarine to be an
essential element in their military arsenals; it is a
major sticking point in arms-limitation negotiations.
At the present time, the Soviet Union has
approximately 375 submarines in service, about half
of which are nuclear powered. The United States has
a force of about 120, all nuclear powered. Both
nations continue to build new, larger, more lethal
submarines and submarine launched weapons.
Not so widely appreciated are the equally
vigorous and expensive antisubmarine warfare
(ASW) programs aimed at neutralizing the
opponent's submarines. Nations with substantial
naval forces, and those whose livelihoods depend on
free access to the oceans, have large ASW research,
development, and procurement programs, as well as
vigilant ASW defenses. By far the greatest efforts are
those of the United States and the Soviet Union,
although there are significant activities in other
countries, including England, Canada, France,
Norway, Sweden, Australia, New Zealand, Japan,
Italy, and West Germany. The North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) staffs a laboratory in La Spezia,
Italy, that has an ASW mission. The level of ASW
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The nuclear attack submarine San Francisco under way on
the surface during sea trials. Submarines such as this are
designed to protect surface shipping, battle groups, and
ballistic missile submarines. They also are used to hunt and
attack enemy subsurface forces. The attack submarine is
equipped with active and passive sonars, high-speed
torpedoes, and submarine-launched rockets. (U.S. Navy
photo)
activity in other free-world nations, such as Spain,
the Netherlands, and Israel, is small, but not
insignificant.
In the United States, ASW expenditures
amount to more than $12 billion annually, about 15
percent of the Navy's total budget. There is no
reason to assume that the Soviet Union devotes
fewer resources to this military category.
A Variety of Technologies
Antisubmarine warfare involves a spectrum of
military platforms from aircraft to satellites, from
surface ships to submarines. ASW sensors are drawn
from a variety of technologies, including passive
listening hydrophones based on the electrical
properties of certain crystals, optical fibers whose
refractive index varies with external acoustic
pressure, infrared radiation, magnetic anamoly and
low-light-level photon detectors, and magnetic and
hydraulic devices that emit high-level sonic "pings"
or low-level, surreptitious, hard to detect signals. For
the final prosecution of an ASW action, the
destruction of enemy submarines, there is a large
arsenal of modern weaponry, including
antisubmarine rockets, mines, depth charges, and
nuclear-armed and conventionally-armed torpedoes.
To understand the importance of ASW to
modern warfare and to national security one must
appreciate the capabilities of the modern submarine
and the differences between its tactical and strategic
missions.
The Modern Nuclear Submarine
The submarine rose to prominence during World
War I and II primarily as a tactical weapon.
Submarine packs were employed to destroy enemy
merchant and naval vessels. During World War II,
German U-boats were enormously successful. They
accounted for the loss of more than 2,800 merchant
vessels belonging to the Allied powers, which almost
led to a decisive victory over the Atlantic maritime
nations.
Had the Germans concentrated on building
their submarine force, they probably could have
starved Britain into surrender, thereby denying the
United States a European base of operations. Hastily
organized ASW programs eventually succeeded in
giving the Allies the upper hand. Sonar, torpedoes,
depth charges, and other weapons were developed.
Tactical procedures were devised to optimize the
probability of finding, hunting, and destroying
German submarines. Sonar was effective, even
though its range was generally limited to several
thousand meters. Listening devices launched from
aircraft (sonobuoys) were invented to locate
submarines. Torpedoes with higher speeds and more
accurate firing systems were developed. The sonic
properties of the ocean were poorly understood at
the beginning, but toward the end of World War II
ASW tactics took advantage of new information
about how sound travels in surface waters and in a
deep-sound channel near the bottom of the
thermocline (seen Oceanus, Vol. 20, No. 2, 1977).
The submarine emerged from World War II as
a major naval offensive and defensive weapon, but it
did not achieve its present position of importance
until the advent of nuclear power. This one giant
technological achievement altered the mission of the
submarine and catapulted it into the center of
international politics. For the first time, it became a
true submarine. Before, it had been a simple, albeit
effective, tactical weapon.
The submarine previously had been primarily
a surface vessel. It was driven by diesel engines that
simultaneously charged the batteries used for
propulsion during brief periods (measured in hours)
of submergence. It spent most of its time on the
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4 P-3C Orion ASW patrol aircraft in flight. Sonobuoy launch tubes are visible in the center of the fuselage. The "stinger" that
extends beyond the tail contains the magnetic anomaly detector, which signals the presence of a submarine by detecting its
effect on the earth's background magnetic field. (U.S. Navy photo)
.urface because its diesels required large volumes of
lir. It had limited depth capability (hundreds of feet)
md limited endurance. Except when running
.ubmerged, slowly, under electric power, it was
loisy.
Antisubmarine warfare in those years
depended on finding the submarine on the surface
>r detecting it acoustically. Submarines were hunted
)y aircraft using short wavelength radars, although
heir effectiveness was largely offset by the
Jevelopment of the snorkel. This device enabled a
ubmarine to ingest sufficient quantities of air to run
ilmost completely submerged most of the time and
ts small width made it practically undetectable by
)verhead radar.
The nuclear submarine is entirely different,
sluclear power frees it from dependence on surface
upplied air. It can remain submerged for many
nonths. Indeed, the duration of its underwater
nission is probably limited only by its capacity to
tore food and oxygen for its crew and by their
>sychologic ability to endure close, crowded, and
:onfined living conditions.
"aclical and Strategic Missions
"he nuclear submarine is designed for speed and
'fficiency submerged, whereas its diesel-electric
>redecessor had to be designed for surface running,
t is estimated that the modern submarine can
>utrun a World War II torpedo. It is armed with
nissiles that can be fired at shore targets thousands
>f kilometers distant so it can patrol in remote ocean
egions far from defended coastlines. It can remain
lidden by the cold and dark waters that cloak its
novements. It can roam under cover of the arctic
cepack. It is stealthy and covert, difficult to detect,
o localize, and to destroy.
Because of this, the mission of the submarine
las expanded. It no longer serves only in the tactical
ole of the World War II attack submarine. It now
las a strategic mission as well, a mission with the
:rucial objective of maintaining world peace through
luclear deterrence.
For many years, the nuclear military policies
of the Soviet Union and the United States have been
based on the concept of assured destruction by
retaliatory response to a preemptive first strike.
Although there have been changes in our military
strategy (see page 38), the precarious balance of
world peace, even world survival, rests to large
extent on this concept of mutual guaranteed loss.
Simply put, no matter how cleverly, swiftly, or
powerfully one side attacks the other, there will be
an inexorable response, for which there is no
defense, that will inflict massive, unacceptable
A sonobuoy is loaded into a launch tube of a P-3C ASW
patrol aircraft. The sonobuoy is a major ASW weapon. It has
also been of great benefit to the civilian oceanographic
research community where it has been used for decades for
sea-floor seismic studies and for research into sound
propagation in the ocean. (U.S. Navy photo)
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damage in return. This is the basis for the principle of
nuclear deterrence in which opposing forces are
held at standoff because of the certainty of
retaliatory destruction. The game is never played
because no one can win.
The submarine sea-based deterrent is one of
the least vulnerable elements in the triad of strategic
military forces, which consists of long-range
bombers, land-based missiles, and submarine-
launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). It may be the
deterrent with the highest probability of surviving a
preemptive first strike because of the extreme
difficulty of keeping track of all patrolling enemy
SSBN's and destroying them before they can launch
their missiles. The balance of world power is so
dependent on the SSBN strategic mission that very
substantial resources are devoted to sophisticated
ASW programs that have as their goal the
neutralization of nuclear powered ballistic
submarines.
Antisubmarine Warfare
The ASW mission is executed in four phases;
detection, identification, localization, and
destruction. First the presence of the submarine
must be detected. Then it must be identified as
friend or foe, and its position determined so that
forces can be dispatched to destroy it. Tactical ASW
is designed to seek out and destroy enemy
submarines that pose a threat to friendly shipping, or
to protect shipping by intimidation. Strategic ASW is
designed to destroy a major fraction of the enemy's
ballistic missile carrying submarines before the
missiles can be launched. The requirements for each
mission have much in common and therefore are
similar. In fact, there is an ambiguity in the tactical
and strategic roles of ASW that creates difficulties in
arms control negotiations. Once an ASW system is
operational, it is difficult to say whether it is for the
protection of shipping and commerce, or for locating
and destroying missile carrying submarines.
Command, control, communications, and
intelligence are vital ingredients in antisubmarine
warfare. An ASW mission often requires the
coordination of disparate and dispersed assets for
confirmation of detection, unequivocal
identification, precise localization, and certain
destruction. A typical scenario might begin with
acoustic detection by listening hydrophones, and
then entail communication with a surface ship
whose towed sonar array can confirm identification
and reduce location uncertainty. An aircraft might be
sent to the position established by the towed array
to drop sonobuoys for pinpoint accuracy. Finally,
sea-based or aircraft torpedoes and missiles might be
launched. If the mission is one of strategic defense,
then an attack submarine might be directed to keep
an eye on the enemy SSBN. Computers would be
used to predict the SSBN's future course and
position so that it could be kept targeted without
constant shadowing.
This bow view of the destroyer U.S.S. Spruance (DD-963)
shows the huge dome which houses ASW sonars. This ship is
specially designed for ASW. (U.S. Navy photo)
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Acoustic ASW
Underwater acoustic techniques are by far the most
effective and widely used ASW methods. The ocean
is virtually opaque to light, and electromagnetic
energy is so rapidly attenuated that it cannot
penetrate usefully beyond several meters. On the
other hand, sound can propagate thousands of
kilometers with little loss. Underwater explosives
detonated near New Zealand can be heard halfway
around the world at Bermuda, and sonar pings can
travel tens of kilometers, reflect off a target, and be
heard quite clearly above the ocean background
noise. Indeed, sound travels so well in the ocean that
a large fraction of the ambient noise results from the
sounds of distant shipping and other man-made
sources, such as seismic exploration airguns and oil
drilling rigs.
Passive sonar relies on the noise of
submarines. Sounds are generated by the flow of
water over the hull, machinery within the submarine,
and by propeller rotation. These sounds radiate into
the water and are sensed by underwater listening
devices called hydrophones. The tones produced by
propellers or rotating machinery are like fingerprints.
They are used to classify the vessel type; sometimes
they can identify a submarine right down to its serial
number.
The United States and the Soviet Union
employ passive sonar in extensive networks of
undersea hydrophones located in virtually all the
world's oceans, strategic straits, choke points, and
essential seas. The U.S. system, known as the Sound
Surveillance System (SOSUS), is designed to detect,
identify, and localize submarines and surface vessels
on an ocean-wide basis. It is a very capable ASW
weapon, but advances in streamlined hull design and
in machinery quieting, coupled with a rising level of
Dcean noise because of the proliferation of oil
exploration and exploitation activities, reduce its
effectiveness for long-range surveillance. Therefore,
it is augmented with portable systems.
'ome sonars are towed aft to remove them from the vicinity
>f noise generated by the ship and to allow them to be
operated at different depths. This enables the operator to use
i/'s sonar to best advantage under varying acoustic
onditions, such as when surface ducts form. These channels
-onfine sonar signals to just beneath the surface and make
lull-mounted sonars ineffective for finding submarines. This
ariable-depth sonar can be lowered beneath the duct for
Affective surveillance. (U.S. Navy photo)
A MK-48 torpedo is lowered into the torpedo room of the
U.S.S. Stonewall Jackson (SSBN-634), a nuclear-powered,
ballistic missile earring submarine. The ADCAP (ADvanced
CAPability) version of this torpedo is one of the most deadly
ASW weapons in the U.S. Navy arsenal. (U.S. Navy photo)
For example, localized passive listening is
provided by sonobuoys. These air-launched, floating
radios have hydrophones suspended at submarine
depths. During their lifetime of about 8 hours they
transmit acoustic data to Navy aircraft or helicopters.
Both are equipped with signal-processing
computers, and secure communication links to
shore, or to carrier ASW operation centers, where
targets are identified and localized automatically by
computers.
A single suspended hydrophone provides
omnidirectional detection; an array of sonobuoys
gives directional reception so that targets can be
localized. Sonobuoys deployed in picket-fence-like
lines are very effective. Under development is a
longer-lived passive device, the air-dropped Rapidly
Deployable Surveillance System (RDSS), designed to
augment SOSUS in strategic areas. Hydrophones
also are lowered into the water from hovering
helicopters that can move rapidly from place to
place to confirm detections and pinpoint location.
The Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System
(SURTASS) is a mobile, long-range, passive
surveillance system. It consists of long hydrophone
arrays towed behind Navy surface vessels. This
system adds to SOSUS capability by allowing better
identification and localization. It improves coverage
in selected high-interest areas and fills in SOSUS
gaps. Attack submarines are equipped with sensitive
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hydrophone arrays that make them particularly
effective threats to the SSBN.
Passive sonar is inherently covert and is
therefore the acoustic ASW weapon of choice. But
its detections are not always definitive. Active sonars,
which depend on the reflective properties of the
submarine hull, are used too. An acoustic ping is
generated and the time taken for it to travel to the
target, reflect from it, and travel back is a measure of
target range. Target bearing is determined by
transmitting or receiving in selected directions. The
ping can be transmitted directly at the target, or it
can be bounced off the ocean surface or bottom to
increase detection range and provide a measure of
covertness. The ping appears to come from a
position not occupied by the sonar. Surface vessels
usually have bow-mounted active sonars, although
some have sonars towed aft to remove them from
the ship's noise. The new Spruance- and Kidd-class
destroyers have been carefully designed for ASW.
Their machinery and hull noise has been minimized
to increase their sonar effectiveness. Submarines
have active sonars. The SH-60B helicopters has a
dipping active sonar and there are even sonobuoys
that can be commanded to actively ping. To combat
active sonar, submarines are coated with special
anti-noise materials to reduce their reflectivity and
make them less detectable acoustically.
The decision to use active sonar during a
tactical or strategic engagement is not taken lightly.
Sonar pings immediately reveal one's presence.
Non-Acoustic ASW
Acoustic systems are not the only ones used in
antisubmarine warfare. Radar can still be effective
during the rare moments when a nuclear submarine
surfaces, or when it is running with its periscope
exposed. Electronic counter measures (ECM) are
used to detect emissions from submarines if they
attempt radio communications. The nuclear
submarine can remain submerged for months at a
time, but, during its mission, it must communicate,
however infrequently, with command and control
authority. Elaborate, cryptographic coding systems
are used to frustrate enemy surveillance;
transmissions that appear to hop randomly in
frequency foil detection by radio direction finders.
ASW aircraft have Magnetic Anamoly
Detectors (MADs) that detect changes in Earth's
background magnetic field caused by large, metallic
submarines. The MADs are extremely effective for
localization, but its detection ranges are limited since
the aircraft has to fly almost directly over the
submarine to spot it. Moreover, the new Alfa-Class
Soviet submarine has a titanium rather than a steel
hull, which produces a smaller magnetic anomaly.
There are other possibilities for non-acoustic
antisubmarine warfare. The blue-green laser can
penetrate many tens of meters beneath the surface.
It offers the hope of airborne submarine detection.
Low-light-level television, image intensifiers, photon
detectors, and other visual technologies may be
useful. Infrared techniques may be used to detect
the heat given off by a submarine. As a submarine
passes through the water, it produces a subsurface
wake that may be detectable by aircraft or satellite
sensors. Indeed, earth-orbiting satellites are
expected to play an important role in future ASW
systems by serving as a platform for sensors as well
as a data and communication link between dispersed
ASW forces and control centers. Both the United
States and the Soviet Union have experimental
satellites, and the U.S. Navy plans to launch N-
ROSS, the Navy Remote Oceanographic Sensing
System, later in the decade.
ASW Weapons
Sensors detect, identify, and localize, but the final
ASW action is the job of torpedoes, missiles, and
mines. These weapons are launched from shore,
surface ships, aircraft and submarines. The anti-
submarine rocket (ASROC) is installed on frigates,
destroyers, and cruisers. It delivers a small nuclear
warhead to 15 kilometer ranges. The submarine
rocket (SUBROC) has a larger payload and ranges up
to 100 kilometers. It is launched from a torpedo
tube, breaks the surface, flies through the air, and
dives back into the sea to attack submarines.
There are two major torpedoes in the U.S.
arsenal, the MK-48, which is a heavyweight weapon,
and the MK-46, which is lightweight, and can be air-
launched. They both have sophisticated sonar
guidance systems and the speed, depth, and payload
to detect and attack the latest Soviet submarines.
The MK-48 has a control wire that allows its speed,
course, depth, and other attack functions to be
continuously refined as it approaches the target.
Homing sonar provides the final guidance for
impact.
Anti-submarine mines are very effective
weapons because they are covert and can be laid
near enemy home ports or essential passages. One
of the latest, most advanced types is the CAPTOR
(encapsulated torpedo) mine. It lies in wait
continually evaluating data from its sensors until it
identifies an enemy submarine, whereupon it
launches a torpedo.
Environmental ASW
The ocean has a highly variable sound speed
structure that greatly affects the range and sensitivity
of sonar. Ducts, formed by surface heating, confine
sound to channels just beneath the surface. They
can extend downward tens to hundreds of meters.
The ocean has a deep sound channel that focusses
submarine sounds so they can travel hundreds, even
thousands, of kilometers. Frontal systems, such as
the Gulf Stream and the eddies and rings that are
found oceanwide, hamper sonar signals because
they are characterized by severe temperature and
sound speed changes. Submarines can hide beneath
surface ducts to avoid detection by a surface ship, or
above them to evade another sub. Eddies and fronts
can mask a submarine or offer opportunities for
tactical maneuvers. Because these environmental
factors are so important, submarines and surface
ships have instruments for on-site evaluation of sonar
conditions. The also are supplied with sonar
forecasts based on the environmental predictions
made by the Fleet Numerical Oceanography Center
(FNOC) in Monterey, California. In the future, it is
expected that satellites, such as N-ROSS, will
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An SH-60B Seahawk helicopter landing aboard the guided
missile frigate U.S.S. Mclnery in the Atlantic Ocean. This is
the Navy's latest ASW helicopter. It is equipped with an
integrated ASW capability known as LAMPS III, the Light
Airborne Multi-Purpose System. (U.S. Navy photo)
Drovide global oceanographic data useful in this
zontext.
Wither ASW?
Despite the tremendous variety of ASW activity,
nost experts agree that there is little likelihood that
he nuclear submarine will be compromised by ASW
developments either now or in the foreseeable
uture. Thus, the submarine will continue to be a
:ornerstone of U.S. and Soviet naval policy. It also
/vill remain a principal element in international
nilitary and political strategies. While we cannot rule
3ut undiscovered technologies, nor can we predict
vith assurance the limits of future applications of
rurrent technologies, it is unlikely that the situation
vill be drastically altered. However, even if major
eaps in ASW capability are not likely, a steady
mprovement in the ability to detect, identify,
ocalize, and destroy submarines will gradually yield
decided military advantage. This prospect will keep
he international investment in ASW research,
Jevelopment, and procurement high.
Robert C. Spindel is Chairman of the Department of Ocean
Engineering at the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution,
vhere, as a Senior Scientist, he conducts research on
jnderwater acoustics.
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View I
Tridents Role
in National
Security
by J. J. Martin
/\ trident is a three-pronged spear, the symbol of
a sea god in classical mythology. In modern times,
it has become a symbol of naval supremacy. The
Trident weapon system is aptly named.
The Trident program consists of the new,
Ohio-class, nuclear-powered ballistic missile
submarine (SSBN); the Trident I (or C-4) submarine-
launched ballistic missile; and the Trident II (or
D-5) missile (Table 1 and Figure 1). In 1982, the
first Trident SSBN entered service, equipped with
C-4 missiles; current plans call for deployment of
one Trident submarine a year until at least 13 are in
service. The C-4 missile is also deployed in 12
older Poseidon SSBNs (Figure 2). The D-5 missile is
under development. The program has had strong
Congressional support since its inception.
Trident is a major improvement over the
earlier Polaris and Poseidon ballistic missile
submarine programs in terms of its ability to survive
a Soviet first strike, and still be able to launch a
retaliatory strike. More importantly, Trident will
have a more prominent role in U.S. military
strategy than these earlier programs.
U.S. strategy trends, Soviet military
capabilities, U.S. nuclear forces, and plans for their
employment are such that the Trident is likely to
be called on to carry out missions beyond second
strike retaliation the primary role for U.S. ballistic
missile submarines in the past. Potential new
missions include limited nuclear strikes; support of
conventional operations; attacks on military targets
that have been reinforced to withstand nuclear
blast, heat, and radiation effects (hard-target
counterforce); and participation in a strategic
reserve force that can be withheld for an indefinite
period in wartime. Trident is already beginning to
assume some of these missions.
The D-5 missile will be able to effectively
attack such hard targets as Soviet intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) silos. While this capability is
Launching ceremonies for the Trident submarine Alabama.
(Photo courtesy of General Dynamics)
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TRIDENT (OHIO-CLASS) SSBN METERS
Soviet leaders place high value on assured control
over domestic elements, East European satellites,
and borders with potential enemies, such as China.
They require high confidence of success before
embarking on military operations.
Therefore, the new strategy calls for nuclear
force capabilities, operational concepts, and
targeting that would reduce Soviet leaders'
confidence in achieving their political-military
objectives in war, and would threaten their political
control. Central to this strategy is a wider range of
options for the employment of nuclear weapons
than previously existed, including options limited in
size, geographic area, and target types. Strategic
force options designed to support theater
commanders are also required.
A wider range of discriminate
options against military targets,
which would result in little or
no direct damage to civilians, is
intended to provide responses
to Soviet attacks while
controlling escalation by leaving
the Soviets with a continued
stake in prudent behavior. The
strategy retains large-scale
nuclear attack concepts and
calls for a secure reserve force
to hold urban-industrial targets
at risk during wartime as an
added threat to induce the
Soviets to stop fighting and
negotiate.
These changes were and
still are controversial. They
suggest that nuclear wars can be
fought in a measured, rational
way, and provide added
impetus for the development of
hard-target counterforce
capabilities, which some view as
destabilizing. But the new
strategy has had the full support
of the Nixon/Ford, Carter, and
Reagan Administrations and key
members of Congress. Despite charges by critics,
its purpose is not to "win" a nuclear war. Rather,
the intent of the strategy, in the words of Harold
Brown, former Secretary of Defense, is to enhance
deterrence by making "... a Soviet victory as
improbable (seen through Soviet eyes) as we can
make it, over the broadest plausible range of
scenarios."
The Trident program clearly is consistent
with many aspects of the new strategy. Because of
the Ohio-class SSBN's likely ability to survive for a
long period under a variety of wartime conditions,
it is a natural candidate for the secure reserve
force. The C-4 missile has ample capability against
soft military and civilian targets; with its planned
accuracy improvements, the D-5 missile will have a
hard-target capability.
^P The Trident program is
also consistent with the arms
control agreements negotiated
in the 1970s. Multiple
Independently-targetable
Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs) on the
C-4 (and, in the future, D-5)
missile hedge against rapid
mt Soviet deployment of a
widespread ballistic missile
defense system in violation of
the ABM Treaty. Planned Ohio-
class SSBN force levels taken
alone are consistent with SALT I
and SALT II limits on strategic
offensive forces. In 1985,
however, the United States
A Trident I missile launch.
(U.S. Navy photo)
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Table 2. Contrasts between MAD and current U.S. nuclear strategy.
MAD Current Strategy
Deterrence by Assured Second-Strike Capability Against Urban-
Industrial Targets
Massive Nuclear Attack Options
Indiscriminate Destruction
No Requirement for Counterforce Capabilities
No Explicitly Designated Secure Reserve Force
Focus Only on Strategic Forces
Disparity Among Force Acquisition, Force Employment, and
Declaratory Policies
Deterrence by Denying Soviet Confidence in Achieving Wartime
Objectives
Wide Range of Limited and Massive Nuclear Attack Options
Capability for Highly Discriminate Attacks, With Low Civilian
Damage
Capability to Attack Military and Civilian Targets
Secure Reserve Force
Encompasses Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces
Consistent Acquisition, Employment, and Declaratory Policies
must decide whether to withdraw some Poseidon
SSBNs from active service in order to remain within
these limits, which are not now legally binding, as it
continues to deploy Ohio-class SSBNs.
Emerging Trident Issues
Events are forcing changes in the classic U.S. triad
concept, where each strategic force component
has an independent ability to attack most important
targets. These changes are likely to cause Trident to
play a more prominent role in future strategic
plans, assuming missions which in some cases are
controversial and in some cases are not altogether
to the liking of the Navy.
Many of the events causing these changes
are taking place in the Soviet Union. An
unprecedented and sustained period of high
military investment there has resulted in a
significant increase in Soviet military capabilities
relative to those of the United States. Soviet
missiles now pose a major first-strike threat to U.S.
ICBMs and the trend is worsening. Ballistic missile
defense research and an extensive radar network
now permit the Soviet Union to deploy a
nationwide anti-ballistic missile system relatively
quickly, should it choose to violate the limits of the
ABM Treaty.
The Soviet Union historically has valued
defenses more than the West. Recent Soviet air
defense improvements are directed toward
countering U.S. manned bomber and cruise missile
programs, and may make it more difficult for these
forces to carry out their missions in the future.
While the Soviets have not achieved major
breakthroughs in their ability to locate and attack
SSBNs at sea, they have vigorous research and
development programs in both acoustic and
nonacoustic antisubmarine warfare. About 200
Soviet attack submarines are currently the main
threat to U.S. SSBNs. This attack force now consists
of many older, less capable vessels, but the Soviet
Union is in the midst of a major program to
upgrade its attack submarines (Figure 3).
In sum, the Soviet Union now poses a major
first-strike threat to U.S. ICBMs, has significantly
increased the capabilities of its defenses against
3 Typhoon
14 Yank**
21 Delta
PETROPAVLOSK
15 Delta
9 Yank**CHARLESTON. S.C.
31 Lafayette /
Ben. Franklin
1 Ohio
Figure 2. U.S. and Soviet SSBN deployments.
42

missile. To a considerable extent, critics of MX
have focused on the problems of finding a basing
plan that is satisfactory from environmental,
military, and cost perspectives. Just beneath the
surface, however, is opposition to the high
accuracy and large payload of MX, which gives it a
significant hard-target counterforce capability.
Whether the MX ever will be deployed in
militarily significant numbers is questionable.
Whether the small ICBM program now being
considered encounters similar political difficulties
when it nears deployment remains to be seen.
Recent administrations have emphasized the need
to negotiate reductions in land-based ICBMs.
President Reagan has made the MX into a
bargaining chip, lobbying strongly for continued
MX funding in order not to undercut the U.S.
position in the recently renewed arms control talks.
It is likely, therefore, that some combination of
arms control and the politics associated with ICBMs
will limit the part played by land-based missiles in
future U.S. strategic plans.
Trident already has major roles in supporting
large-scale nuclear attack options and in providing
an element of the secure reserve force. Should the
foregoing assessment be correct, Trident's part in
the secure reserve force will become even more
important. Moreover, the Trident D-5 missile over
time could be required to assume the counterforce
role against time-urgent hard targets that has been
assigned to land-based missiles. Depending on the
extent to which European politics permit continued
modernization of NATO's intermediate range
nuclear force, much of which still consists of
tactical aircraft that are vulnerable to a nuclear first
strike, Trident may also be required to support
conventional military operations in Europe with a
variety of limited nuclear options.
As land-based ICBMs contribute less to the
second-strike capability of U.S. strategic forces,
high SSBN survivability over the 20-30 year life of
Trident will become even more vital. Moreover, if
Trident must provide limited nuclear options
against Soviet hardened installations or theater
targets, plans may have to be developed for launch
of only part of an SSBN's missiles. It would then be
important to assure the continued survival of that
SSBN, a problem complicated by the fact that the
partial missile launch would provide indications of
the submarine's location to Soviet sensors.
The extended range of the C-4 and D-5
missiles and the quieting advances in the Ohio-
class SSBN are important for high survivability of
the Trident weapon system. Depending, however,
on Soviet anti-submarine warfare advances, Trident
may in the 1990s or beyond have to rely more on
countermeasures, tactics, and support by general
purpose forces to survive in an extended war.
While Trident survivability is likely to remain high
because of the complexity and variability of the
ocean's background noise, greater dependence on
operational maneuvers and tactics will make
Trident survivability less predictable. This potential
change from today's virtually unquestioned SSBN
survivability to a condition of less predictable (but
not necessarily reduced) survivability will probably
cause the Navy to resist assignment of new
missions to Trident and may over time undercut
the solid Congressional consensus on funding new
ballistic missile submarines.
Since the nuclear-armed Tomahawk Land-
Attack Missile (TLAM-N) is now being deployed
aboard surface ships and submarines, it may be
asked whether Trident and this cruise missile are
unnecessarily redundant. While the effectiveness
of both depends upon survival of sea-based launch
platforms, each poses different problems for Soviet
defenses. The Tomahawk imposes major costs on
Soviet air defenses and Trident would present
considerable difficulties to an expanded Soviet
ballistic missile defense. Each system hedges
against different kinds of advances in Soviet
defenses; both may force the Soviets to divert
resources from offensive weapons to defensive
ones.
The D-5 missile will have sufficient accuracy
to attack Soviet hard targets such as missile silos.
Although recent Department of Defense reports to
Congress have noted this development, it has not
yet become the subject of controversy, perhaps
because critics of ballistic missile accuracy
improvements currently are concentrating on
defeating the MX.
Opponents of high missile accuracy
generally believe that a second-strike retaliatory
capability against Soviet cities is sufficient to
preserve deterrence. They view the hard-target
counterforce capability of accurate MIRVed
missiles as destabilizing, arguing that it threatens
the other side's deterrent force, stimulating the
arms race in peacetime and increasing Soviet
incentives to launch their ICBMs early in a war,
before they can be destroyed by U.S. attacks.
But there is ample evidence that the Soviet
Union does not subscribe to the MAD theory of
deterrence and the associated stability concepts.
Highly accurate missiles based in a survivable
mode (such as D-5) are essential for controlling
escalation by keeping attacks precise and
discriminate, should deterrence fail. Moreover,
many defense planners believe improved U.S.
threats to hard targets are needed to counter
existing Soviet threats to U.S. ICBM silos. Restoring
this balance will reduce the risk of war by reducing
the confidence of Soviet leaders in achieving their
war aims. Further, U.S. threats to Soviet ICBM silos
are as likely to lead to negotiated reductions as to a
heightened arms race. It was the threat posed by
the U.S. Safeguard ballistic missile defense system
that convinced the Soviet Union to negotiate the
ABM treaty in the early 1970s.
Nevertheless, the hard-target kill capability
of the Trident D-5 missile is likely to become more
controversial as the missile nears deployment.
/. /. Martin is manager of the National Security Studies and
Systems Group at Science Applications International
Corporation. He was a member of the Office of the
Secretary of Defense from 1968 to 1976, where he worked
on the Undersea Long-range Missile System and helped
develop the new nuclear strategy.
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View II
The Trident
and
Strategic Stability
by Theodore A. Postol
Decause submarines carrying strategic missiles can
be hidden in vast areas of the oceans, they cannot
easily be found and attacked. This peculiar
circumstance makes it possible for strategic
submarines to survive a first strike, regardless of the
size and quality of an adversary's nuclear forces, or
the intensity of the attack. The capabilities of
strategic missile submarines therefore have
fundamental and profound implications for the
vulnerability of the strategic forces of both the
United States and the Soviet Union.
In early April of 1983, the President's
Commission on Strategic Forces (better known as the
Scowcroft Commission) issued its report to President
Reagan. The report emphasized that efforts to
MM III
Trident II
Polaris Poseidon Trident
A
A-1 A-2 A-3 C-3 C-4 D-5
SS-N-20
RANGE 1,200NM 1,500NM 2,500 NM 2,500 NM
LENGTH 29.5ft 31.0ft. 31.2ft 34.2ft
DIAMETER 54 in. 54 in. 54 in. 74 in.
WEIGHT 29,000 Ibs 33,000 Ibs. 35,000 Ibs. 64,000 Ibs.
4,000 NM 4,000 NM -6,000 NM -6,000 M -4,500 NM
34.2 ft -44 ft 59 ft 71 ft -49 ft
74 in. -83 in. 66/52 in. 92 in. -90 in
-73,000 Ibs -120,000 Ibs -78,000 Ibs -193,000 Ibs -155,000 Ibs
NM = nautical miles
Figure 1 . The six left-most missiles are all U.S. submarine launched missiles. The Minuteman III (MM III) is a silo-based missile
that carries three warheads with an explosive force of about 300 kilotons, and the MX is a larger silo-based missile that will carry
10 warheads of roughly the same or slightly higher yield. The SS-N-20 is a new Soviet missile, deployed on the new Soviet
Typhoon class submarine. Data on the SS-N-20 are speculative.
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Figure 2. Four nuclear powered submarines, a) The nuclear-powered ocean research submarine NR-1 . This submarine is about
136 feet long and has a submerged displacement of 400 tons, b) The Lafayette/Pose/c/on class submarine has a length of 425
feet, a hull diameter of 33 feet, a submerged displacement of 8,250 tons, and can carry 16 Trident I missiles, c) The still larger
Ohio/Tr/dent class submarine is 560 feet long, has a hull diameter of 42 feet, displaces 18,700 tons when submerged, and can
carry 24 Trident I missiles, d) The Soviet Typhoon class submarine has a considerably greater displacement, about 25,000 tons. It
carries 20 nearly ICBM-sized SS-N-20 missiles (see Figure 1).
modernize U.S. strategic forces should be channeled
in directions that enhance long-term "strategic
stability." In the context of the Commission's report
to the President, strategic stability exists when
neither the United States nor the Soviet Union has
incentives to launch a preemptive nuclear attack (or
first strike) on the other.
Two possible destabilizing circumstances
were explicitly discussed in the report. In the first,
one or both adversaries have an incentive to strike
first, in hopes of destroying much of the opponent's
forces and thereby improving their strategic position
vis-a-vis the other. The second circumstance is when
one or both adversaries have an incentive to strike
first in order to avoid the loss of their forces from the
other's attack. These two circumstances may exist
simultaneously for either or both powers.
While the concept of stability may have some
analytic utility, it is nevertheless an abstraction of
highly uncertain meaning. Most significantly, it
suggests that decisions might be made on the basis
of perceived military advantages, rather than in
consideration of the unimaginable levels of
destruction that would surely accompany even a
limited use of nuclear weapons. This view of
stability, however, has been the basis of much of the
U.S. strategic debate. For this reason, it may be
instructive to apply it even with a full appreciation
of its limitations to the question of whether or not
the Trident sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)
system is a destabilizing weapon.
ICBMs and Stability
Any discussion of strategic stability that builds on the
definition used by the President's Commission
cannot be limited to an examination of sea-based
systems alone, but also must include those stability
issues raised by the capabilities and vulnerabilities of
other weapon systems.
The forces most clearly subject to preemptive
attack are fixed, silo-based intercontinental-range
ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Unlike submarines, which
are almost invulnerable to attack while hidden in the
ocean, or bombers, which can be put in the air
without committing them to attack, on detection of
an incoming attack ICBMs must be either written off
or quickly launched. In addition, it is often argued
(incorrectly, in the view of this author*) that silo-
based forces have the greatest military capability
because they combine powerful warheads with great
accuracy, a combination that allows them to destroy
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even the most heavily fortified (or hardened) targets.
This ability is known as hard-target kill capability.**
Thus ICBMs have the ability to attack well-protected
command centers and other well-protected military
installations. These missiles combine high capability
with high vulnerability, making them very attractive
targets for preemptive attacks that would, at least on
paper, result in a strategic advantage to the attacker.
The Trident Weapon System
The Trident weapon system is America's newest
submarine-based strategic missile system. The
system currently is built around the Trident I or C-4
long-range missile (Figure 1). According to lane's
Weapon's Systems, the missile weighs about 70,000
pounds, and is designed to deliver eight 100-
kiloton*** warheads with high accuracy from a range
of up to about 4,000 nautical miles.
* Since SLBMs cannot be found, and hence, cannot be
attacked, they would be unaffected by a preemptive attack,
or by delays in decision-making and communications. Thus,
regardless of enemy action, SLBMs would be able to attack
such militarily important targets as airfields, ports, staging
areas, rail and highway junctures, war supporting and
related industries, nuclear storage sites, possible troop
concentrations, and command centers.
In contrast, the military value of ICBMs against these
targets is less certain, since they can be preemptively
attacked. A countervailing argument is that this drawback is
offset by the fact that ICBMs have, or will have, an ability to
destroy an enemy's silo-based ICBMs.
In fact, ICBM warheads take about 30 minutes to
reach their targets, which makes it technically possible for
one side to launch its ICBMs before the other's warheads
arrive. No military planner (U.S. or Soviet) could therefore
have confidence that enemy ICBMs could be attacked
successfully. Equally, no commander could plan with
confidence that his own ICBMs could be successfully
launched if the enemy attempts to destroy them.
Thus, from the point of view of the prudent
planner, ICBMs would have to be regarded as highly
inflexible, having no capability unless they are used in a
preemptive mode, or successfully launched prior to the
arrival of warheads from an enemy preemptive attack.
However, the SLBM, unlike the ICBM, does provide
assured capability against all targets that can reasonably be
expected to be subject to attack. By this measure of
conservative military planning, its military value undeniably
surpasses that of the ICBM.
**
Capable and capability, as used in this article, refer to the
ability of a strategic weapon to destroy fortified targets.
Such capability is determined by the accuracy of the
weapon, the power (or yield) of the nuclear warhead, and
the reliability of the delivery system.
*** The destructive force of nuclear warheads is measured
in kilotons and megatons, which indicate, respectively, a
power equal to the destructive force of a thousand or a
million tons of TNT. Extremely large conventional bombs
have a yield of on the order of 0.005 kilotons. The bomb
that destroyed Hiroshima had a yield of about 13 kilotons.
At the end of 1 989 or beginning of 1 990, the
larger, more capable Trident II or D-5 missile will be
deployed. If this larger missile utilizes propulsion
technology similar to that used in the Trident I,
scaling by volume indicates that it should weigh
about 120,000 pounds, and should carry about 60
percent more weight. Scaling from weight and range
data on other solid-propellant missiles (Minuteman
III and MX) indicates that the Trident II should carry
from seven to nine warheads, each with a yield of
300 to 600 kilotons. When the Trident II missiles
begin deployment in 1989, the Soviet Union will be
confronted with the most capable nuclear weapon
system yet to be invented, an almost invulnerable
sea-based missile that has accuracy and payload
capabilities equal to those of the MX.
The Trident I missile is currently deployed
aboard two different types of U.S. ballistic missile
submarines: the 16-tube Lafayette/Benjamin Franklin
(or Poseidon) class submarine, and the much larger
and more modern 24 tube Ohio (or Trident) class
submarine (Figure 2). Because the Trident II missile
will be so much larger than the Trident I, it will only
be deployable on the larger Trident submarine.
In addition to missiles aboard nuclear
submarines, the Trident weapon system includes
navigational, fire-control, and guidance systems. Of
particular significance is an improved navigation
system, which provides the missile's guidance
system with highly accurate data about its launch
location, velocity, and direction to target. In addition,
the missile guidance system utilizes a star-tracker,
which allows the missile to further correct for
navigation and guidance errors before the dispensing
of warheads. The result of these technological
innovations is a sea-based missile of vastly improved
accuracy.
The Question of Stability
There are three concerns that have been raised
about Trident's effects on stability: that it could
tempt the United States into a first strike; that it
would force the Soviets to adopt a position of
launching their missiles on warning of an attack,
thereby increasing the likelihood of accidental war;
and that it will reduce the decision-making time
available to the Soviets in a crisis.
Since the bulk of Soviet strategic capability
currently resides in silo-based forces, the
development by the United States of a sea-based
missile capable of attacking such forces has raised
concern among some that Trident II would be
destabilizing (Figure 3), since, according to this view,
it would provide U.S. leadership with the tempting
option of destroying most Soviet nuclear forces, the
execution of which would result in U.S. strategic
advantage.
An additional concern, which is perhaps more
realistic, is that Soviet measures to prevent the
destruction of their silo-based military forces in the
face of Trident II would increase the likelihood of
accidental or inadvertant nuclear war. Furthermore,
since the silo-based forces would be regarded as
vulnerable, plans that called for the withholding of
such forces would not be militarily sensible. Thus, it
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Figure 3. Some configurations of nuclear forces relevant to
the concept of strategic stability, a) If each side has a force of
single-warhead silo-based missiles, the attacker disarms
himself in the process of disarming his adversary. Since
neither side can achieve a strategic advantage as an outcome
of such an attack, this circumstance is considered to be
"stable." b) One or both sides now have multiple warhead
missiles based in silos. In this circumstance, a successful "first-
strike" could result if only a fraction of the missiles in one
force destroy the other force. Since the outcome of a
successful attack results in the strategic "superiority" of the
attacker, an incentive is created to "go first." This
circumstance is considered "unstable" or
"destabilizing."
c) In this scenario one side has invulnerable sea based forces
that have missiles of sufficient accuracy that a disarming first-
strike against the other is technically possible. This
circumstance is also unstable according to the criteria of the
President's Commission. However, because neither side has a
strong incentive to go first, and only one side is forced to
adopt a hair-trigger posture, there are fewer opportunities for
errors or misjudgments that could lead to an accidental
exchange. This situation is therefore less unstable than the
situation illustrated in (b). d) In still another possible
circumstance, both sides have invulnerable sea-based forces
armed with highly accurate missiles. Although both sides
have considerable capability against hardened targets, neither
side would have an option to disarm the other. This situation
is therefore stable. It is important to bear in mind that any of
the exchanges postulated above could well involve the
detonation of hundreds or thousands of high-yield warheads,
resulting in deadly fallout. In addition, if silos are in grassy or
forested regions, fires could result over areas of tens or even
hundreds of thousands of square miles, with potentially
disastrous effects on the atmosphere and climate. Thus, while
the above concept of stability may have some analytic utility,
it does not capture the absolute consequences of even a
"limited" attack. The planetary scale of nuclear effects from
attacks and counter-attacks clearly would weigh heavily on
the mind of any rational, informed decision-maker.
is argued, the hard target kill capability of the Trident
II simultaneously denies the Soviets the option of
withholding part of their silo-based force and
coerces them to adopt measures to assure a rapid
launch. Therefore, the result of Trident II
deployment would be an increase in both the
likelihood of accidental nuclear war and the
likelihood that such a war would result in a total
exchange of both U.S. and Soviet forces.
These concerns about technological
developments that could lead to accidental or
inadvertant nuclear war, however remote or
implausible they may seem, are understandably
most disturbing. Furthermore, arguments that "they
would go first, but we never would" simply do not
address the security dilemmas faced by super-power
leadership in the nuclear age.
Experience has shown that when national
leadership is subject to the extreme pressures of a
crisis, signals can be misread and misjudgments can
occur. In addition, casual and careless statements of
high-level government officials, or impressions
created by military officials writing about fighting and
winning nuclear wars, may lead to misimpressions
that could result in dire actions during a crisis.
This is especially so when one considers that
leadership might have to function through an
extended period of crisis, constantly tortured by the
knowledge that at any instant, they might receive
warning that in less than 20 to 30 minutes their
country would be hit by enemy warheads. After an
extended period of such stress, it is entirely
possible in fact it might even be expected that
decision-makers would feel pressured to act on
issues of momentous importance even though
available time and information might be inadequate.
This concern has been exacerbated by the
claims of some that the Trident II will greatly reduce
the warning time available to the Soviet Union.
While this concern should not be dismissed, the
case is not as clear cut as one might expect.
The Soviet Union, like the United States, has a
variety of early warning systems to alert it of a
possible U.S. attack, but U.S. Department of
Defense publications indicate that current Soviet
launch detection systems provide poor, incomplete,
or non-existent warning of submarine-launched
missiles. The Soviet Union would receive warning of
an attack not when the missiles are launched, but
only when line-of-sight radars first detect warheads
coming over the horizon, a quarter hour or less
before impact. Thus it could be argued today that
any U.S. SLBM, hard target capable or not, is
destabilizing because of Soviet failures to develop
adequate launch detection systems.*
But Department of Defense publications
suggest that Soviet warning systems may be
upgraded to include such capabilities by the end of
the decade, which would then provide them with
almost as much warning of an SLBM attack as of an
ICBM attack. Thus, as long as both the U.S. and
*
It should be noted that Soviet Yankee-class submarines,
equipped with 1,300-nautical-mile range missiles, patrol
near the U.S. coast. These missiles are potentially within
less than 10 minutes flight-time of Washington and other
U.S. targets on the East and West Coasts. Hence even with
launch detection data, decision time in the United States
today could be relatively short.
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SLUM Trajectories
f\ variety of trajectories for a submarine-launched
ballistic missile like a Trident I or // are shown at right. The
points along each trajectory are separated by 60 seconds of
flight time. For example, the 4,000-nautical-mile (nm)
trajectory has about 26 intervals, indicating a flight time of
about 26 minutes from launch to target. Since the curves
are calculated by assuming the missile instantaneously
achieves the required velocity, adding about 2 minutes of
flight time to any of the above curves gives an estimate of
the approximate time of flight from breakwater to impact
on target.
The 4,000-nm range trajectory shown above is
called the "minimum energy" trajectory. It is the trajectory
that results in a maximum range for a given achieved
velocity.
Since the fully loaded missile can only achieve a
certain velocity during boost, it must loft the warheads at
an
"optimal" angle to achieve maximum range. If the loft
angle is larger or smaller than optimal, full range will not be
achieved. At shorter ranges, the missile does not need to
achieve as high a velocity to reach its targets. It is therefore
possible to use this additional velocity to "loft" or "depress"
the trajectory above or below the optimal trajectory. Lofting
can be useful because warheads spend a longer time
coasting toward targets, allowing for greater dispersal
of the warheads and making it possible to attack widely
separated targets. Depressing a trajectory also can be
useful, since the warheads take less time to arrive at targets,
reducing an enemy's warning and reaction time. The
depressed curves for 3,000 nm and 1,200 nm ranges, for
example, would take about 1 7 and 8 minutes, respectively,
from missile breakwater to impact on target.
Such trajectories would be desirable for attacks that
are designed to minimize an enemy's warning and reaction
time. Warheads on severely depressed trajectories re-enter
the atmosphere at small angles relative to those that re-
enter from optimal ones. Thus, they travel long distances
through the atmosphere before reaching the ground, and
are subject to severe aerodynamic heating and dynamical
interaction with the atmosphere. For this reason, it is very
unlikely that a weapon system that has not been
thoroughly tested under such conditions would be
depended on for a critical nuclear mission. Neither the
United States nor the Soviet Union has tested SLBMs on
depressed trajectories, presumably because both recognize
the provocation inherent in such tests.
Soviet Union continue to emphasize long-range
SLBMs and do not test them on depressed
trajectories, which offer much shorter flight times
(see box on SLBM trajectories), it seems unlikely that
the problem of warning time will confront us with
stability issues more fundamental than those raised
by the Trident's counter-silo capability.*
A Plausible Scenario
The question of the stabilizing or destabilizing effect
of the Trident cannot be examined in isolation,
however. To examine whether or not the Trident will
create strategic imbalances as dangerous as some
have argued, it is necessary to make some
projections about the number, types, and
capabilities of future U.S. and Soviet forces. Table 1
shows the postulated disposition of Soviet and U.S.
silo-based forces from the late 1980s to the mid-
1990s.
U.S. silo-based forces currently consist of 450
relatively inaccurate Minuteman Us, each of which
delivers a single powerful warhead, and 550
somewhat more accurate Minuteman Ills, each of
which delivers three warheads. (The large and aging
*
It is important to distinguish between possible instabilities
introduced by the shortness of warning time and those
introduced by counter-silo capability. If SLBMs do not
threaten central strategic forces, even if warning time is
short, leadership still has an option to arrange for an orderly
transition of decision-making authority. For instance, in the
event of a loss of communication with leadership during a
crisis, arrangements could be made for an alternate
leadership group to take over national command
responsibilities. The alternate national leadership could
adopt, by prearrangement, a wait-and-see posture designed
to determine whether or not an attack was the cause of the
loss of communication. However, if the SLBMs (or other
attacking systems) present a credible threat to central
strategic forces, such arrangements do not buy either
decision-making options or decision-making time.
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Table 1. Possible U.S.-Soviet silo based forces late 1980s to mid-
1990s.
U.S. U.S.S.R.
Si/o Strength and Missile Accuracy
H' igh value Soviet MIRVed missiles are assumed to be
in upgraded, "super-hardened" silos, able to survive the
many effects of nuclear detonations (blast, heat, ground
motion, nuclear radiations, electric field effects, and so
on) including a shock wave of 4,000 pounds per square
inch (psi). Less valuable single warhead missiles are
assumed to be housed in less expensive, "softer" silos,
able to withstand effects equivalent to 1,000 psi.
Differences in silo hardness estimates made by U.S. and
Soviet planners are, for simplicity, accounted for in their
choices of missile accuracy. For example, the U.S.
planner believes MX has an accuracy of 400 feet against
the Soviet 4,000 psi silo, while the Soviet estimates that
MX accuracy is instead 300 feet. In terms of probability
of destruction, the U.S. planner could make the
equivalent assumption that MX has an accuracy of 300
feet, but the upgraded Soviet silo is nine or ten
thousand psi hard, rather than 4,000 psi hard. Estimates
for the Trident II are based on scaling from the MX and
Minuteman III.
Missile System
U.S. Planners "View" Soviet Planners "View"
System System
Reliability* CEP(ft)** Yield (kilotons) Reliability CEP(ft) Yield (kilotons)
MX
Alliance
150
Minuteman
oMX
Figure 5. a) A map of Warren Air Force Base, which is located
in Wyoming, Colorado, and Nebraska. At this site, 100 MX
missiles will replace 100 Minuteman Ills, b) Possible fallout
pattern from a limited attack on MX silos at Warren Air Force
Base. The pattern assumes a 15 mile per hour (mph) westerly
wind at the time of a 100- to 200-megaton attack. Variations
in wind conditions could result in dramatically different
results. If, for instance, the wind carried the fallout cloud
slightly to the south, it would reach Lincoln, Nebraska, about
25 hours after the attack. Although radioactivity would
diminish rapidly, if individuals did not evacuate the area or
seek shelter, 7 to 8 hours exposure to the radiation would be
sufficient to require hospitalization; within 20 hours a lethal
dose would result. If all conditions were the same except that
the prevailing wind happened to be 25 mph, then the cloud
would arrive at Lincoln sooner and initial radiation levels
would be much greater; one hour of exposure would result
in a need for hospitalization, and two hours' exposure would
cause certain death. If these unusually high winds instead
carried the fallout toward Chicago, lethal levels of fallout
could even result there. Thus, although the attack on the MX
would be very limited by the relative measures implied in the
concept of strategic stability, the consequences of the attack
in absolute human terms would be highly unpredictable,
varying only in degrees of horridness. Within the stippled area
unprotected people would receive a lethal dose of radiation
within a week of the attack.
decision-maker a limited attack with such high-
payoff, aimed only at preserving Soviet military
capabilities, might well be worth considering. After
all it might be argued such a limited anti-ICBM
attack would be far less provocative than one
involving 1,000 to 2,000 warheads, and would
therefore be much less likely to provoke a full-scale
U.S. response with remaining bomber and
submarine forces. Furthermore, all the MX-filled
Minuteman silos will be located at a single location
in a sparsely settled area of the central United States
(Figure 5). Hence, a desperate and exhausted Soviet
leadership might well reason that information
provided by U.S. early warning systems would be
adequate for an accurate U.S. assessment of the
limited nature and intent of the attack.
But such a limited Soviet attack against the
MX would deny the United States the ability to
decisively destroy the Soviet silo-based force. Thus,
the U.S. incentive to launch the MXs first, or in
response to any limited Soviet action, would be very
great, and the Soviet incentive for such an attack
would be perhaps greater yet. This circumstance is
as unambiguously destabilizing as any yet postulated
in the strategic debate.
Moreover, there is good reason to believe
that the consequences of such a limited Soviet attack
would not be viewed with equanimity by U.S.
leadership (see Figure 5). There is, of course, good
reason to believe that this also would be understood
by Soviet leadership. In addition, the Soviets would
have to gamble that the U.S. would not launch its
MXs while withholding Minuteman in response to
the limited attack. If this occurred, the Soviets would
be forced to choose between losing most of their
silo-based forces, or launching them, perhaps
guaranteeing a complete exchange of both U.S. and
Soviet ICBMs. Once ICBMs had been launched by
one or both sides, a wholly new range of still more
terrifying actions would likely follow, including a
quick (or even simultaneous) launching of bomber
forces, SLBMs, and theater nuclear systems.
This circumstance points to an important fact
that is often ignored in both strategic planning and
stability analyses: the projected improvements in the
strategic offensive capabilities of both U.S. and
Soviet SLBMs and ICBMs offer no hope of
definitively preventing socially and militarily mortal
responses to a preemptive attack.
The Effect of the Trident
The pathological instability created by the
deployment of 100 MX missiles in silos at Warren Air
Force Base will be the situation in late 1988 or early
1989, before large numbers of Trident II warheads
become available. In late 1989 or early 1990, the first
Trident Us will be deployed. Shortly thereafter, they
will exist in sufficient numbers to offset this extreme
instability.
The rapid introduction of Trident II
submarines comes about because newly constructed
Trident submarines can immediately accommodate
Trident II missiles, and older Trident I carrying
submarines can be converted during their first major
overhaul to carry Trident II (Figure 6). Thus, in 1988
the first Trident II capable submarine will become
available as a test platform for launches of the
Trident II missile, and deployment of operational
missiles will begin at a rapid pace at the end of 1989
or the beginning of 1 990.
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From the point of view of the Soviet decision-
maker who has the objective of preserving Soviet
silo-based military and retaliatory capabilities, the
very limited attack against MX postulated previously
is only interesting insofar as it meets its objectives.
By 1992 or 1993, assuming the high deployment rate
estimated in Figure 6 is correct, sufficient numbers of
"MX-equivalent" Trident II warheads will diminish
the attractiveness of an anti-MX attack. Thus, the
attack against the 100 MXs only remains attractive for
a period of three to five years, between perhaps late
1988 and 1992 to 1994.
After 1993 or 1994, since the U.S. could
redress any strategic imbalance by destroying Soviet
ICBMs with Trident II warheads, even a full-scale
counter-silo attack against all U.S. land-based
systems would cease to preserve Soviet ICBMs.
Thus, almost commensurate with the removal of the
pathological instability created by the MX
deployment, Trident II itself creates a destabilizing
situation by presenting a threat to Soviet silo-based
forces.
There are, however, two closely related but
distinct reasons why Trident II, according to stability
arguments, is less strongly destabilizing than MX; one
is because of the extraordinary vulnerability of the
MX, the other due to the extraordinary
Invulnerability of Trident. Consideration of these two
reasons leads to the following observations:
The introduction of Trident II missiles, while
representing a serious and increasingly
destabilizing threat to Soviet silo-based forces,
would negate the benefits of a limited strike
against U.S. silo-based MX missiles.
While Trident II might force the Soviets to plan
to launch their silo-based forces rapidly, the
system is so impervious to the affects of a
Soviet preemption that the Soviets could not
even hope to reduce, much less eliminate, U.S.
ability to meet any identifiable counter-
military, counter-silo or assured destruction
objectives. Under these conditions, they would
have no incentive to strike first. Although, as
already noted, Soviet preparations to launch
rapidly if the U.S. tried to strike first would
certainly increase the likelihood of accidental
or inadvertent war.
Other Factors
This raises another question. Will the Trident II drive
Soviet decision-makers to see themselves as trapped
in a dangerous use-or-lose circumstance? In fact,
evidence is already emerging to suggest that this may
not be the case.
The Department of Defense has reported that
the Soviets have recently taken steps that indicate a
greatly increased interest in long-range strike aircraft
and air-launched cruise missiles (Figure 7). An
entirely new variant of the Bear bomber (the Bear
H), which probably is a long-range cruise missile
carrier, has been introduced.* This marks the first
new production of a strike version of the Bear
airframe in more than 15 years. It also is known that
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Figure 6. a) The number of Trident II carrying submarines by
year, as reported by the Congressional Research Service, b)
The author's estimates of the number ofat-sea warheads
available on a day-to-day basis and in a crisis. The lines
across the top of the graph indicate the number of warheads
needed to attack all Soviet silos and to send two warheads
against all MIRVed silos.
the Soviets are developing a long-range heavy
bomber, the Blackjack, which appears similar to the
U.S. B-1B bomber, but is larger. This aircraft is
projected to become operational in 1987.
Assuming a modest production rate of one
Bear H a month, followed by a similar rate of
production of Blackjacks starting in 1988, the Soviets
could easily achieve a force of some 90 Bear H and
60 Blackjack bombers by 1993. If the Bear H carries
only 8 long-range air-launched cruise missiles and
the Blackjack carries only 16, then by 1993 the
Soviets could deliver more than 1,700 cruise missile
warheads against the United States with these
bombers alone. If for some unforeseen reason the
Blackjack development program suffers serious
* The Soviet Bear aircraft is a huge, high-speed and high-
endurance four turboprop aircraft that has been in
production for more than 30 years. In addition to several
strategic strike versions of the Bear, there also are distinct
configurations for maritime strike, for over-the-horizon
target acquisition in support of naval forces, for long-range
maritime reconnaissance, and for long-range antisubmarine
warfare.
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delays or failures, Bear H production might, for
instance, be doubled in 1988. By 1993, even if no
Blackjacks are produced, this would result in a
bomber force capable of delivering more than 1,400
air-launched cruise missiles against the United States.
Projections published by the Congressional
Research Service of Soviet SLBM warheads show a
growth in the number of deliverable warheads over
the next decade, mainly because of the introduction
of additional multiple independently-targetable re-
jentry vehicle (MIRV) missiles on a growing number
of modern, quiet, MIRV carrying submarines of the
Typhoon class (Figures 1 and 2). The projections
indicate that the Soviets could have between 4,000
and 5,000 submarine delivered ballistic missile
warheads, with possibly 2,000 of these warheads on
exceptionally survivable ultra-quiet submarines by
the early 1990s. Even if the Soviets could only
deploy half of these forces in a crisis, then on the
order of 2,000 warheads would be available for
retaliation against the United States should war
occur.
It is clear that no properly informed U.S.
decision-maker, unless stressed to the point of
extreme irrationality, would be willing to accept the
consequences of these forces being unleashed on
the United States. It is equally unlikely that informed
Soviet leadership would be willing to accept a similar
fate for their country. Thus, the question comes
back, as it usually does, to what kind of measures are
really useful in reducing the likelihood of a nuclear
war that everyone wants to avoid.
The vulnerability of Soviet silo-based forces is
not just the product of U.S. accuracy improvements,
it is also a self-inflicted vulnerability as the result of
poor Soviet military planning. While concern about
the destabilizing possibilities of highly accurate
ballistic missiles is understandable, it is also true that
both the United States and the Soviet Union have
had options to deploy less vulnerable systems. The
United States has, with all its alleged domestic
political problems, wisely developed diversified
forces. These forces, because they are not use-or-
lose, greatly reduce the technical demands for
disruption-free communications and early warning
systems. They also are greatly forgiving of errors of
judgment, providing decision-makers with assets that
need not be committed rapidly, massively, and
irrevocably. The MX is, unfortunately, an exception
to this wise pattern.
For these reasons, the development of much
more capable and diversified Soviet strategic nuclear
forces should not necessarily be viewed with alarm.
If the Soviets do in fact successfully diversify their
forces, then their dependence on vulnerable silo-
based ballistic missiles would cease. Under these
conditions Trident II would cease to have any
destabilizing effects. These developments may
therefore present important diplomatic opportunities
in the 1990s for negotiated reductions or the
elimination of destabilizing silo-based forces. If this is
3 Long-Range Strike Aircraft
USSR US
Meters Tu-95 Bear Blackjack B-1B B-52
Unrefueled combat 8,300
radius (km)
Max speed (knots) 500
7,300 7,500
1,200 795
Long-Range Cruise Missiles
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Figure 7. a) U.S. and Soviet long-range strike aircraft. The
extremely capable Soviet Bear bomber, first seen by the West
in about 1954, could be the mainstay of a greatly expanded
Soviet bomber force, even into the 21st century, b) Armed
with perhaps seven or eight of the AS-X-15 air-launched
cruise missiles, the Bear could stand-off thousands of
kilometers from the United States and launch its weapons.
c) The great range of this durable and capable turboprop, in
combination with its 3,000-kilometer-range cruise missiles,
would permit the Soviets to fly circuitous routes (solid lines)
to launch points for hard-to-detect cruise missiles (dashed
lines).
what the future holds, the result will almost certainly
be a world that is safer for all.
Until May of 1984, Theodore A. Postol was the Assistant for
Weapons Technology in the Strategic and Theater Nuclear
Warfare Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval
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of Naval Operations on ICBM/SLBM vulnerability. Since then
he has been a Carnegie Foundation Science Fellow at the
Stanford University Center for International Security and Arms
Control.
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The Tomahawk
Nuclear Cruise Missile:
Arguments
For and Against
by Jeffrey S. Duncan
I he controversy surrounding big-ticket weapons
systems such as the MX has obscured the
importance of the cruise missile, which many
consider the technological innovation that will most
affect offensive military firepower in the 1980s.
Current Reagan Administration plans call for the
procurement of 9,000 cruise missiles during the next
decade, some 4,000 of which will be stationed
aboard approximately 180 U.S. Navy surface ships
and attack submarines. Nearly 800 of these sea-
launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) will be armed with
200-kiloton nuclear warheads each 14 times more
powerful than the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima.
In 1984, Congressional concerns about the
Reagan Administration's failure to come up with a
proposal for banning or strictly limiting nuclear
SLCMs prompted calls for restrictions on their
deployment. In the House of Representatives, the
Defense Authorization Bill was amended to ban
funding for the assembly or deployment of nuclear
SLCMs until either the Administration could come
up with a satisfactory way to verify the differences
between nuclear and conventional SLCMs or the
Soviets deployed their new long-range nuclear land-
attack SLCM. Though the Senate rejected this
approach, it urged inclusion of SLCMs in all future
arms control negotiations with the Soviets, and
successfully pressed the Navy to accept intrusive,
on-site inspections as a way to ease verification of
nuclear SLCM limitations.
Given the Reagan Administration's continuing
opposition to a moratorium on nuclear SLCM
deployments and the weapon's de facto exclusion
from arms control proposals, Congressional
pressures to halt or restrict further nuclear SLCM
deployments are likely to continue.
Background
Cruise missiles small, unmanned jet aircraft armed
with either conventional or nuclear warheads have
been part of U.S. and Soviet arsenals throughout the
post-World War II period. The Soviets placed greater
emphasis on cruise-missile systems at first, because
they lacked carrier-based aircraft capable of
attacking U.S. warships. Throughout the 1960s and
1970s, the range of Soviet weapons remained short,
and their accuracy fairly poor.
Early U.S. cruise missiles were large,
unreliable, and, until the 1970s, notoriously
inaccurate. However, U.S. interest in cruise missiles
increased with the advent of new technologies and a
convergence of political calculations a desire for
"bargaining chips" to use in arms-control
negotiations, a need to appease critics of both
Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) I and SALT II
by showing our willingness to pursue new
technologies not covered by the treaties, and a
fascination with the military potential and relatively
low cost of the cruise missile.
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Ironically, the armed services originally
opposed development of the cruise missile. They
feared it would compete for scarce funds with
favorite weapon systems. The Air Force was
concerned that development of a long-range, air-
launched cruise missile (ALCM) would undermine its
rationale for the B-1 bomber; the Navy feared that,
since SLCMs could be placed on any ship and be
used against targets at sea or on land, SLCMs would
compete with big aircraft carriers; and the Army
worried that ground-launched cruise missiles
(GLCMs) would compete with artillery on the
battlefield and with the other services' existing
"tactical" and
"strategic" weaponry, draining
resources from the conventional forces.
Despite the reservations of the military,
Defense Secretary Melvin Laird, Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger, and, later, Defense Secretary
Harold Brown found the cruise-missile option
attractive. Between 1970 and 1980, under the
stewardship of these men, the cruise-missile
program moved from the drawing board to
engineering development to actual flight-testing,
while remaining largely outside the purview of
ongoing arms-control negotiations. As work on the
new missiles progressed, interest in the military
potential of cruise systems and protecting the
growing U.S. lead in the field overcame the original
desire to use the cruise missile as a bargaining chip.
In fact, during SALT II the United States resisted
Soviet efforts to ban deployment of long-range
nuclear-armed cruise missiles. The United States
accepted inclusion of ALCMs in the overall SALT II
ceilings, but resisted attempts to prevent the
deployment of new GLCMs and SLCMs, finally
agreeing to a three-year ban on deployment that
would not interfere with research and development
efforts nor alter the Pentagon's timetable for cruise-
missile deployment.
The Reagan Administration, while informally
abiding by unratified SALT II, considers the
limitations on GLCMs and SLCMs to have lapsed
since they were contained in a protocol to the
treaty set to expire in December of 1 981 . This
Administration began deploying GLCMs (along with
Pershing II ballistic missiles) in the fall of 1983,
prompting a Soviet walkout from talks on limiting
intermediate-range nuclear forces and a Soviet
suspension of strategic arms talks. Though the
Reagan Administration had indicated "everything is
on the table" during those negotiations, it opposed
including SLCMs in either Intermediate Nuclear
Force (INF) or Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
(START), citing the difficulty of verifying SLCM
limitations. The Administration began deploying
nuclear SLCMs in June of 1984.
Negotiations between the United States and
the Soviet Union have resumed in Geneva.
However, it is uncertain whether nuclear SLCMs are
on the agenda, or whether the United States has a
proposal for a ban or strict limitations on these
weapons. In its most recent Arms Control Impact
Statement, the Reagan Administration expressed
skepticism about the possibility of SLCM limits,
noting, "With regard to potential future arms control
agreements, small mobile systems such as cruise
missiles are likely to present difficulties for
verification."
Description and Analysis
The "Tomahawk" Sea-Launched Cruise Missile
Program has three parts: the Tomahawk Anti-Ship
Missile (TASM), the Tomahawk Conventional Land-
Attack Missile (TLAM-C), and the Tomahawk Nuclear
Land-Attack Missile (TLAM-N). Of a total program
budget of some $13.8 billion (in 1977 dollars, the
year the program began), two-thirds is reserved for
the procurement of conventionally armed SLCMs
(2,600 "land-attack" missiles and 600 "anti-ship"
missiles); $1.8 billion is reserved for the nuclear-
tipped version (about 760 nuclear land-attack
missiles). A separate, classified account is reportedly
earmarked for research and development of an
advanced "Stealth" SLCM that will eventually serve
as a follow-up to the Tomahawk.
The Conventional Anti-Ship Missile (TASM)
The TASM is a conventional missile for destroying
enemy navies and keeping open sea lanes in time of
war. With a range of about 300 miles and a 900-
pound high-explosive conventional warhead, the
TASM extends the standoff attack capability of U.S.
surface ships and submarines by a factor of four or
five. These missiles became operational aboard
attack submarines in November, 1983, with the first
operational deployments on surface ships in June,
1984. Outside analysts note that vessels armed with
the TASM could threaten an enemy vessel within
200,000 square miles, and could prevent the
movement of enemy ships through channels less
than 500 miles wide.
Similar but less sophisticated anti-ship
cruise missiles have been used since 1967, when an
Egyptian patrol boat used a Soviet-made SLCM to
sink the Israeli destroyer Elath. TASM supporters
hope that TASMs will endow U.S. surface warships
similarly a capability previously limited to carriers
with bomb-laden aircraft.
Total program acquisition cost for the TASM is
estimated at $1.9 billion. The fiscal-year 1986
request is for about $290 million for 97 missiles
(Table 1).
The Conventional Land-Attack Missile (TLAM-C)
Like the TASM, the TLAM-C is a conventional missile
deployed on ships; unlike TASM, the TLAM-C is for
use against land-based targets such as airfields,
communications centers, and industrial complexes.
Already deployed on the battleships New Jersey and
Iowa, the TLAM-C allows ships to project power
ashore, from distances that previously would have
required carrier-based aircraft.
The TLAM-C ranges up to 700 miles, can
carry either a single 1,000-pound warhead or
multiple small submunitions (bomblets), and has an
accuracy approaching 30 feet. It would be suitable
for use against the Soviet Union, whose
sophisticated air defense system makes manned
bomber attacks very costly; it also would be
adaptable for use in the Third World. For example,
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Table 1. Planned U.S. SLCM procurements.
FY80 FY81 FY82 FY83 FY84 FY85 FY86 FY87 Planned Total
TLAM-N
flight-testing program, but though the U.S. Navy
expected it to become operational in 1984,
apparently it has not. Recent expectations are that
the SS-NX-21 will be deployed on one or more
classes of Soviet submarines later this year. There are
no indications of plans for deploying this missile on
surface vessels.
A second nuclear land-attack SLCM, the SS-
NX-24, is under development, with initial flight tests
expected to begin onboard a converted Yankee-
class submarine. The SS-NX-24 is physically much
larger than the SS-NX-21, has a greater range, and
probably will be capable of reaching supersonic
speeds. It is expected to become operational within
the next two years.
According to 1985 testimony by U.S. Navy
Intelligence Chief Admiral John L. Butts, "The SS-NX-
21 probably is intended primarily for theater
applications, but also likely would be employed for
strikes against U.S. targets such as command,
control, and communications facilities and naval
bases." In previous testimony, Admiral Butts stated,
"The other new missile [the SS-NX-24] . . . likely is
intended to cover targets such as major industrial
centers, key military facilities, and vital C
3
[command, control, and communications] sites in
the U.S."
The U.S. Navy reported that the Soviets are
working on stealth technologies for their SLCMs, and
"could deploy some retrofitted . . . cruise missiles this
decade whose radar signatures will be reduced
substantially." Such missiles would be difficult to
detect and locate, particularly when flying at low
altitudes. For this reason, Reagan Administration
officials are concerned that these new Soviet SLCMs
might "negate" current plans for protecting the U.S.
bomber force, since they could arrive before U.S.
strategic bombers had a chance to escape the
runway. To improve detection and tracking of Soviet
SLCMs, the U.S. is researching infrared sensors, but
they are not expected to be deployed until the early
to mid-1 990s.
Arguments For the Nuclear SLCM
Supporters of the nuclear Tomahawk argue that it
would be low-cost and highly effective, and would
provide an additional "strategic reserve."
Deployment of these weapons on ships, proponents
assert, vastly upgrades the Navy's ability to deter
Soviet attacks by threatening retaliation, and by
enhancing ships' ability to attack Soviet targets
ashore. Proponents argue that the nuclear
Tomahawk is not inherently destabilizing because its
slow speed prevents its being perceived as a first-
strike weapon. Major points in the argument for the
nuclear SLCM are as follows:
1. Increased flexibility and effectiveness
With the deployment of the nuclear Tomahawk,
proponents note, the Navy will grow from a fleet
centered on 14 nuclear-capable aircraft carriers to a
fleet with more than 180 potential nuclear-strike
platforms. This force will be able to threaten areas of
the Soviet Union not now targetable by naval forces,
stretching Soviet air defenses beyond their
capabilities. Proponents also contend that the new
SLCM force will provide flexibility in Third World
areas facing a Soviet threat in the Persian Gulf, for
instance, where we should have the flexibility to
respond to a Soviet incursion with forces more
effective than our present conventional weapons
and troops, but less provocative or destructive than a
strategic nuclear strike.
2. Improved survivability
By deploying the nuclear Tomahawk on cruisers,
destroyers, and battleships, proponents argue that
we disperse our nuclear retaliatory threat so widely
that any Soviet attempt to attack our sea-based
deterrent would be doomed.
3. Strategic reserve
Proponents also argue that nuclear-armed SLCMs,
especially when deployed on submarines, will
provide a credible and survivable nuclear arsenal (a
strategic reserve) that could be used in a limited
nuclear conflict against targets of naval interest (such
as ports or naval airbases) or in a strike against
military or industrial targets in Eastern Europe, the
Soviet Union, or elsewhere. Such a capability would
be particularly useful in a protracted nuclear conflict,
when other nuclear forces already had been
expended.
4. Low cost
Supporters of the nuclear SLCMs point out that they
are the least expensive nuclear deterrent yet
developed. Supporters assert that the $3 million per
missile price tag for the Tomahawk program is
virtually nothing to pay for a weapon that secures
our second strike capability and augments our
strategic reserve especially when compared to
other strategic programs (such as the MX, which will
cost more than $70 million per missile).
5. Soviet SLCM threat-
Supporters of the nuclear Tomahawk argue that the
impending Soviet deployment of new nuclear
SLCMs (the SS-NX-21 and SS-NX-24) makes it
essential for the United States to move ahead with
our own nuclear SLCM program.
While the Soviets admittedly have long had
nuclear SLCMs, their new missiles pose a much
greater threat to the United States than any
previously deployed: their greater range, speed, and
accuracy allow the Soviet Navy to target U.S. tactical
and strategic assets from a safe "standoff" distance.
To deter the Soviets from ever using these weapons,
the United States must similarly threaten the Soviet
Union: if the Soviets know that any use of their
nuclear SLCMs could provoke a U.S. response in
kind, they will have few incentives to initiate such an
exchange.
While proponents of the Tomahawk concede
that it might have been preferable had both sides
chosen not to deploy these new weapons, they note
that the Soviet Union and not the United States
"started" the SLCM race, and assert that it is too late
to put the nuclear SLCM genie back in its bottle.
Proponents hold that the pace of Soviet SLCM
development indicates a commitment to the
exploitation of cruise missile technologies, and claim
it would be naive to expect a unilateral U.S. halt of
the nuclear Tomahawk program to lead the Soviets
to abandon their programs.
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The Case Against the Nuclear SLCM
Opposition to nuclear SLCMs has been driven by
questions on the arms control implications of SLCMs'
deployment, and by doubts over the weapon's
actual military utility. Underlying these arguments is
a fundamental concern that deployment of this
weapon is a major step away from mutual
deterrence, and a major step toward the adoption of
highly destabilizing "warfighting" and "first strike"
strategies.
1. First strike capability-
Opponents of nuclear SLCMs argue that perhaps the
most dangerous implication of the new weapon is a
little-discussed one: that, by serving as a new
"strategic reserve," SLCMs free up our existing
SLBMs from their second-strike retaliatory mission,
making them available as a first-strike force against
"hard" Soviet military targets.
Opponents note that as SLBMs (such as the
Trident II or D-5) become more accurate (see page
38), the Soviets will view SLCM deployments as part
of a larger U.S. attempt to attain a disarming
counterforce capability. This will impel the Soviets to
accelerate their efforts to acquire similar
capabilities resulting, in the long run, in decreased
security for both sides.
2. Limited nuclear war fighting weapon
Critics of the nuclear Tomahawk question the
necessity of deploying the missile to fight a "tactical"
nuclear war at sea. They argue that the U.S. does not
need additional warheads to threaten targets of
"naval interest," such as ports or airbases, and assert
that it is far from certain that a tactical nuclear war
could be kept limited for very long, since it would
involve attacks on Soviet territory difficult to
distinguish from "strategic" strikes, and would
inevitably result in substantial damage to Soviet
society. Deploying nuclear SLCMs in support of a
warfighting strategy, critics hold, will only further
contribute to the mistaken belief that a nuclear war
can be controlled or won, when in actuality, any use
of nuclear weapons is much more likely to result in a
massive and mutually devastating exchange.
3. Arms control: verification problems
Critics emphasize that the nuclear SLCM seriously
threatens future prospects for verifiable arms-control
agreements. Noting that the nuclear Tomahawk is
externally indistinguishable from its conventional
version, critics assert that the Tomahawk's presence
cannot be detected easily through the usual
"national technical means" of verification.
If national technical means are insufficient,
say critics, any limits on nuclear SLCMs would have
to rely on intrusive, on-site inspections (which may
not be acceptable to either side and may not be fully
effective) or on "counting rules" that would treat
each SLCM carrier as a nuclear weapons platform.
(Such rules have been used successfully to count air-
launched cruise missiles, by assuming each platform
holds up to a certain maximum load.)
Some opponents of the SLCM argue that
although any SLCM negotiations will be complex,
ultimately a total ban on nuclear SLCM deployment
would be far easier to verify than would some
numerical ceiling. Even if such a ban must provide
for cooperative measures for verification (such as on-
site inspections or the emplacement of "black
boxes" to detect nuclear radiation or monitor SLCM
production), arms-control advocates state that a ban,
under which the deployment of even one new
nuclear SLCM would be a violation, could be
adequately verified.
Other arms-control advocates think a full-
scale deployment ban may be difficult, but that strict
limitations in U.S. and Soviet deployments are
possible. Given that the U.S. has proceeded with the
nuclear Tomahawk, and that Soviet deployments of
new SLCMs are believed imminent, solutions other
than a ban must be explored. For example, counting
rules comparable to those developed to determine
the numbers of warheads on ballistic missiles could
be adapted for SLCMs. Such limits, despite a lack of
precision, would be preferable to leaving SLCMs out
of any future accord and thus creating a loophole
the Soviets would surely exploit.
4. Military utility
Some critics of the nuclear SLCM suspect the missile
will never be able to perform its warfighting mission.
They also doubt the desirability of transforming the
entire U.S. fleet into a strategic target.
These critics point out that although the
proliferation of nuclear weapons at sea may indeed
complicate Soviet planning, such proliferation will
greatly multiply the Soviet incentive to target the
entire U.S. Navy for immediate destruction in any
future conflict. This would accelerate Soviet anti-
submarine and anti-ship warfare efforts, thereby
reducing the survivability of our vessels.
5. Response to Soviet capabilities
Does Soviet SLCM development justify U.S.
development? opponents of the nuclear
Tomahawk point out that the Soviet threat is far from
new: the Soviets have had nuclear-armed anti-ship
SLCMs since the 1950s and nuclear land-attack
SLCMs since the 1960s. Neither fact has concerned
our strategic planners, mostly because the United
States had (and has) a wide variety of nuclear
systems for deterring the use of Soviet SLCMs.
Opponents concede that the new Soviet
SLCMs are greatly improved, with increased range,
accuracy, and speed; they assert, however, that the
deployment of these weapons, far from providing a
rationale for the nuclear Tomahawk, shows the need
for arms control covering this type of weapon.
Opponents of the nuclear Tomahawk argue
that the United States even with technologically
superior SLCMs, would ultimately be the loser of an
SLCM arms race because the United States, unlike
the Soviet Union, has its major targets (capital,
industrial centers, key military installations) near its
coastline, within range of Soviet SLCMs. In this
sense, opponents hold, the U.S. and not the
U.S.S.R. is the most vulnerable to SLCMs, and
should therefore lead the fight for a ban on
deployment.
6. Heightened nuclear tensions
Some opponents of nuclear SLCMs, who believe
nonetheless in a strong and visible U.S. Navy, fear
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that the potential for deployment of nuclear SLCMs
on most major combatants will ultimately undercut
the use of the U.S. Navy for "showing the flag"
abroad, and could transform all naval shows of force
into exercises in nuclear saber rattling.
These critics point out that there are many
instances in which the United States wants to use
the Navy to support diplomatic objectives, but in
which a signal of nuclear capacity might be
provocative. For example, if the battleship New
lersey, when deployed off Lebanon, had been armed
with the nuclear SLCMs it is now slated to receive,
its presence there might have been viewed as
further escalating our involvement. It also might have
become an attractive target to factional rivals in the
region, who would have gained immediate
recognition if they had attacked a strategic nuclear
platform. By blurring the distinctions between
nuclear and conventional naval power, critics fear, a
Tomahawk-armed U.S. Navy could be handicapped
in new ways.
7. Complicates relations with allies
Critics note that nuclear SLCMs could complicate
U.S. -Allied relations in some delicate negotiations
relating to naval visits. Some of our allies prohibit the
stationing of nuclear weapons in their territories. For
example, New Zealand and Iceland ban all port visits
of nuclear-armed U.S. warships. Even more of our
allies have public constituencies that respond to
visits of nuclear-capable vessels with large protests
and anti-American demonstrations. Already a
coalition of citizens' organizations in Japan has rallied
against Tt>mahawk deployment, and Reagan
Administration officials reportedly fear that japan
and other allies, such as Australia, Norway, and
Spain, could take action to restrict U.S. naval visits-
making future stops at "friendly" ports much more
complex and contentious issues.
Recently, New Yorkers objected to the
planned basing of the nuclear-weapons-capable
battleship Iowa in New York. If such anti-nuclear
concerns spread, even homeporting arrangements in
the United States may be complicated.
Verification Stance
The 1985 Defense Department Authorization Bill
required the Administration to submit a report on
SLCM verification. This report was submitted in
classified form this April, and reportedly focuses on
intrusive on-site inspection of U.S. and Soviet ships.
Navy Secretary John F. Lehman has testified to
Congress that the Navy will "accept whatever
intrusive means of arms control inspection, including
allowing Soviet inspection teams aboard our ships,
whatever is negotiated."
leffrey S. Duncan is Legislative Assistant to Congressman
Edward I. Markey (D.-Mass.); until May, 1985, he was Staff
Consultant on arms control and military affairs for the
Congressional Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus. This
article was adapted from a May 1 984 fact sheet prepared for
members of the caucus. The views expressed do not
necessarily reflect the views or concensus of the caucus.
A Tomahawk missile is launched from the U.S.S. Merrill (DD-
976) in a 1983 test. (General Dynamics photo)
61
Polar
Strategic
Concerns
by Melvin A. Conant
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Soviet forces
regularly deploy through the Arctic. Shown are potential
NATO fleet movements (solid arrows), potential Soviet fleet
movements (repeated arrows), and key zones for preventing a
Soviet fleet breakout into the Atlantic or Pacific (hatched
areas).
In recent years, a great deal has been written about
the untapped resources of the north and south polar
regions in relation to our nation's strategic needs.
Most of the writing has been speculation because
there is inadequate geophysical coverage to date on
these vast and inhospitable regions. Although
comments such as "huge potential hydrocarbon
deposits . . . more than 50 percent of the world's
petroleum reserves lie north of the Arctic circle" are
common, there is scant evidence to back them up.
Regardless, enthusiasts of the polar regions persist in
raising hopes of future "Eldorados." This may some
day become true, but the prospects are so distant
that our government or companies certainly cannot
plan on it, even generally in their long-term strategic
forecasts.*
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* See Louis Ray's characterization in Arctic Energy
Resources, Comite Arctique, September 1982.
The Antarct/c is claimed by a number of different nations; some of the claims overlap. Also shown are the locations of some
potential resources, which are unlikely to be exploited in the near future.
As for other resources, some see the world
benefiting from storehouses of metals; some day,
perhaps. But not until other sources in more
accessible places have been depleted a century
possibly from now. Nowhere, however, in the Arctic
or in the Antarctic, have commercially recoverable
deposits of iron, copper, chrome, nickel,
molybdenum, gold, silver, tin, and so on been found
in large quantities, easily accessible.
Only in a very few areas of the north polar
region have commercially recoverable petroleum
reserves been established on the North Slope of
Alaska, and perhaps in the Canadian Beaufort Sea.
Large fields may lie in the East Arctic Islands of the
Canadian Archipelago, offshore of northern Norway,
and in the Soviet Arctic (east and west), but they are
not exploitable now, nor will they be in the
foreseeable future. The Soviet Union, with urgent
energy priorities, may use some other measure than
"commercially recoverable" and hence will continue
to explore and exploit their Arctic lands on a scale
far surpassing the efforts of any other country.
This brings us to an aspect of the north polar
region that is increasingly troublesome. What are the
likely consequences of the ever-darkening Arctic
haze the result of pollutants from industrial
economies that has become so noticeable? Only a
few decades ago the atmosphere in polar regions
was clear. Could it be that concern about the Arctic's
impact on weather worldwide will be of far greater
importance than its prospective minerals or
petroleum?*
* For a particularly useful review of non-defense North
Polar matters, see Arctic Ocean Issues in the 1980s and in
the 1990s, edited by Douglas M. Johnston, Law of the Sea
Institute, University of Hawaii, 1981.
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The strategic stakes in the polar regions,
notably those in the Arctic, include the shadowy
world of high-flying aircraft, missiles, and
submarines. In the north polar region, many of the
deadliest games of force and counterforce, of
deterrence, and of matching weapon systems are in
continuous play. It is an area of great importance to
the defensive and offensive capabilities of both the
Soviet Union and the United States.*
The south polar region does not have a
strategic importance comparable to the North; the
strategic value of the south lies chiefly where it did
in World Wars I and II in the ocean approaches to
the Cape of Good Hope and to Cape Horn, and in
the seas that stretch southward to the polar lands.
The importance of the Falklands in two world
wars, and perhaps again in the recent confrontation
between Britain and Argentina, is justification
enough for a continuing British presence in that part
of the world. But having mentioned these
approaches to south polar seas, there is little to add
about their strategic use.**
There may, however, still be occasions when
national conflicts over jurisdictional claims will
plague the Antarctic (for example, between Chile
and Argentina (see page 93), or between Britain and
Argentina), but these probably will be local
engagements. Thus they would in no way be
comparable to the more dangerous scenario of a
massive clash of strategic forces in the north polar
areas.
The north polar region is the shortest route
the Soviet Union could take to the United States and
Canada in the event of a war between the two
superpowers. It thus would be the favored route for
long-range strategic aircraft deployed out of the
Soviet Far East, East Siberia, and from the complex of
bases in the Soviet West Arctic, particularly on the
Kola Peninsula, which houses the largest naval base
complex in the world.
When manned aircraft were superseded by
strategic missiles of intercontinental range it became
possible to project trajectories in space streaming
above the Arctic in both directions aimed at North
America and the industrial heartland of the Soviet
Union. These missile systems have been succeeded
but not displaced by another weapons system
composed of nuclear-armed, low-flying intermediate
range cruise missiles launched either from aircraft or
from surface or submarine platforms. The advantage
of the Arctic to most weapon systems is in the
* A most prescient interpretation of Arctic strategic stakes is
found in C. R. Lindsey's Stragetic Aspects of the Polar
Regions, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Toronto,
1977.
**
Far and away the most useful "briefing packet" on all
aspects of the south polar region is provided by the
International Institute for Environment and Development,
1717 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C.
20036. See The Resource Guide on Antarctica (including
update, November 1, 1984).
shortest alert time to the other side afforded by
Arctic trajectories.
Hence, all countries involved in the use of
Arctic spaces are committed to early warning
systems that locate, identify, and analyze the
purposes of aircraft and submarine movements.
Sensors are placed along ocean bottoms, in the
approaches to straits, or on land as in the alert
systems of North America, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, and those of the Soviet Union. Other
systems are airborne or in satellites that ceaselessly
monitor every detectable movement in the waters,
under the ice, and through space. These intricate
networks are designed to alert defense forces to
incoming weapons, to chart their paths, and to
monitor and in some cases direct the ensuing battle.
The next generation of sensors affecting the Arctic
will almost surely be developed as part of what is
now referred to as "Star Wars" or the U.S. Strategic
Defense Initiative.
The forces maneuvering against each other in
the Arctic have two critical and different tasks. From
the viewpoint of the Soviet Union, it has to be able
to send its naval forces out from the Kola base
complex and from the Soviet Far East, past islands,
straits, and other land configurations into the North
Atlantic, or into the Arctic region and beyond. These
Soviet naval units must be able to gather intelligence,
maneuver, and search for U.S. naval ships. Unless
Soviet naval forces, aided by aircraft and satellite
detectors, can move through such constricted seas
undetected, they cannot prevent NATO forces from
moving into approaches to important Soviet bases
on the Kola Peninsula, a protected haven for long-
range missile systems, including nuclear submarines.
Similarly, the Bering Strait is an important passage for
the Soviet Union in moving ships to and from the
Pacific.
For the forces of either side, the Arctic is thus
a zone of transit or of hovering and of waiting. Ice,
which has been for centuries the bane of surface
shipping, is a natural and secretive cover for
submarines. Ice can be a screen between subsurface
and atmospheric detectors; ice is also a continuously
moving phenomenon whose location and effects on
temperature gradients can conceal submarine
movements, sometimes rendering these vessels
undetectable to even the most sophisticated of
antisubmarine warfare devices.
While the Soviet Union still has to deal with
the same historic land and island barriers to the
outward bound movement of ships, it does not have
any need to make arrangements with allies to insure
effective use is made of the Arctic or of the
atmosphere above it. This freedom from political
constraints is in marked contrast to NATO forces,
which must rely on prior arrangements with Canada,
Greenland, Iceland, Norway, Britain, and Japan.
While most of the arrangements relate to seaborne
forces and aircraft surveillance over the Greenland-
Iceland-United Kingdom gaps, similar
understandings pertain in the Pacific regarding
Canadian and Japanese assistance to the United
States.
Arctic detection networks across North
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The U.S.S. Skate at the North Pole. (U.S. Navy photo)
\merica range from Alaska to Greenland. These
equire continuing technical improvements to insure
heir effectiveness as weapon systems change and
ipproaches to tactics shift. There is now full
acceptance in Canada of that nation's automatic (and
jnavoidable) involvement both in countering threats
o North America and in the support of U.S. strategic
deterrent forces.
Most recently, Canada and the United States
iecided that the Distant Early Warning Line, strung
icross Canada, would be improved, at a cost of $1.2
million (with Canada assuming for the first time a
.ignificant share of the expense 40 percent), into a
lew North Warning System better able to cope with
lew generations of weapons.
Canada and the United States also have
edefined their plans for the defense of North
America into an Air Defense Master Plan whose
each is deep into the Arctic. None of these
igreements have been concluded easily, however,
"he Canadian reaction to U.S. testing of cruise
nissiles over northern Canadian lands is a continuing
eminder of that nation's reluctance to do more than
t feels necessary in a common continental defense.
A major, if presently dormant, issue between
lanada and the United States is the regime
;overning transit of ships through the Canadian
Arctic Archipelago. Canadians assert these are
internal" waters or passages under Canadian
erritorial control; the United States regards them as
nternational passages. While much of this argument
effects Canada's assertion of its sovereignty, the
ocus of the debate is on the practice of notification
ind passage of warships largely American which
leither country wishes to identify in ways helpful to
he Soviet Union. This issue is unlikely to be resolved
n the near future.*
There also are concerns in the United States
jbout Greenlander and Icelandic attitudes toward
* For discussion of these matters, see U.S. Arctic Interests in
the 1980s and 1990s, edited by Kurt M. Shusterich and
William E. Westermeyer, Springier-Verleg, 1984.
their commitments to Atlantic defense. Their
territories are so crucial to allied defenses that great
pressure should be brought to bear to assure access
to their lands. Any possibility, however remote, of a
Soviet presence in these lands including
Svalbard is unthinkable.
Svalbard is a possession of Norway. There is
deep Soviet concern that these islands pose a threat
to the Kola Peninsula. Moreover, because Svalbard
lies on the southern edge of Arctic ice, Soviet naval
passage between Svalbard and northern Norway is a
near requirement the waters consititute a naval
"artery" for the U.S.S. R. Consequently, the Soviets
would welcome neutrality for Svalbard; on the other
hand, NATO has advantages in and near Svalbard
that would be very difficult to relinquish in favor of
"neutrality."* Moreover, Svalbard lies directly under
the arc along which strategic missiles and long-range
aircraft of either side presumably would fly.
The precise location of the Soviet-U.S.
boundary as it lies through the Bering Strait and
across the Navarin Basin (which may have an oil and
gas potential) is an example of another strategic
problem. This is a dispute that neither side is
prepared to make an issue of at this time. Still,
Navarin lies very close to a critical passage,
important to the Soviet Union and to the United
States.
On rare occasions, the United States tests
Soviet reactions to U.S. ships approaching Soviet
Arctic passages. Achievement of an all-weather
capability would allow the Soviet Union the
important strategic option of transferring some of its
warships from the Barents to the Bering Sea, thereby
avoiding the vulnerabilities of a long sea passage
around the Eurasian continent.
For much of the last decade and a half, a
* See
"Defending the Far North," by Tomas Ries, in the
International Defense Review, No. 7, 1 984, and "Soviet
Options on NATO's Northern Flank," Major General R. C.
Bowman, USAF, Ret., in the /Armed Forces lournal, April
1984.
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common tactic used by both superpowers has
allowed for long-range missile submarines to
encroach on each other's territory. In recent years,
this tactic has changed as the greatly increased range
of submarine-launched ballistic missiles allows the
vessels to remain close to home, obviating the earlier
requirement to be in or transiting Arctic seas. In this
respect, there is less need for strategic forces to
exploit the Arctic environment. However, this has
not closed down an Arctic watch by either
superpower. If strategic surprise is ever achieved, it
will most likely be by a complex mix of forces of
which the long-range component may be the most
important, but not the only element.
Finally, there is the goal of a number of Arctic
peoples, including Scandinavians, to create nuclear-
free zones in an effort to limit their own involvement
in and exposure to nuclear tensions and perhaps to
nuclear war itself. By having nuclear-free zones, the
intention also is to set observable limits on where
forces are and how they may operate. It is unlikely
that proponents of such zones will succeed in
establishing them, but those advocating them
constitute a democratically organized voice in the
Arctic. Whether their goal could, in fact, be achieved
through the withdrawal of nuclear forces is less
certain.
In short, it is regrettable, but unavoidable, that
the northern polar region is so deeply enmeshed in
the strategic maneuvering of the superpowers. But
that is the condition; a circumstance which, for the
foreseeable future, will overshadow resource
development, concern over what is happening to
global weather as a result of pollutants concentrated
in the Arctic skies, or the appeals of peoples whose
wish is to be left to their own desires and devices. If
anything about the Arctic is certain, it is that it will be
decades before the strategic imperatives mentioned
in this article will fade away; would that it could be
otherwise.
Me/v/'n A. Conant is Chairman of the Senior Advisors
Committee to the Marine Policy and Ocean Management
Center at the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution. He
also is author of several North American defense studies,
including The Long Polar Watch. A specialist in world energy
resources, Conant was formerly professor at the U.S. National
War College.
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/.//ce (he Coast Guard itself, this 378-foot high endurance cutter (the U.S.C.C.C. Sherman) must tackle numerous missions,
including long-range search and rescue, ocean station patrol, and military readiness. She is based in Boston, Mass. (U.S. Coast
Guard photo)
The Role
of the U.S.
Coast Guard
Table 1. U.S. Coast Guard missions.
by Porter Hoagland III
I hroughout its history, the missions of the United
States Coast Guard have paralleled ocean-use
patterns in the United States. Today, the Coast
Guard has regulatory or enforcement authority for
drug smuggling, illegal immigration, a coastal military
"maritime defense zone," piracy, search and rescue
of lives in peril at sea, buoys and lighthouses, vessel
traffic, port security, fisheries management, ocean
dumping, oil pollution, and marine sanctuaries,
among others (see Table 1). These multiple and
sometimes disparate responsibilities are tied together
by the Coast Guard's ability to operate in the marine
environment. Because the Coast Guard's
responsibilities enhance the welfare and safety of
U.S. citizens in their use of ocean resources, the
Mission Responsibility
Enforcement of Laws
and Treaties
Search and Rescue
Aids to Navigation
Marine Safety
Marine Environmental
Protection
Military Readiness
Polar Ice Operations
Cutter and aircraft patrols on the high
seas and within U.S. jurisdiction for:
drug smuggling, illegal immigration,
highjacking or theft of vessels, fisheries
violations, other unlawful activities.
Nationwide system of boats, aircraft,
cutters, and rescue coordination
centers on 24-hour alert.
Short-range aids to navigation (buoys
and lights), long-range aids to
navigation (Loran-C), bridge
administration, and domestic
icebreaking.
Merchant vessel inspection, licensing of
merchant-marine personnel, boat
safety standards, recreational boater
education, Coast Guard Auxiliary
support, and ports and waterways
security.
Aerial oil pollution patrols, pollution
investigations, monitoring cargo
transfer operations, oil pollution
removal, hazardous substance spill
cleanup, ocean dumping surveillance.
Individual and unit training, joint naval
training exercises, and Coast Guard
single and multiship operations in:
antisubmarine warfare, inshore
undersea warfare, convoy escort, and
selected other responsibilities.
Icebreakers or ice-strengthened cutters
operate to facilitate commerce,
support Coast Guard programs, and
support the requirements of other
federal agencies on a reimbursable
basis.
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Buoy tending (maintaining navigational buoys) is one of the
Coast Guard's responsibilities. (U.S. Coast Guard photo)
Coast Guard contributes in a very real sense to the
security of the nation.
History
The Coast Guard's law-enforcement mission
predates its other missions. In 1789, Congress
established customs duties on all imports as well as
tonnage duties on maritime shipping. This was a first
step toward financing the nascent republic's
burgeoning national debt. The following year,
Congress created the Revenue Cutter Service as an
agency of the Treasury Department to enforce
customs laws. When the U.S. Navy became a
permanent, cabinet-level department in 1798,
Congress established that, in the event of a national
emergency, the Revenue Cutter Service could be
transferred from the Treasury to the Navy
Department.
The Revenue Cutter Service's maritime duties
grew over the years as the value of an ocean-going
constabulary became more apparent. Early on, the
service conducted search-and-rescue operations as a
sideline to customs enforcement. In 1819, the
service was given authority to suppress the slave
trade and piracy. Later, such diverse tasks as
provision of medical aid to deep-sea fishermen,
suppression of merchant vessel mutinies, protection
of the safety of lives at sea during regattas and
marine parades, and enforcement of sponge-fishing
regulations were added to its responsibilities.
Congress authorized the Lifesaving Service-
established in 1848 along U.S. coasts to aid in the
rescue of lives and property from shipwrecks to
merge with the Revenue Cutter Service in 1915. This
combination became known as the Coast Guard.
The Coast Guard increased its responsibilities by
assimilating other agencies, including, in 1939, the
Lighthouse Service and, in 1942, the Bureau of
Marine Inspection and Navigation. Several
unsuccessful attempts have been made to move the
Coast Guard from the Treasury Department: first to
the Navy after World War I, then to the Commerce
Department in the late 1960s (into a proposed
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration),
and more recently to the Defense Department.
In 1967, in part because of its increasingly
diverse responsibilities concerning marine
transportation, the Coast Guard was moved from
Treasury to the newly formed Department of
Transportation (DOT). Within DOT, the Coast Guard
is both a maritime regulatory agency and a law
enforcement arm of the federal government.
Additionally, the Coast Guard remains one of the
five armed services of the United States.
During World Wars I and II, the Coast Guard
was transferred temporarily to the Navy Department.
Since then, although no international conflict has
been of a scale to require such a transfer, smaller
numbers of Coast Guard ships and personnel have
been placed under the direction of the Navy. The
Coast Guard served in Korea, where it organized a
South Korean Coast Guard; in Vietnam, where it
worked as a coastal and riverine naval force; and in
Grenada, where it provided a post-invasion security
presence.
In very recent history (the 1970s), Congress
has enacted laws that give the Coast Guard
substantial new responsibilities, particularly in the
areas of water pollution control, ports and waterways
safety, and fisheries enforcement. Coast Guard
resources, however, have increased at a decidedly
slow pace, incommensurate with this recent growth
of responsibility.
Resources
About the size of the Department of Justice, the
Coast Guard has more personnel and a larger budget
than the Department of Commerce. On the other
hand, Coast Guard resources (personnel, budget,
and physical capital) are small in comparison with
those of the other U.S. armed forces. The Coast
Guard maintains about one-twentieth of the U.S.
Navy's manpower.
The Coast Guard employs roughly 39,000
active-duty military personnel; 5,500 civilians; and
12,250 selected reservists, who are ready to be
activated in an emergency. It also has a unique
volunteer civilian component called the Coast Guard
Auxiliary, which numbers approximately 40,000. The
Auxiliary assists the Coast Guard in search and
rescue, boating safety, and public education.
From 1981 to 1984, the number of Coast
Guard personnel, both military and civilian, has
remained relatively stable. In the late 1970s
reenlistment was a substantial problem, dropping to
a low of 16 percent in 1979. However, recent pay
hikes for military personnel and the lack of
employment opportunities outside the service have
boosted the reenlistment rate after a first term of
service (usually four years) to almost 60 percent. It is
unclear what the effect might be on this service of
the recent discussions of cuts in military retirement
benefits.
The Coast Guard's operating budget
represents almost two-thirds of its total annual
budget (approximately $2.5 billion see Figure 1).
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The other third includes capital expenses and a
general category that covers retirement pay and
reserve training, among other things. During the late
1970s and early 1980s, the Coast Guard's total
budget actually declined in real (adjusted for
inflation) dollars, even as regulatory responsibilities
grew.
Enforcement of laws and treaties, search and
rescue, and aids to navigation remain the Coast
Guard's most important missions, accounting for
almost two-thirds of the operating budget. During
the three-year period, 1981 to 1984, the Coast
Guard's budget increased about 5 percent in real
terms. Law and treaty enforcement, military
readiness, and marine environmental protection
gained in funding, while the budget shares of polar
icebreaking operations and marine safety missions
were cut back. The Coast Guard's operating
expenses for enforcement of laws and treaties now
exceed those for search and rescue.
One physical capital resource limitation for
the service has always been its aircraft and cutters
(vessels more than 65 feet long). The Coast Guard
has 49 high- and medium-endurance cutters (Table
2). A high-endurance cutter is expected to be able to
operate at sea for an extended period of 30 to 45
days, while a medium-endurance cutter can operate
at sea for 10 to 30 days. Several of these cutters have
been in service more than 40 years, which makes
them quite old. Downtime when a cutter is not in
use because of routine maintenance 01 a
breakdown has been a problem; in 1984, all
cutters together averaged 36.7 percent downtime
(see Figure 2). By the late 1980s, the Coast Guard
will be decommissioning old cutters at a faster rate
than it will be bringing new cutters on line.
Because of this age factor, the Coast Guard is
in the midst of an ambitious building and renovation
program for both cutters and smaller utility boats.
The agency is working on the design of several new,
small boats, as well as a 600-ton catamaran or
SWATH (small waterplane area twin-hull) vessel. The
Table 2. U.S. Coast Guard high- and medium-endurance cutter
service life summary* (As of April 1, 1984)
Number
The Coast Guard icebreaker Polar Star breaks a swath
through ice in McMurdo Sound off Antarctica. (U.S. Coast
Guard photo)
transport turboprops. Several of the C-1 30s will
require major renovations or replacement soon. The
Coast Guard recently acquired 41 Falcon search-
and-surveillance fixed-wing jets. Some Falcons will
be equipped with the highly sophisticated AIREYE
infrared surveillance system. AIREYE can detect,
map, and identify selected targets such as oil spills.
The effective use of this aircraft has been slowed by
technical problems with its engine.
Mission Priorities
In 1982, Vice President George Bush headed a task
force aimed at two apparent problems in the
southeastern United States: the increased
immigration of people from Caribbean countries
(such as Cuba and Haiti), and the smuggling of drugs.
The Vice President charged the Coast Guard to
"immediately and significantly increase its forces and
manpower in the south Florida area to help in the
coming months with the interdiction of illegal drugs
and aliens." Subsequently, Admiral John B. Hayes,
the Commandant of the Coast Guard, testified
before Congress that this shift in priorities would
necessitate reductions in north and central Atlantic
search-and-rescue response capabilities and fisheries
enforcement patrols.
This case illustrates the Coast Guard's
renowned mission-switching, or multimission,
capability. Mission-switching allows the Coast Guard
to quickly readjust priorities. Thus it can enforce
fisheries regulations with its buoytenders and
interdict drug smugglers with its search-and-rescue
helicopters. In fact, many Coast Guard seamen are
cross-trained as policemen, linguists, biologists,
accountants, and soldiers. This has paid off in
situations such as the Vietnam conflict, where the
Coast Guard used its expertise in shallow-water boat
handling and contraband control to thwart coastal
arms smuggling by the North Vietnamese.
The Coast Guard's national security role is
shaped by the seemingly unlimited number of ocean
uses. The Coast Guard's resources, however, are
limited. To a degree, the Coast Guard can
accommodate increasing demands for its services
through more effective use of its internal resources.
For example, in 1984, Coast Guard cutters "stood
by" an average of 27 percent of the time (see Figure
2). Standby time results primarily from personnel
constraints such as time needed for a crew's
education, liberty, and leave. The Coast Guard has
been evaluating various means, such as pay
incentives (more pay for hazardous or undesirable
duties, for example), to reduce standby time. A
cutter that is at sea or in a high-readiness posture for
a larger portion of its total hours may be more
effective in responding to the demands of the
various Coast Guard responsibilities.
Not surprisingly, certain missions sometimes
receive a higher priority than others. A wartime
emergency is a clear example. On a short-term basis,
mission-switching is a way for the Coast Guard to set
priorities among missions and to distribute its
resources more effectively. As ocean uses in the
United States grow in importance, however,
decisions will have to be made to direct the Coast
Guard's limited resources toward those uses with the
greatest long-term potential for enhancing the
welfare and safety of U.S. citizens.
Inter-agency Coordination
Just as the Coast Guard economizes through better
use of its internal resources, inter-agency
relationships can provide access for the Coast Guard
to external resources needed for accomplishing its
own missions. For example, in the southeastern
United States, Navy ships on routine maneuvers
have been used as platforms for Coast Guard
boarding officers conducting drug interdiction.
Moreover, between 1984 and 1989, the Navy plans
to contribute more than $400 million of its own
funds to install and upgrade ordnance and defense-
related electronic equipment aboard Coast Guard
cutters and aircraft.
In the conduct of its national security
missions, the Coast Guard coordinates extensively
with other federal agencies. The Coast Guard works
with, among others, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation in counteracting domestic terrorist
-
A U.S. Coast Guard launch approaches a ship of Haitian
refugees. (U.S. Coast Guard photo)
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activities; the Drug Enforcement Agency in drug
interdiction efforts; the National Marine Fisheries
Service in fisheries enforcement; and the
Environmental Protection Agency in oil and
hazardous substance control.
The Coast Guard and the U.S. Navy have
established a joint policy group (similar to one
between the Navy and the Marine Corps) known as
the NAVCUARD Board. The NAVGUARD Board
comprises seven Coast Guard and seven Navy flag
officers (admirals) and is chaired jointly by the Vice
Commandant of the Coast Guard and the Vice Chief
of Naval Operations. The primary role of the
NAVGUARD Board has been to promote
coordination between the two services for national
defense purposes.
In the event of war, the Coast Guard will
further increase its coordination with the Navy, as
well as take on additional responsibilities. As a result
of a 1982 NAVGUARD Board study, the Coast
Guard Commanders in the Atlantic and Pacific
became responsible for planning and conducting
U.S. defense activities in a coastal "maritime defense
zone." The Coast Guard is now undertaking
contingency plans to prepare for coastal and harbor
defense, thus adding to its peacetime responsibilities
as well. The NAVGUARD Board suggested several
other areas in which the Coast Guard could add to
or expand its wartime responsibilities (see Table 3).
While it is to be expected that Coast Guard
resources would be increased during such an
emergency, certain mission responsibilities would
nonetheless receive a lower priority most likely
bridge administration, recreational boating safety,
certain marine environmental protection activities,
and certain law enforcement activities.
User Fees
The pressure of increasing responsibility has forced
the Coast Guard to re-evaluate its mission priorities,
to increase the size of its resource base, to seek
assistance from other agencies, and to examine
means of support other than the federal budget.
Within the last few years, several studies have been
published that discuss Coast Guard responsibilities
and priorities (see Additional Readings). The concept
of user fees was recommended in each of these
studies. A user fee is a charge imposed by a
government agency on an individual or group of
individuals (rather than on the public in general) to
cover the cost of a particular service.
Considerable dispute exists over the user fee
concept, and thus far it has not been employed by
Table 3. General transfer of Coast Guard responsibilities from
peacetime to wartime
Mission Peacetime Wartime
Enforcement of Laws and
Treaties:
Coastal surveillance and
interdiction
Other responsibilities
Search and Rescue:
Wartime search and rescue
Wartime salvage
Other responsibilities
Aids to Navigation:
Short range aids
Radio navigation
Bridge administration
Domestic Icebreaking
Marine Safety:
Port safety and security
Merchant vessel safety
Recreational boating safety
Marine Environmental
Protection:
Flammable chemical
response
Hazardous chemical
response
Other responsibilities
Polar Ice Operations
Military Readiness:
Antisubmarine warfare
Inshore undersea warfare
Wartime Tasking:
Naval control of shipping
Harbor defense and
security
Mine countermeasures
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X**
X*
X
X
X
X'
X
X
X
X'
X*
X6
X*
'
Responsibilities that are expanded during wartime.
*
Responsibilities that are added during wartime.
Source: NAVGUARD Board, 1981, as reported by the House
Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee.
the Coast Guard. At a general level, those
organizations that have studied the Coast Guard are
not in complete agreement over which services
should be subject to user fee charges (see Table 4).
User fees could provide extra funding for some
Coast Guard services, but then federal budget
support for those services probably would be cut
back, resulting in a negligible net increase. Some
other potential problems revolve around the effects
of the charges on user behavior. Would ocean users
in danger be reluctant to call for Coast Guard
assistance, knowing that they must pay for it, and
thus put themselves and others in greater peril?
Would ocean users expect more from the Coast
Guard, such as professional medical care from
Table 4. General comparison of recommendations for Coast Guard user fees by mission.
Mission
1981
HOUSE
1982
SENATE
1982
DOT
1983
NACOA
1985
H.R. 1936
Enforcement of Laws and Treaties
Search and Rescue
Aids to Navigation
Marine Safety
Marine Environmental Protection
Military Readiness
Polar Icebreaking Operations
(No User Fees Recommended)
X X
X X
X
(No User Fees Recommended)
X
X
X
X
X
Sources: After NACOA, 1983.
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U.S. Coast Guard personnel direct ship traffic through Puget
Sound. (Photo by Lowell Georgia, Photo Researchers)
search-and-rescue personnel, for services that are
paid for directly?
In April of this year, a bill (H.R. 1936) was
introduced in the House of Representatives by Silvio
Conte (R-Mass.), a ranking member of the
Appropriations Committee, that would establish user
fees for the operating expenses of certain Coast
Guard services. The bill explicitly mentions several
responsibilities within the marine safety mission, and
includes implicitly all responsibilities except those
that fall under enforcement of laws and treaties,
polar ice operations, military readiness, and certain
waterways management programs.
Perhaps the most controversial category of
user fees implicit in H.R. 1936 is that they might be
charged for the search-and-rescue mission. The bill
would result in the identification of people who are
saved or otherwise assisted at sea (190,000 in 1980)
as a special user group. Especially in peacetime, the
search and rescue of recreational boaters and
commercial vessels may contribute as much toward
enhancing the welfare and safety of U.S. citizens as
military readiness responsibilities. In 1980, for each
U.S. citizen the federal government spent about half
a cent on Coast Guard search and rescue. (By
comparison, that same year about $630 went to the
U.S. military budget for each citizen.) In 1980, more
than $1 billion in property loss was prevented
through Coast Guard search and rescue operations.
This figure is approximately equal to the Coast
Guard's operating budget for all of its missions in
that same year.
In the broad definition of national security
embodied by the Coast Guard, the concept of user
fees presents an enigma. Inherent in the user-fee
concept is the premise that a particular Coast Guard
responsibility contributes more to the security of a
particular group than to the nation as a whole. Thus
the group is charged for the costs of providing that
security. In House bill H.R. 1936, marine safety
activities such as search and rescue or merchant
vessel inspections are considered contributory to the
security of particular groups. Activities that concern
law enforcement or defense are considered
contributory to the national security. Any
congressional deliberation of this bill will involve a
philosophical debate over the degree to which
government should be involved in enhancing the
welfare and safety of individual U.S. citizens who use
the resources of the ocean. In the future, the
national security role of the Coast Guard may be
redefined with respect to those responsibilities that
involve user fee charges.
Conclusion
The Coast Guard's current Commandant, Admiral
James S. Gracey, recently explained to the U.S.
Reserve Forces Policy Board that "National security
is indeed what the Coast Guard is all about but in
many ways we differ from our partners in the
Department of Defense." Indeed, understanding the
role of the Coast Guard in the oceans and national
security requires a broad definition of national
security one that includes those responsibilities
that enhance the welfare and safety of U.S. citizens.
Virtually all of the Coast Guard's mission
responsibilities fall within that broad definition. But
as the uses of the oceans become more diverse,
Coast Guard responsibilities grow apace. The Coast
Guard faces these increasing responsibilities with
limited resources. Any understanding of the Coast
Guard's national security role is incomplete without
a knowledge of how the agency handles this
A U.S. coastguardsman records data on a Soviet ship. (U.S.
Coast Guard photo)
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problem. In unique fashion, the Coast Guard has
been able to accommodate many new
responsibilities through the re-setting of long-term
priorities and mission-switching in the short-term.
Coordination with other agencies and selective
resource increases also have helped the Coast Guard
handle increasing demands. Other means of support
for Coast Guard services, such as user fees, may be
employed in the future.
The missions and responsibilities of the Coast
Guard recently have received a great deal of
attention. The agency deserves this attention: it is a
national asset that contributes substantially to the
national security of the Unfted States.
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Falcon jets like the one shown above are to be used by the
Coast Guard for detection of marine pollution, search and
rescue, and other tasks. Use of the aircraft has been held up
by engine problems. (U.S. Coast Guard photo)
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Soviet Naval Forces
EDITOR'S NOTE: The following material has been excerpted and edited from Soviet Military Power 1985, a
publication of the U.S. Department of Defense. This material also draws on force comparison studies
conducted in 1984 by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The purpose of the piece is to give the
reader a sense of how the United States perceives Soviet naval capabilities.
I he growth of the Soviet Navy since 1960 and the
expansion of its oceanic areas of operation have
made it a highly visible symbol of increasing Soviet
military capabilities. During this period, the ballistic
missile submarine force has become an important
strategic arm of the Soviet Armed Forces.
The Soviets maintain the world's largest
ballistic missile submarine force. As of early 1985,
the force numbered 62 modern nuclear ballistic
missile submarines (SSBNs) carrying 928 nuclear-
armed missiles. These totals do not include 13 older
submarines with 39 missiles. Eighteen SSBNs are
fitted with 300 Multiple Independently-targetable
Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) equipped submarine-
launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). These 18 units
have been built and deployed within the last 8 years.
More than two-thirds of the ballistic missile
submarines, including those equipped with MIRVed
missiles are fitted with long-range SLBMs that enable
the submarines to patrol in waters close to the Soviet
Union. This affords protection from NATO
antisubmarine warfare operations. Moreover, the
long-range missiles allow the Soviets to fire from
home ports, if necessary, and still strike targets in the
United States.
Three units of one of the most modern Soviet
ballistic missile submarine, the Typhoon, have
already been built. Each Typhoon carries 20 SS-N-20
solid-propellant MIRVed SLBMs. The Typhoon is the
world's largest submarine, with a displacement of
25,000 tons, a third greater than the U.S. Ohio-Class
(Trident). The submarine can operate under the
Arctic Ocean icecap, adding further to the
protection afforded by the 8,300-kilometer range of
the SS-N-20 SLBM. Three or four additional
Typhoons are probably now under construction,
and, by the early 1990s, the Soviets could have as
many as eight of these weapon systems in
operation. The Soviet Navy's power, mobility, and
capability for worldwide deployment give it the
ability to support state interests abroad to a degree
unmatched by other branches of the military.
Because the Soviet Navy has evolved from its own
particular national political requirements and
geographic constraints, its missions, organization,
structure, and composition differ appreciably from
those of the U.S. Navy.
While the modern Soviet Navy has not been
tested in battle, it is clearly designed and structured
for wartime tasks. Overall, the missions of the Soviet
Navy are to conduct strategic strikes against land
targets, to provide for the maritime security of the
U.S.S.R., and to support Soviet policy and promote
Soviet interests worldwide.
Naval Organization
The Soviet Navy is headed by a Commander in
Chief (CINC) who is also a Deputy Minister of
Defense; he functions as the equivalent of both the
U.S. Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval
Operations and is the chief adviser on naval policy
to the Minister of Defense. Fleet Admiral of the
Soviet Union Sergei G. Gorshkov has commanded
the Navy since 1955, and was appointed Deputy
Minister of Defense in 1956. He is assisted by several
deputies who supervise the day-to-day operations of
the Navy, including the work of more than 10 staff
directorates.
The Soviet Navy is comprised of four major
fleets: Northern Fleet, Pacific Ocean Fleet, Baltic
Fleet, and Black Sea Fleet. Fleet headquarters are
located at Severomorsk for the Northern Fleet,
Vladivostok for the Pacific Ocean Fleet, Kaliningrad
for the Baltic Fleet, and Sevastopol for the Black Sea
Fleet. Under each fleet commander there are several
major operational elements, including surface and
submarine forces, naval base commands, naval
aviation, and naval infantry. While the fleet
commands provide administative, logistic, and
operational support to the strategic submarine force,
operational control of Soviet SSBNs is at the national
level.
Submarines
A significant part of Soviet naval strength lies in its
general purpose submarine force, the largest in the
world. Today, this force numbers some 300 active
units composed of some 25 different classes of
torpedo attack, cruise missile, and auxiliary
submarines. Nearly half the force is nuclear
powered, and this percentage is expected to rise in
the years ahead.
Currently, the Soviets are producing or testing
nine different classes of submarines. Of these, all but
one are nuclear powered. This program spans the
entire range of undersea warfare applications
including torpedo and anti-ship cruise missile attack,
land-attack sea launched cruise missiles (SLCM),
technology research, and specialized
communications support. The newest Soviet
submarine designs show evidence of an emphasis on
quieting, speed, nuclear propulsion, weapon
versatility, and incorporation of advanced
technologies.
Since 1983, four new classes of nuclear-
powered attack submarines have been introduced.
The Mike SSN, at almost 10,000 tons, embodies the
Soviets' state-of-the-art in propulsion and pressure
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The reach o/ 5ov/e( naval forces, including strategic missile submarine operating areas, overseas port and airfield access, and fleet
operational areas. (After Soviet Military Power 1985)
hull design. It is capable of firing a wide range of
submarine-launched weapons, including the SS-N-1 5
nuclear depth bomb, the SS-N-1 6 antisubmarine
warfare (ASW) missile, and possibly the SS-NX-21
land-attack SLCM.
The second nuclear-powered attack
submarine introduced in 1983 was the Sierra. At
8,000 tons, the Sierra is about 20 percent larger than
the Victor III, which was introduced only four years
earlier. In this era of rapidly developing technologies,
the Sierra is a clear demonstration of the high priority
that submarine development programs receive in the
Soviet Union.
A third submarine development of 1983
typifies another aspect of Soviet philosophy, which is
to incorporate new innovati'->r^ into older designs,
Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarines
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thus extending the service life and tactical utility of
its submarine force. In this case, the ballistic missile
tubes were removed from a Yankee SSBN in a
process that converted the unit to an attack
submarine. This Yankee SSN has probably been re-
equipped with updated systems, such as fire control
and sonar, in addition to other modifications that will
enable it to launch a wider variety of weapons.
In 1984, another new class of nuclear-
powered attack submarine the Akula-Class was
launched. The lead Akula unit is also similar to the
Victor III- and Sierra-Classes.
Surface Forces
The surface forces of the Soviet Navy conduct a
broad range of naval operations, especially in waters
distant from the U.S.S.R. In general, the afloat forces
are modern and well equipped.
The trend in Soviet major surface warship
programs has been toward larger, technologically
more sophisticated units. Construction of these
Soviet ships over the last decade has produced
increasingly larger ships with an upgraded array of
weapon systems and complementary sensors. These
ships can cruise for longer distances, carry more
ordnance, and conduct a greater range of operations
than their predecessors. This has created a new
flexibility and versatility for Soviet surface forces in
carrying out deployed operations on a worldwide
scale.
Currently, the largest ship in the Soviet Navy
is the Kiev-class aircraft carrier. Its weapons suite
includes a battery of 550-kilometer-range SS-N-12
antiship cruise missiles that can be targeted beyond
the ship's horizon by onboard Hormone helicopters
or information derived from satellites or land-based
long-range aircraft. This class also carries an array of
other weaponry and support equipment, including
more than 100 long- and short-range surface-to-air
missiles, air defense gun batteries, tactical sensors,
electronic warfare systems, and advanced
communications devices. The 600-foot flight deck
accommodates both Hormone and Helix helicopters
and Forger vertical/short take-off and landing
(V/STOL) aircraft that are capable of daylight attack,
reconnaissance, and intercept missions.
A new era in Soviet warship development
began in 1980 with the appearance of the initial
units of the most technologically advanced classes
yet produced. These included the first Soviet
nuclear-powered surface warship the Kirov guided-
missile cruiser and the Udaloy and Sowemennyy
guided-missile destroyers. In 1982, the first of a new
class of gas-turbine-powered guided-missile
cruisers the 5/ava entered the inventory. The
S/ava is equipped with 16 SS-N-12, 550-kilometer
range antiship cruise missiles, 64 SA-N-6 air defense
missiles, 40 SA-N-4 point defense missiles, a 130-mm
twin-barrel, dual-purpose gun, and the surveillance
variant of the Hormone helicopter.
Each of these classes is currently in series
production and illustrates the Soviet Navy's trend
toward construction of larger displacement ships
with greater firepower, endurance, and
sustainability for distant operations. The Kirov CGN,
with a displacement of about 28,000 tons, is the
largest warship, with the exception of aircraft
carriers, built by any nation since World War II. Its
principal armament is a battery of 20 550-kilometer
SS-N-19 antiship cruise missiles, complemented by
launchers for the SS-N-14 antisubmarine missile in
the first ship of the class only. Three Helix or
Hormone helicopters are carried onboard for ASW
and missile targeting.
Other new construction combatant programs
show similar evidence of Soviet concern for the
multidimensional aspect of modern naval warfare. All
new principal surface combatants are equipped with
surface-to-air missiles and sensors and weapons for
antisubmarine warfare, in addition to helicopters and
specialized weaponry. The 5ovremennyy DDG, for
example, is estimated to carry 44 SA-N-7 short-range
surface-to-air missiles, a Helix helicopter, 53cm
torpedoes, and 120 antisubmarine rockets, as well as
8 SS-N-22 supersonic antiship missiles.
A newer era still in Soviet naval development
will begin soon with the launching of a new type of
aircraft carrier now under construction at Nikolayev
in the Black Sea. Expected to displace some 65,000
tons, this new unit will probably incorporate a
nuclear propulsion system based on that of the Kirov
nuclear-powered guided-missile cruiser CGN.
The ultimate flight deck configuration of the
new carrier is still not confirmed, and the aircraft for
its air wing are still under development.
Naval Aviation
Although there will be an increasing emphasis on
sea-based aircraft development, Soviet Naval
Aviation (SNA) will remain primarily a land-based
force. Numbering more than 1,600 aircraft, SNA
alone is larger than most of the national air forces in
the world today. Since the mid-1950s, when the
force was first equipped with missile-carrying jet
bombers, weapon systems and tactics associated
with its principal antiship strike mission have been
progressively upgraded. The Tupelov-designed
variable-geometry-wing Backfire bomber entered the
SNA inventory in 1974 and is currently deployed in
the Black Sea, Baltic Sea, and Pacific Ocean Fleets.
The Backfire can carry antiship missiles, bombs, or
mines and exhibits marked improvements in
performance, nearly doubling the combat radius of
its Badger and Blinder predecessors.
Swing-wing fighter-bombers are also assigned
to SNA. Its Fitter C aircraft, which can carry more
than 7,000 pounds of ordnance, are well suited to
such roles as the support of Soviet amphibious
forces and antiship attacks against fast and highly
maneuverable small combatants. Naval Fitters were
first assigned to the Baltic Fleet, and a new naval unit
was formed recently in the Pacific.
ASW is an important and growing mission for
SNA as new and improved airborne sensors are
deployed. A Bear F turboprop variant, designed for
ASW missions, was introduced in 1970 and has since
been upgraded. With a 5,000-kilometer radius and a
sophisticated sensor suite, it enables the Soviets to
extend the range and quality of their ASW searches.
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New Class Aircraft Carrier
Surface Ship Comparisons
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Displacement 7,824 Tons
OLIVER HAZARD PERRY-Class Guided-Missile Frigate
. _ i I T--J-,~
-130 Meters -
Displacement 3,605 Tons
For shipboard applications, a new ASW helicopter,
the Helix, became operational in 1980. Now widely
deployed in the Soviet fleets, the Helix has
significantly greater range, speed, and payload than
its Hormone predecessor.
Naval SPETSNAZ Forces
A smaller body of specially trained troops is also
present in each fleet ara. Designated Special Purpose
Forces, or SPETSNAZ, these troops are controlled by
the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the Soviet
General Staff and are trained to conduct a variety of
sensitive missions, including reconnaissance and
sabotage operations. A brigade-size unit is assigned
to each of the four Soviet fleets.
In wartime, small 5-12 man teams would be
transported to a target area by aircraft, submarine, or
surface ship and would be inserted immediately
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USSR Attack Submarines
TANGO-Class SS
CHARLIE II Class SSGN
102 Meters
VICTOR Ill-Class SSN
104 Meters
ALFA-Class SSN
- 79 Meters
OSCAR-Class SSGN
MIKE Class SSN
SIERRA Class SSN
YANKEE-Class SSN
130 Meters
AKULA Class SSN
107 Meters
Armament
Propulsion:
Submerged Displacement:
Initial Operational Capability:
Armament
Propulsion:
Submerged Displacement:
Initial Operational Capability:
Armament:
Propulsion:
Submerged Displacement:
Initial Operational Capability:
Armament:
Propulsion:
Submerged Displacement:
Initial Operational Capability:
Armament:
Propulsion
Submerged Displacement:
Initial Operational Capability:
Armament:
Propulsion:
Submerged Displacement:
Initial Operational Capability
Armament:
Propulsion:
Submerged Displacement:
Initial Operational Capability
Armament:
Propulsion:
Submerged Displacement:
Initial Operational Capability
Armament:
Propulsion:
Submerged Displacement:
Initial Operational Capability
Armament:
Propulsion:
Submerged Displacement:
Initial Operational Capability
Torpedoes, Possible ASW missile
Diesel
3,900 MT
1973
Torpedoes, SS-N 9 antiship cruise missile
Nuclear
5,400 MT
1974
Torpedoes, SS-N-16 ASW missile
Nuclear
6,300 MT
1979
Torpedoes, SS-N 15 ASW missile
Nuclear
3,700 MT
1978
Torpedoes, SS-N-19 antiship cruise missile
Nuclear
14,000 MT
1981
Torpedoes
Diesel
3,000 MT
1980
Torpedoes, ASW missile
Nuclear
9,700 MT
1983
Torpedoes, ASW missile
Nuclear
8.000 MT
1984
Torpedoes, land attack cruise missile
Nuclear
13,000 MT
1984
Torpedoes, ASW missile
Nuclear
8,000 MT
1985; still in sea trials
LOS ANGELES-Class SSN 688
US Attack Submarines
Armament:
Propulsion:
109 Meters
Torpedoes. HARPOON antiship missiles,
TOMAHAWK SLCM. SUBROC ASW rocket
Nuclear
Submerged Displacement: 6,500 MT
USS LOS ANGELES-Class is shown for comparison purposes. Other US attack submarine classes are
STURGEON. SKIPJACK. SKATE, and PERMIT
prior to hostilities. Their training includes
parachuting, scuba diving, demolition, sabotage,
surveillance, and target selection, as well as
languages, such as English and French.
Once deployed, naval associated SPETSNAZ
would conduct reconnaissance and tactical
operations against a wide variety of naval targets,
such as ship and submarine bases, airfields,
command and intelligence centers, communication
facilities, ports, and harbors, radar sites, and of
prime importance nuclear weapons facilities.
Though a small force, SPETSNAZ has the potential to
achieve results disproportionate to its size.
Soviet Merchant Fleet
Going beyond the strict categorization of military
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METERS
15
10
SS-N-6
SS-N-8
A
Nuclear Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles
USSR
SS-N-18 SS-N-20 SS-NX-23
A A A
SS-N-17
A
MOD MOD MOD
US
POSEIDON
SLBM C-3
TRIDENT
SLBM C-4
A
The wave
of the future
This is a picture of the ocean
The ocean. How you picture it depends, quite simply, on your
perspective. To some it's food, to others, sandy beaches. But the
ocean is a lot more than just water and fish. It's an amazing
complexity of almost incomparable proportions. It's the cradle of
life, the arbiter of weather, the testing ground of science and the
border of nations. And that's just for starters.
It's also one of the most pressing concerns of the decade.
The uses and users of the ocean are currently escalating at an
astonishing rate. And more and more these users are having to
come to grips with their own inseparability. Yet in order for
this great resource to function properly, all these components
must interlock.
A puzzling problem.
That's why 1984-1985 has been designated Year of the Ocean-a
nationwide effort to piece together the vast ocean constituencies
for the first time for a common purpose: to insure the equitable use
and wise management of the ocean. And hence, our future.
The cornerstone has been laid. A Foundation established. With
representatives from a cross-section of ocean-interest areas at the
lead. And thousands of organizations taking part across the nation.
This, however, is only the beginning. There is an ongoing need for
increased understanding of and communication about this vital
resource. Year of the Ocean is intended as a catalyst an endeavor
to initiate broad-based interest in addressing the puzzling issues
that surround the ocean. So that when future generations picture
the ocean, they see more than just water, than fish.
Because their lives depend on it.
For a better picture of the ocean, write: Year of the Ocean, Box 1 100, 3421 M St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20007-3522
John R. Seesholtz
- A J
I
Oceanographer of the Navy
John Seesholtz is a little like a
strong anchor in a gale. He's
holding fast in a very demanding
by Paul R. Ryan
job. A sturdily built man with a
semi-crewcut that suggests a
white-headed retirement, he
hails from the mountain country
around Reading, Pennsylvania,
and is proud of it.
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He is fond of recalling the
time when his father once visited
him in the 1960s at New
London, Connecticut. The
younger Seesholtz was assigned
to an old diesel submarine of
World War II vintage. The elder
Seesholtz, now deceased, had
been a miner in his younger
years before becoming a
successful businessman. After a
tour of the old sub, the father
remained uncharacteristically
quiet for some two hours.
Finally, as they were traveling
home to Pennsylvania in the
family car on a cold, blustery
Sunday in January, the elder
Seesholtz turned to his son and
blurted out, "That reminded me
of being in the mines. I thought
that your being in the Navy
would get you away from that
kind of life."
It would eventually. His
son would rise to the rank of
Commodore one star and be
appointed Oceanographer of the
Navy, a command that extends
worldwide and includes the duty
of Director of the Oceanography
Division in the Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations. The
younger Seesholtz, however,
loved his days in the "Navy
mines."
At one point, early in his
Navy career, Seesholtz was
Commanding Officer of the
U.S.S. Dolphin, the world's
deepest diving submarine. "We
carried out the deepest sonar
operations conducted to that
time, and learned a great deal
about how sound traveled deep
in the ocean. I still view this
assignment as probably the most
enjoyable time I've ever had,"
Seesholtz recalled.
Commodore John Richard
Seesholtz, 52, graduated from
the U.S. Naval Academy in 1956.
The son of Mrs. G. Elizabeth and
John F. Seesholtz, he has a
brother David, a forest ranger at
Mount St. Helens, Washington,
and two sisters, Barbara Sparr of
Reading, and Mary Ann Yeager
of Green Hills, both in
Pennsylvania.
"I spent about 8 years at
sea before I got into
oceanography. The first ship I
was on went to Antarctica and I
enjoyed it very much. There
were a lot of things that I saw in
the ocean that puzzled me. I
wondered what the mechanisms
were for certain physical
phenomena."
In the 1960s, the
Secretary of the Navy established
a Navy doctoral program.
Seesholtz applied and was
accepted at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology,
graduating in 1968 with a Ph.D.
in Oceanography. "The doctoral
program, which was similar to
the one that Secretary of the
Navy John Lehman has recently
reinstated, was something that
came along at the right time in
my life. I think as a result I
wound up being the
My responsibilities
include operational
oceanography. This
consists of about 70
activities worldwide.
Oceanographer." Seesholtz
remembers that his student days
included work with Henry
Stommel, Erik Mollo-Christensen,
and Walter Munk, all eminent
scientists today. "The Woods
Hole Oceanographic Institution/
MIT graduate joint program
agreement was signed about a
month before I graduated," he
recalled.
The voyage to
Oceanographer of the Navy,
arrived at on 14 October 1983,
would include tours as a missile
officer on a Polaris submarine, a
special projects officer at
antisubmarine warfare
headquarters, and director of
programs in underwater
acoustics, ocean processes, the
Arctic, and defense and missile
research and development. It
would also include attendance at
several special service schools,
such as the Technical Russian
Course at the Defense Language
Institute, Monterey, California,
and the Senior Officers' Ship
Material Readiness Course in
Idaho Falls, Idaho.
Being Oceanographer of
the Navy does not leave
Commodore Seesholtz much
time for leisure activities, the
chief of which is probably talking
about Oceanography. He is
married to the former Marylee
Gehris of Bernville, Pennsylvania,
and has two children, a son
Daniel, who is a Lieutenant (jg) in
the Navy, and Amy, who lives at
home in Alexandria, Virginia.
Most mornings will find him at
his desk in the U.S. Naval
Observatory building about 7
a.m. It is unusual to see him
leave much before 7 p.m.
There is a sign on the first
floor of the Naval Observatory
that states its mission: "To
determine the positions and
motions of celestial bodies, the
motions of the earth and precise
time. To provide the
astronomical and timing data
required by the Navy and other
components of the Department
of Defense for navigation,
precise positioning, and
command control and
communications. To make these
data available to other
government agencies and to the
general public. To conduct
relevant research. To perform
other functions or tasks as may
be directed by higher
authorities."
One of Commodore
Seesholtz's tasks is to oversee
the Naval Observatory where
Vice President George Bush and
his family live in a house on the
spacious, flowering grounds. The
Navy facility is situated on a tree-
shaded hill on Massachusetts
Avenue, in Washington, D.C. A
security guard, on entering the
grounds, insists on I.D., and is
quite specific about following the
yellow line to the Commodore's
office, presumably so one does
not end up in the Bushes' living
room.
The Commodore has an
attractive, functional office, and
greets one with a hearty
handshake. On a warm day he is
inclined to take off his jacket and
urge his visitor to do the same.
There is a large leather couch
and two comfortable matching
chairs on one side of the room.
At the far end is a large desk.
Along one wall is a sizeable map
of the world with a lot of red
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dots marking it. There also is a
blackboard and a conference
table. Several ocean-related
magazines adorn the coffee table
before the couch. A stream of
captains flow in and out.
This interviewer asks the
basic question: What does the
Oceanographer of the Navy do?
"My responsibilities include
operational oceanography. This
consists of about 70 activities
worldwide. The red dots on the
map over there represent the
major facilities around the world
that supply not only
oceanographic information to
ships, but also meteorological
information associated with the
marine environment to
operational aircraft.
"In Monterey, California,
for example, we have the Fleet
Numerical Oceanography
Center, which receives data from
our worldwide network. They, in
turn, fashion global weather
models, some of which are
distributed to our individual
ships. The Center also monitors
antisubmarine warfare
conditions, especially as they
relate to physical ocean
conditions. The Center provides
such things as wave forecasts-
useful in avoiding areas of really
rough weather and reports on
storm systems. This Center will
be the primary data processor for
the N-ROSS* satellite we hope to
have aloft by the end of the
decade. This satellite will have
four dedicated ocean sensors.
"Other important centers
are located in Maryland (Polar
Oceanography Center), Pearl
Harbor, Hawaii, and Guam. The
latter, for example, is responsible
for typhoon forecasting. It's a
joint program we operate with
the Air Force. We provide the
typhoon warning for the civilian
populations in these areas as well
as for our ships at sea.
"Our largest single
activity, the Naval
Oceanographic Office, is located
at Bay St. Louis, Mississippi.
Through the military Sealift
Command, we direct 12
oceanographic vessels, plus 3
aircraft. Four of the ships at the
*
Navy-Remote Ocean Sensing
Satellite.
present time are doing deep
ocean surveys in the mid-
Atlantic, two others are in waters
off Oman and Indonesia, and
two others are working in coastal
areas.
"We also run a
cooperative program with a
number of Latin American and
Asian countries. We provide the
equipment, small boats, and
technical expertise, and they
// we see something
that has applied
characteristics, we
will try to orient that
program so that it
answers some basic
questions.
provide the crew. As a result, we
get data that is helpful in
producing charts of harbors and
coastlines and they get data that
is useful for their economic
development.
"Most of our ships are
engaged in classical hydrography
and oceanography:
measurements of temperature
and chemical structure,
biological inquiries, and
bathymetric work. Our aircraft
mainly support major fleet
exercises and operation. They
are capable of sampling large
areas of the ocean surface by
dropping bathythermographs*
and then processing the data on-
board."
Commodore Seesholtz
also explained that he was
responsible for "Project Magnet,"
which consists of obtaining the
magnetic signature of the world
at periodic intervals. This is
particularly useful in naval air
* An instrument that records
temperature at various depths in the
ocean, usually within a few hundred
meters of the surface.
operations that have magnetic
navigation requirements. In
addition, the Naval Observatory,
under Seesholtz's command,
provides the National Clock
Service. This means providing
frequency standards for
communication requirements
and navigation systems. The
Global Positioning System, for
example, is very dependent on
accurate time references.
Another activity of the
Oceanographer is putting
together nautical almanacs with
information gathered from field
observatories in Florida and
Arizona. These almanacs form
the primary reference for people
doing celestial navigation-
navigation with a sextant and star
tables.
All told, Commodore
Seesholtz estimated that there
are approximately 5,000 people
associated with oceanography in
the Navy. Of these, about 4,000
are directly connected with naval
oceanography programs, 2,000
of whom are enlisted men. "We
have some 400 naval officers
employed here, and some 300 at
sea. Then there are from 500 to
1,000 enlisted men out in the
fleet who work with our system.
We're responsible for their
training. There are about 1,300
to 1,400 civilians working with
us, too, the great majority at the
Naval Oceanographic Office in
Bay Saint Louis. The balance are
scattered throughout the
system."
The Oceanographer of
the Navy is largely concerned
with
"applied" oceanography.
"Basic" research is the province
of the Office of Naval Research
under the Chief of Naval
Research, Rear Admiral John
Bradford (Brad) Mooney, Jr. (see
page 12). "We coordinate with
Admiral Mooney's people.
Several of our people are
actually assigned to duty over
there. Their job is to coordinate
and develop projects that have
their root in basic ocean science.
If we see something that has
applied characteristics, we will
try to orient the program so that
it answers some basic questions.
Much of this work is done under
grants in universities, some in
laboratories."
An example of applied
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oceanography is the use of
satellite sensors. Data that used
to be gathered by aircraft and
ships about the fine-grain
structure of the ocean in a
particular area or where
upwelling occurs is now being
gathered by satellite sensors.
These sensors can give detailed
information on Gulf Stream
meanders or the structure of
large-scale eddies. They also can
pinpoint areas with particular
dew-point characteristics at
certain times of day areas that
are likely candidates for fog,
information useful to the Navy.
"Right now, on a clear
day, we can pretty much tell
what the ocean surface
conditions are. The N-ROSS
satellite will enable us to
determine sea-surface conditions
in the presence of clouds. We
also will be able to get wind
speed and direction from it,
along with significant wave
height."
Commodore Seesholtz
expressed a personal interest in
remote sensing along with
understanding the exchange of
energy between the atmosphere
and the ocean. "If you are going
to get lengthy weather forecasts
beyond, say, five days, then we
need a much more complete
understanding of the reactions
between the atmosphere and the
oceans. The Europeans have
developed some skill in
forecasting beyond five days. Of
course, our National Weather
Service is probably only
interested in the livable parts of
the United States and in coastal
waters. But we are interested in a
good part of the rest of the
ocean because that's where we
have to be able to operate. The
fleets are scattered all the way
from the Indian Ocean to the
Pacific and Atlantic."
The topic of remote
sensing prompted the
Commodore to mention the
mskin
flight of oceanographer Paul
Scully-Powers on the space
shuttle last October. This civilian
employee of the Navy took
some 2,500 pictures of the
oceans while orbiting 190 miles
in space, some of which
disclosed details of circulation
features not previously observed.
Eddies were clearly visible, but it
was not known whether they
were a foot deep or 1 00 feet
deep. "We're finding out that the
ocean is more opaque than we
thought. It's more difficult to see
or discern anything than we
realized. I believe too many are
overly optimistic about being
able to see through the ocean to
the bottom," Seesholtz
commented.
As mentioned previously,
keeping on top of these activities
leaves very little time for leisure.
Friends say that the Commodore
is active in local church and civic
affairs. "He's the type of man
you trust with looking after your
house and garden when going
on vacation," one neighbor
confided. Another spoke of his
interest in carpentry "he likes
to make fences and cabinets."
Still another spoke of his dry
humor, while recalling that the
Commodore was the recipient of
a mink teddy bear from an
admirer (his wife) this past
Christmas. This suggests that
behind the daily mask of formal
reserve exists another persona-
impish at times and playful.
Most of the Commodore's
time, however, is devoted to
serious, high-level Navy
business. It is he and his
command that provide the fleet
and its aircraft with important
environmental data so that the
U.S. Navy can better carry out its
national security functions. As
Seesholtz put it, being
Oceanographer of the Navy "is a
lot of work, but it's also very
interesting a fun job."
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The Sea and Soviet Maritime Policy
by Michael MccGwire
EDITOR'S NOTE: The following material has been excerpted, with
Mr. MccGwire's permission, from the proceedings of a March 1981
conference sponsored by the Center for Study of the American
Experience, The Annenberg School of Communication, University
of Southern California. The author notes that although this "is not
the latest analysis of what the Soviets are thinking, it [still] presents
a reasonably balanced picture [in 1985]." For a more current
assessment, please see Chapter 5 of Soviet Military Objectives by
Michael MccGwire, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., in
press.
navies provided vital support to
the forces of counter-revolution.
As a consequence, Russia's naval
policy was increasingly
dominated by the need to
defend four widely separated
fleet areas against maritime
powers who could concentrate
their forces at will.
It is therefore wrong to
suggest that Russia has only
recently awakened to the
significance of sea power. She
used it in the past to her own
advantage, and has more often
seen its long arm used against
her. Over the years she has
committed very substantial
resources to naval construction,
and the major warship building
program initiated in 1945 was
the fourth attempt in 65 years to
build up a strong Russian fleet.
But national strategy involves
setting priorities and balancing
competing claims for scarce
resources. Russia was
predominantly a land power; the
only threats to her territorial
existence had come by land; the
army was the basis of security at
home and influence abroad.
Naval forces were indeed
required to defend against
assault from the sea and to
counter the capability of
maritime powers to dictate the
outcome of events in areas
adjacent to Russia. But these
forces were seen as an expensive
necessity rather than a preferred
he Russian Navy is nearing its
300th birthday, and for the last
200 years or so it generally has
been the third or fourth largest in
the world. Russia used naval
forces in the 18th century to gain
control of the Baltic and Black
Sea coasts, and four times
between 1 768 and 1827 she
deployed sizable squadrons to
the Mediterranean for a
year or more. Three of these
deployments took place during
wars with Turkey, with ships
being drawn from the Baltic Fleet
to operate against the southern
side of the Black Sea exits.
But thereafter, Russia
increasingly found herself
confronting more powerful
maritime nations. In the Black
Sea, Britain used her naval
strength to prevent Russian gains
at the expense of the failing
Ottoman Empire; in the
company of France, Britain
intervened directly in what we
call the Crimean War, extending
her naval operations against
Russia to the Baltic, White Sea,
and Pacific, and the subsequent
peace treaty forbad Russia a
Black Sea fleet. Twenty years
later in the eighth Russo-Turkish
War, British pressure ensured
that Russia did not gain control
of the Straits. In the Far East,
Russo-Japanese rivalry
culminated in a disastrous war
and the loss of two Russian
fleets. And in 1918, the Western
instrument of policy. This
ordering of priorities, and the
army's domination of military
thinking, persist today and are
enshrined in the concept of a
combined arms approach to
military problems, including
naval ones.
Postwar Naval Buildup
The Second World War
confirmed Russia's belief that
ground forces were the basis of
her national security. However,
by the end of the war her most
likely opponents were the
traditional maritime powers, who
had not only been responsible
for the capitalist intervention
during the Russian Revolution,
but had recently demonstrated
their capacity to transport
continental-scale armies over
vast distances of sea and to
support their operations ashore.
The likelihood of maritime
invasion of the Baltic and Black
Sea coasts was considered
substantial. The Baltic gave
access to the lines of
communication with the
Western front. The Black Sea
would allow invaders to by-pass
Russia's traditional defense in
depth; and the rivers, instead of
serving as defensive barriers,
would provide invaders with
easy access to Russia's industrial
heartlands. In enemy hands, the
Black Sea becomes a grenade in
Russia's gut.
In 1945, Russia had a
powerful army but lacked a
battleworthy fleet, and the navy
therefore received relatively high
priority in the postwar
reconstruction, with force
requirements largely carried over
from before the war. Under the
new, 20-year naval construction
program, no fewer than 1,200
submarines were to be built.
They probably also planned to
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build some 200 escorts, 200
destroyers, about 36 cruisers, 4
battlecruisers, and 4 aircraft
carriers during this period, plus a
mass of torpedo boats, gunboats,
and subchasers, and some 5,000
aircraft for the naval air force.
Large numbers, but of course
nothing compared to the size of
the combined Western navies at
the end of the war, and even the
submarines fall into perspective
when divided among the four
fleet areas. The prewar concept
of defense in depth and
coordinated attacks by air,
submarine, and surface units was
carried over. About 1 ,000 of the
1,200 submarines were intended
for defense of the home fleet
areas, and the carriers probably
were intended to extend fighter
cover in the Barents Sea and in
the Pacific.
Shift in Threat Perceptions
However, in 1954, as a
consequence of the post-Stalin
policy review, the Soviet
leadership downgraded the
threat of seaborne invasion and
gave first priority to the dangers
of a surprise nuclear attack by
strategic bombers. The naval
threat from the West was seen in
more limited terms of nuclear
strikes by carrier-borne aircraft,
primarily against naval bases.
This engendered a radical
reappraisal of naval requirements
and the decision to place
primary reliance on long-range
cruise missiles, which would be
carried by small- to medium-
sized surface ships, diesel
submarines, and aircraft. The
operational concept relied on
the potential reach, the payload,
and the accuracy of these
weapons (which had yet to be
developed) as a substitute for
large numbers of weapon
platforms. It appears to have
been influenced by the demands
of the domestic economy and
the need to release shipbuilding
facilities to commercial
construction.
There was resistance
within the Soviet Navy to these
ideas, so Nikita Khrushchev
brought the 45-year-old Sergei
Gorshkov to Moscow to
implement the decisions. The
building of cruisers was checked
in mid-course; the mass
production of medium-sized
submarines, then at 72 units a
year, was sharply tapered to a
halt; and while the destroyer,
escort, and subchaser programs
each ran its full course, their
successor classes were put back
four years. This represented a 60
percent cut in annual production
tonnage, enabling substantial
resources to be released from
warship construction to the
domestic economy. Seven of the
13 largest building ways were
reassigned from naval use to the
construction of fish factory and
merchant ships. This shift of
resources from naval to
commerical construction was an
important indication of Soviet
priorities in use of the sea.
The new concept of
operations was predicted on
engaging enemy carrier groups
within range of shore-based air
cover. It envisaged coordinated
missile attacks by strike aircraft,
diesel submarines, and large
destroyers, and it was planned
that these newly designed units
would begin to enter service in
1962. However, by 1958 the key
premise that shore-based fighter
defense would be available over
the encounter zone had been
rendered invalid by increases in
the range of carrier-borne
aircraft, which would allow U.S.
carriers to strike at the Soviet
Union with nuclear weapons
from the Eastern Mediterranean
and the southern reaches of the
Norwegian Sea. To meet this
threat from distant sea areas, it
was decided to place primary
emphasis on nuclear submarines,
which would be able to operate
in the face of Western surface
and air superiority.
This involved another
major change in naval building
programs, and to understand the
full implications, we must
backtrack to pick up the task of
strategic interdiction. Faced with
the U.S. atomic monopoly, at the
end of World War II the Soviet
Union had to develop not only
its own weapon, but also the
means of delivering it. In regard
to the latter the Soviets pursued
three lines of development: the
intercontinental missile, the
long-range bomber, and the
submarine. The Soviet Navy had
a tradition of daring attacks on
enemy ports, and the torpedo-
firing submarine was the only
system immediately available
that had the range and payload
to bring atomic weapons to bear
on North America; a shallow-
water burst in the approaches to
New York or San Francisco was a
significant threat. But here, also,
there was parallel development
of tried and innovative systems,
with a nuclear torpedo probably
being developed by 1954, and a
ballistic missile being test-fired
from a submarine in 1955. These
were the precursors to four
classes of submarine that began
delivery in 1 958, two of them
nuclear-powered and two diesel,
one of each type armed with
ballistic missiles, the other relying
on torpedoes. However,
technical problems (the nuclear
classes were noisy and the
missile-armed classes had an
unreliable weapon system),
coupled with advances in
American antisubmarine
capabilities, meant that at least
three of the four classes were
unable to meet planned
operational requirements.
The Carrier Air Threat
Thus, by about 1958, there was a
convergence of three separate
developments: the apparent
success of the Soviet
intercontinental ballistic-missile
program, which would become
the main means of delivering
nuclear weapons to America; the
relative failure of the submarine
strategic delivery systems; and
the emergence of a new strategic
threat to the Soviet Union in the
shape of long-range nuclear
strikes by carrier-based enemy
aircraft. It was this combination
that justified the reallocation of
nuclear propulsion from the role
of strategic delivery to that of
countering the carrier, the role of
strategic missile strike being
taken away from the navy at
about the same time. The
missile-armed diesel submarine
(SSG) programs were cancelled
and, as an expedient, their long-
range surface-to-surface missile
(SSM) systems were used to
reconfigure the nuclear-powered
hull/propulsion units (originally
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Ittookmillionsofyears
toputafishwhere
itfcneverbeenbefore.
On land-locked African plains, or the rice fields of an Asian countryside,
a simple fish can be a rarity or even a nonexistent food source.
Today, Peace Corps volunteers with biology degrees and fishery experi-
ence are being trained to successfully raise freshwater fish in areas of the
world where there have never been fish before. And for the first time, people
undernourished from a diet of starches have an adequate source of protein.
It's only one of many projects around the world where Peace Corps
volunteers are sharing their skills with others to make life better. A unique
opportunity to discover the world, and broaden your own capabilities with
some real experience. At a professional level.
If you have a biology degree or experience in any field that can suit a
Peace Corps project, call Peace Corps, toll-free, 800-424*8580. And put your
experience to work where it can do a world of good.
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intended as ballistic missile
submarines) as cruise missile-
armed units (SSGN) for use
against the carrier. Meanwhile,
plans were made to double the
production of nuclear
submarines to ten boats a year,
with deliveries due to begin in
1968, and to develop new
methods of attacking the carrier,
including a horizon-range
submerged-launch cruise missile
system with its own target
location capability.
In this same period of
1957 to 1958, a need to extend
the range of antisubmarine
warfare (ASW) coverage beyond
that provided by shore-based
helicopters was identified,
particularly in northern waters,
where the Soviets assumed that
U.S. Polaris submarines would
patrol in due course. This led to
the production of the Moskva-
class of antisubmarine helicopter
carriers.
Reformulation of Soviet Policy
This brings us to 1961: a year
crucial to understanding
contemporary Soviet policy, in
which decisions arrived at barely
20 months before were reversed.
In January of 1960, Khrushchev
had announced the results of
what appears to have been a
thoroughgoing defense review,
which included formation of the
strategic rocket force (SRF), its
designation as the primary arm of
the nation's defense, a
substantial reorganization of
military research and
development, and the cutting
back of conventional ground
forces. Given Khrushchev's faith
in nuclear missiles and his belief
that nuclear war would be
suicidal, the new policy could
only indicate a shift in emphasis
toward the Western concept of
nuclear deterrence, and away
from the traditional reliance on
balanced forces and a war-
fighting capability.
But by October of 1961
the shift had been reversed, and,
at the 22nd Party Congress,
Marshall Malinovsky's speech
clearly indicated a return to
traditional military verities.
Meanwhile, a thoroughgoing
reappraisal of what was involved
in fighting with nuclear weapons
was begun, as was development
of a whole series of
consequential policies, including
a restructuring of the ballistic
missile programs.
There is now substantial
evidence that this reversal of
policy reflected a re-evaluation
of the Western threat,
engendered by the defense
decisions announced by
President John F. Kennedy
shortly after he took office in
January, 1961. These included a
very sharp acceleration of the
Polaris program and a doubling
of the planned production rate
of solid-fuel ICBMs, which would
be deployed in underground
silos, remote from centers of
population. Perhaps equally
important to Soviet threat
perceptions were the crusading
rhetoric of the new American
administration, with its
willingness to go any place and
pay any price, and the detached
logic of tough-minded academic
strategists who were busy
thinking the unthinkable and
developing theories of limited
nuclear war.
From the Soviet
viewpoint, a significant aspect of
the U.S. decisions was the
apparent shift in emphasis from
land-based to sea-based strategic
nuclear strike forces: the rapid
buildup of Polaris units
coinciding with the entry into
service of the large attack carriers
(including the nuclear-powered
Enterprise) ordered in the wake
of the Korean War. These units
could be expected to survive the
intercontinental exchange and
could therefore be held back in
order to influence the outcome
of the war. In particular, these
forces could deny the Soviet
Union the use of Western
Europe as an alternative socio-
economic base. Given the Soviet
doctrine of deterrence through
possession of a warfighting
capability, this had major
implications for the Soviet Navy's
roles and missions. First, it would
have to develop some means of
countering these American
systems. And second, it would
be necessary to develop
matching assets so as to deny the
United States a unilateral
advantage, in the event it could
not be countered.
This second requirement
meant that, after all, the Soviet
Union would have to build up a
force of nuclear-powered
ballistic missile submarines
(SSBN), but this could be done
only at the expense of the hull/
propulsion units originally
intended for other roles,
including that of countering the
carrier. The latter mission would
remain practicable, although at a
lower level of effectiveness.
Polaris, however, presented a
problem of a different kind.
The Anti-Polaris Response
There were three possible ways
of directly countering Polaris:
area exclusion, trailing, and
ocean search/surveillance. The
last two would require
development of new systems,
but a start could be made on the
incremental process of excluding
Polaris submarines from the
more threatening sea areas, by
trying to raise to unacceptable
levels the probability of their
detection. This would involve an
extension and elaboration of the
operational concepts that had
been successfully developed for
defense of the Soviet offshore
zone, but would require
additional, purpose-designed
antisubmarine warfare (ASW)
forces.
This explains the Soviet
Navy's shift to forward
deployment in the early 1960s. It
took place in two stages. The
initial response (lasting five years)
extended the outer defense zone
to the 1,500-nautical mile (nm)
circle from Moscow. This
covered the threat from carrier
strike aircraft as well as the early
Polaris systems, and took in the
Norwegian Sea and the Eastern
Mediterranean. The interim
response, starting in 1967, was a
slow process of consolidating the
newly established defense zones,
while extending the area of naval
concern to take in the 2,500-
nautical mile circle of threat. This
included the eastern half of the
North Atlantic and the
northwestern part of the Arabian
Sea. There was a progressive
buildup in the number of ships
on forward deployment and in
ship-days deployed until the
period from 1972 to 1973, when
both levelled off.
Meanwhile, the major
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emphasis in surface ship
capabilities was switched from
anticarrier to antisubmarine
systems, in part by the major
conversion of two existing
classes (SAM Kotlin and Kanin)
and in part by modifying the
design of new construction
programs, one currently building
and the others projected. For
example, the 12-ship Moskva
program of helicopter-carrying
antisubmarine cruisers was
cancelled (because the cruiser
was too small to be operationally
effective in the new concept),
and its weapon systems were
used to switch the Kresta from
anticarrier (Kresta I) to
antisubmarine (Kresta II). The
Moskva was replaced by the Kiev
ASW carrier, at twice the size.
As originally planned, it
was probably hoped that 10
years would be sufficient to
develop a range of measures
that, beginning in 1972, would
allow some kind of final response
to Polaris along all three lines of
attack. However, not only were
these hopes unduly optimistic,
but other developments had
meanwhile prompted a shift in
operational priorities.
The Nuclear Reserve Goes to Sea
The most significant
development was the relative
failure of the SS-1 3 land-based,
solid-fueled ICBM during 1967
and 1968. It seems likely that the
Soviets had intended to develop
this as a mobile system, so that it
could serve as the main element
of the national strategic reserve.
Faced by this failure, it would
appear that the Soviets chose the
alternative of achieving mobility
and concealment by putting the
strategic reserve to sea aboard
the Delta-class SSBN, due to
begin delivery in 1973. However,
to ensure security, the SSBNs
would have to operate in
protected waters, which meant
that the planned range of the SS-
N-8 missile would have to be
extended considerably. The
resultant lengthening of the
missile would explain the
improbable humpback
characteristics of the Delta-class.
At about this time, the
American press reported that the
U.S. Navy was intending to
develop two new classes of
submarine for operations against
Soviet SSBNs, one very fast and
the other very silent, that would
enter service at about the same
time as the Delta. This focused
Soviet attention on the force's
security and led to the concept
of deploying submarines in
defended ocean bastions in the
Greenland and Barents Seas and
in the Sea of Okhotsk.
Meanwhile, as more
antisubmarine systems became
available to the Soviets aboard
new surface ships, submarines,
and aircraft, it must have
become increasingly clear that
these traditional methods had
inherent limitations against
Polaris. This led to a shift in ASW
emphasis away from the Eastern
Mediterranean and Arabian Seas,
to extending the inner defense
zones of the Northern and
Pacific Fleet areas, and to
providing them with watertight
defenses.
The shift in operational
priority to protecting the SSBN
bastions generated a
fundamental change in the
design criteria for distant-water
surface units. Previously, the
emphasis had been on
weathering a preemptive attack
long enough for the surface units
to be able to strike at Western
carriers and Polaris submarines,
after which the surface units
were expendable. Now, the
security of the SSBN bastions
had to be ensured for the
duration of a protracted war.
Surface ships, therefore, had to
be capable of the sustained
operations needed to gain and
maintain command of a large sea
area such as the Norwegian Sea,
and this required long
endurance, large magazine loads,
and an underway replenishment
capability. Establishing command
would be facilitated by seizing
key stretches of coast. In the
Pacific this could involve the
Japanese side of the two
southern straits that give access
to the Sea of Okhotsk, and might
even extend to the whole
northern coast of Hokkaido. In
the Norwegian Sea, the
requirement could include key
islands as well as stretches of the
Norwegian coast.
Scaling Up the Surface Forces
To meet these new
requirements, the Soviets
decided they would have to
scale up the whole surface force,
roughly doubling the size of all
major surface types. The
traditional destroyer-sized unit of
about 3,500 tons (Krivak) was
redesignated as an escort toward
the end of the 1 970s. The new
destroyer types that began
delivery in 1980 (Sovremmeny
and Udaloy) are about 7,000 to
8,000 tons, larger than the
previous generation of light
cruisers. The new light cruiser
class is expected to be 12,000 to
1 3,000 tons, and the Kirov-dass
heavy command cruiser (or
battle cruiser) is over 20,000
tons. There has been a similar
scaling-up of amphibious
construction. This represents a
major increase in the allocation
of resources to naval shipyards;
the Kirov program required the
return to the Soviet Navy of
shipyard facilities that had been
in civilian use since the mid-
1950s.
These new classes appear
to have been included in the
Ninth Five-Year Plan approved
by the Twenty-fourth Party
Congress in the spring of 1971.
The plan also would have
included the various submarine
programs, including the Oscar-
class of SSGN, (which displaces
some 16,000 tons and carries the
new mach-2.5 long-range SSM
system fitted aboard Kirov), and
the very large Typhoon-class of
SSBN, which one must assume
to have been purpose-designed
to operate from the protection of
Soviet home waters. However,
the Soviet Navy still did not
consider these substantial
increases sufficient to meet the
new demands being placed
upon it, and took its case to a
wider audience by means of
articles in Morskoj sbornik that
have become known as "the
Gorshkov series." This debate
had other ramifications that will
be touched on later, but a major
strand concerned the importance
of general-purpose forces,
particularly in the submarine-
support role, and the need for a
greater diversity of surface ship
types, the characteristics of
which should provide for long
range at high speeds.
The in-house argument
would have focused on the
specifics of the threat to the
89
Soviet SSBN. The direct threat
would come from U.S. nuclear-
powered attack submarines, but
the SSNs' success would depend
on suppression of Soviet ASW
defenses by supporting U.S.
surface forces. The Soviet Navy
would have had to assume that
U.S. carrier groups would be
deployed in support of their
SSN, whereas Soviet shore-based
air forces would cease to be
available after the initial nuclear
exchange. Without this air
component, there would be no
certainty that the Soviets would
be able to prevent the carrier
groups from penetrating the
outer defense zones. It could be
assumed that U.S. carriers would
seek to establish command of
the surface and the air, denying
their use to Soviet ASW forces;
that they would harry the
defending SSN; and that they
might even become directly
involved in hunting down Soviet
SSBNs. If the Soviet Navy were
to prevail against this kind of
force, it would need a
comparable capability, including
effective sea-based air forces.
Presumably, it was the
inherent plausibility of this
scenario that allowed the Soviet
Navy to win at least part of its
case, and it seems that by mid-
1974 authority was given to go
ahead with the design of a large
air-superiority carrier that would
enter service in the second half
of the 1980s. It may also have
been at this stage that the
second of the new destroyer-
sized ship classes was
authorized, in order to allow for
task specialization between
classes.
The Search for Naval Adequacy
Presently, the Soviet Union is
embarking on yet another
attempt to reshape its navy to
meet changing requirements.
The underlying theme, however,
remains the same, and the
allocation of resources to naval
construction reflects the Soviet
perception of a threat of assault
from the sea.
After World War II, we
saw first the mass-construction
programs designed to meet a
misperceived threat that was
incorrectly inferred from the
capitalists' war-inflated navies
and from a Marxist prognosis of
history. This was followed by
savage cuts in shipyard
allocations when the likelihood
of seaborne invasion was
realized to be low. Then there
was heavy investment in nuclear
submarine construction facilities,
responding to the new and
correctly perceived threat from
carrier-borne strike aircraft, and
to the need to oppose them in
Western-dominated waters. The
1961 period not only included
the addition of Polaris to the
immediate problem, it included a
more complex formulation of
threat as the Soviets thought
through the implications of
warfighting with nuclear
weapons and of sea-based
systems being withheld from the
initial intercontinental exchange.
And then in 1968, it was decided
to put the national nuclear
reserve to sea, generating a
qualitatively new need to ensure
the integrity of home waters in
the north and the Pacific.
The Chinese Dimension
These naval requirements all
stemmed from the threat of war
with the West, but by the end of
the 1960s there was added
concern about the growing
possibility of war with China. In
such an event, it had to be
assumed that the Trans-Siberian
railway would be cut and that
the Far Eastern front would have
to be supplied by ship, either via
the Red Sea or through the
Persian Gulf. These shipments
would require protection from
the Chinese submarine force (the
third largest in the world), and
the threat of attack could reach
back to the Arabian Sea. This
increased the strategic
significance of the Indian Ocean,
more than compensating for the
shift in emphasis away from the
countering of Polaris in that area.
Peacetime Role of Naval Forces
The Soviet Navy's move forward
in strategic defense brought with
it political opportunities for
exploiting the presence of Soviet
forces in distant waters, but even
here, wartime concerns assumed
importance. Underlying the
pattern of Soviet naval diplomacy
over the last 1 5 to 20 years, we
can infer four types of objectives,
each involving a different level of
risk and degree of political
commitment. At the high end of
the scale is the requirement "to
establish a strategic infrastructure
to support war-related missions,"
an objective that has been the
primary motive for a broad span
of decisions ranging from
promoting a coup in a client
state, to acquiring base rights by
barely concealed coercion. The
pressure on Egypt from 1961 to
1967 to provide naval support
facilities is a good example.
Another is base rights in Somalia.
The latter were originally
intended to support the
development of a counter-Polaris
capability, but by the early
1970s, the concern had
extended to protecting the sea
lines of communication and to
securing the entrance to the
Persian Gulf.
At the low end of the
scale of political commitment is
"protecting Soviet lives and
property." In between these
extremes is the general objective
of
"increasing Soviet prestige and
influence," which encompasses a
wide span of activity from
showing the flag and port-
clearance operations to
providing support for
revolutionary elements or to
regimes threatened by
secessionist elements. The
Soviets are prepared to commit
significant resources to this
objective, but while the
propensity for risk-taking has
risen steadily, the underlying
political commitment remains
strictly limited.
Overlapping this general
influence-building objective is
the more restricted one of
"countering imperialist
aggression." Despite much
bombast, it appears that when it
comes to major confrontation
with the West, Soviet political
commitment is low. After 15
years we have no hard evidence
of Soviet readiness to actually
engage Western naval forces in
order to prevent them from
intervening against a Soviet client
state, although the Soviets
sometimes have positioned
themselves as if to do so.
What we do see is
progressively greater
involvement by the Soviet Navy
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in the provision of logistical
support, both before and during
Third World conflicts. However,
as an instrument of overseas
policy, the navy's role remains
secondary. The primary
instruments are arms supply;
military advice and training; the
transport of men, munitions, and
equipment by merchant ship and
long-range aircraft; and direct
participation by combat troops
of revolutionary states such as
Cuba and Vietnam. The main
role of the Soviet Navy is to
provide protection against
interference by local states, and
to serve as an assurance of Soviet
commitment.
The Sea in Soviet Foreign Policy
Is there some grand Soviet
design driving a coordinated
ocean policy in support of
overseas objectives? The short
answer appears to be no, but
here we must distinguish
between the operational aspects
and the setting of objectives. The
military-style organization of the
merchant, fishing, and research
fleets means that they can be
used in peacetime for naval
support tasks such as
replenishment, forward
picketing, and intelligence
gathering. There are also
geostrategic advantages to be
gained with respect to a
worldwide maritime
infrastructure, actual or potential.
However, the long-term
interests of the military,
merchant, and fishing fleets often
diverge. The buildup of the
fishing fleet stemmed from the
Soviet decision in the late 1940s
that fishing is a more cost-
effective source of protein than
farming. The buildup of the
merchant fleet reflected the
post-Stalin shift toward trade,
aid, and arms supply in the
middle 1950s, and the
consequential need to earn hard
currency and avoid dependence
on foreign shipping. At the same
time, the Soviet Navy's shift to
forward deployment reflected
the new threat to the Soviet
homeland from distant sea areas.
Inevitably, there is some conflict
among these different interests,
as could be seen at the Law of
the Sea negotiations. Only the
merchant fleet, which brings in
military supplies, takes out local
commodities such as bauxite and
rubber, and is both a well-
disciplined and a pacific
instrument, consistently serves
the more general foreign policy
goals of increasing the Soviet
Union's share of world influence.
To that extent, it can be seen as
the principal maritime instrument
of Soviet overseas policy.
Michael MccGwire is a Senior Fellow
in the Foreign Policy Studies Program
at the Brookings Institution, Washing-
ton, D.C., and a former British naval
officer.
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Addendum
and Correction
The chart of state laws relating to
marine archaeology that ap-
peared on page 5 of the Spring
1985 issue of Oceanus was pre-
pared by Anne Giesecke.
The object being examined by a
diver in the photograph on page
19 of the same issue was incor-
rectly identified as a coral. It is a
sponge.
115th Annual Meeting
American Fisheries Society
The 1 15th annual meeting of
the American Fisheries Soci-
ety will be held in conjunction
with the 75th annual meet-
ing of the International Asso-
ciation of Fish and Wild-
life Agencies in Sun Val-
ley, Idaho, September 7-12,
1985.
Special session topics include
Application of Remote Sens-
ing to Fisheries, Fish Habitat
Relationships, Rehabilitation
of Depressed Salmon and
Steelhead Runs in the Colum-
bia River Basin, User Group
Conflicts Economic Ele-
ments and Social Impacts,
Water Quality Concerns-
Real or Perceived, Riparian
Ecosystem Management,
Competitive Fishing Chal-
lenges and Potential Impacts,
Computer Utilization in
Hatcheries, Problems with
Gas Supersaturation, Tribal
Governments as Co-managers
of Fisheries Resources, and
Gear Evaluation in Difficult
Habitats. Full-day workshops
are planned on Stock Assess-
ment and Fisheries Educa-
tion. Several contributed pa-
per sessions will be held, in-
cluding Freshwater and Ma-
rine Fisheries Management,
Fish Population Dynamics,
Pollution and Toxicology,
Physiology and Genetics and
Fish Ecology.
All program-related questions
should be directed to R. G.
White, 1985 AFS Program
Chairman, Montana Cooper-
ative Fishery Research Unit,
Biology Department, Mon-
tana State University, Boze-
man, MT 59717 (telephone
406-994-3491). Questions
regarding meeting facilities
and arrangements should be
directed to Jim Keating,
Arrangements Coordinator,
5203 Hill Road, Boise, Idaho
83703 (telephone 208-342-
4401).
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The 1 984 Argentine-Chilean
Pact of Peace and Friendship
In 1984, Argentina and Chile
concluded a Treaty of Peace and
Friendship that has important
economic, political, and strategic
implications for the southernmost
part of the Americas. Argentine
President Alfonsin claimed that the
treaty is a broad step toward "peace,
integration, and disarmament in Latin
America." There are nonetheless
difficult obstacles that must be
overcome if the ambitious aims of
the treaty are to be realized.
Historical Problems
The treaty is the result of arduous,
protracted efforts by both countries
to resolve many problems that had
long soured their relations.
Competition between Argentina and
Chile for position and influence dates
from the beginning of national
independence in the early years of
the last century. A boundary treaty
between the two states in 1881
embodied a political compromise for
the southern reaches of South
America and established a legal
framework to stabilize the
compromise.
The 1881 treaty delineated
the entire frontier between Argentina
and Chile, and in general terms has
been mutually accepted for the last
100 years. Moreover, in the south,
the treaty played an important role in
helping stabilize the respective
distribution of land and maritime
areas between Argentina and Chile.
In essence, a commitment to a
mutually accepted legal framework
helped moderate political
competition.
But ambiguities and
uncertainties in the 1881 treaty
became increasingly serious over
time, as continuing political
competition and mistrust between
the two states weakened the good
will generated by the original
compromise. On several occasions,
political differences threatened to
degenerate into armed clashes and at
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figure 1 . The recent treaty between Argentina and Chile settles disputes over the
Beagle Channel and the Straits of Magellan, and may affect the Falklands/Malvinas
Islands and claims to Antarctica.
times bordered on war.
The vagueness of the 1881
treaty spawned two pressing
boundary disputes, which the 1984
treaty attempts to resolve. First, the
1881 treaty did not specify which
country possessed the eastern mouth
of the Strait of Magellan nor the
ocean zone that the mouth of the
strait would generate in the Atlantic
Ocean. Second, the 1881 treaty did
not clearly establish the boundary
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between the two countries at the
eastern end of the Beagle Channel.
Here too, uncertainty about the
boundary led to a related dispute
about the ownership of offshore
zones.
Strategic Importance
The area at the tip of South
America's Southern Cone (Figure 1)
encompassed by the 1984 treaty is
resource-rich and strategically vital.
These facts have conditioned
prospects for conflict and
cooperation, and have greatly
complicated resolution of
outstanding problems, which
successive policy makers have been
coping with for more than a century.
At the same time, the very
importance of the area will heighten
the achievement of the new treaty,
should it prove a viable solution.
The longstanding Beagle
Channel dispute between Argentina
and Chile has involved ocean areas
that both parties have regarded as
strategically important, in part
because ownership of these areas
would affect their respective
Antarctic claims and their access to
the cold continent. Both states very
nearly went to war over the issue in
1978, which triggered involvement
by the Pope in the dispute and
eventually led to the 1984 treaty.
The Argentine-British dispute
over the Falkland/Malvinas Islands
has likewise festered for more than a
century, and culminated in war in
1982. The war in fact steeled what
had been wavering British resolve to
remain in the islands. However, the
proximity of considerable Argentine
military power has since obliged
Britain to adopt a "fortress Falklands"
policy as long as it is unwilling to
negotiate the issue of sovereignty
with Argentina. Postwar Argentine
responses, including a continuing air
and naval buildup and persistent
claims to sovereignty over the islands
and adjacent ocean areas, also have
contributed to the militarization of
the Falklands and their offshore
areas.
In 1962, Britain did redefine
the Falkland Islands and
dependencies to exclude British
Antarctic territories, so that two
separate administrative units replace
the previously unified administration
of these territories. Hence, a transfer
of the Falklands to Argentine
sovereignty would not affect British
Antarctic claims. Nonetheless, the
renewed British commitment to
remain in the Falklands Islands has
forged new bonds between the
Falklands and the contiguous British
Antarctic territory. This in turn
complicates the longstanding
problem of the overlapping Antarctic
claims of Argentina, Britain, and
Chile.
In the South Atlantic,
heightened involvement of outside
powers via the Falklands issue has
threatened to awaken latent conflicts
in this strategically located ocean
basin. Britain's direct involvement
and eventual victory in the 1982
Falklands war included reliance on
Ascension Island in the middle of the
ocean basin, and the United States
siding with Britain against Argentina.
Soviet involvement in the 1982 war
was minimal, although offers of
military equipment have been made
to Argentina and the Soviet Union is
well entrenched in both Angola and
Mozambique, which border,
respectively, the South Atlantic and
Indian Ocean portions of the
strategic shipping route around South
Africa.
Chile has regarded any
Argentine pretensions to share in
control of the Strait of Magellan as
directly challenging its vital national
interests. Chile holds that its control
of this important interoceanic
waterway is a central element in the
1881 treaty compromise and is
essential for its national security. In
the last decade, however, competing
interpretations of ownership of
strategic areas offshore the Atlantic
mouth of the Strait of Magellan have
proliferated. Depending on the
particular formulation, Argentina and
Chile each claimed control over the
eastern mouth of the strait as well as
a 12-mile territorial sea and a 188-
mile exclusive economic zone (FEZ)
in the Atlantic, fronting the mouth of
the strait. A Chilean FEZ would
nearly reach a British Falklands' EEZ,
to the dismay of Argentina.
The Strait of Magellan issue
also complicated peaceful resolution
of the Beagle Channel problem. Prior
to the 1984 treaty, which provides an
apparent legal solution to both
matters, Argentina and Chile
expected that any resolution of the
Beagle Channel problem would
merely set the scene for reopening
the interlocking Strait of Magellan
issue. A package deal or compromise
resolving both issues simultaneously
was consequently regarded as
necessary, which contributed to the
protracted, complicated nature of the
negotiations.
Economic Importance
Argentina and Chile are well
endowed with offshore resources,
and the enclosure of these resources
by extended territorial seas and
exclusive economic zones promises
significant economic development.
Both Argentina and Chile have
sizeable oil and gas reserves,
including scattered distribution
offshore. All of the Chilean oil
production has been concentrated in
the Magellan region in the far south,
and since 1980 the majority of this
production has occurred offshore in
the large bay enclosed by the eastern
entrance of the Strait of Magellan.
The Magellan oil basin extends
onshore to the north and south of
the Strait of Magellan as well, and
also offshore to the east into the
Atlantic. Gas production, in contrast,
has mostly occurred on land because
of technological and transportation
constraints.
Tension between Argentina
and Chile increased in the late 1970s,
when Argentina offered exploratory
drilling concessions to foreign oil
firms in the disputed area of the
Atlantic ocean to the east of the Strait
of Magellan, and also laid an offshore
gas line from Tierra del Fuego Island
to the mainland across the same
disputed area. The 1984 Argentine-
Chilean treaty allocated these
previously disputed offshore areas to
Argentina.
The unsettled political future
of the Falkland Islands has slowed
realization of offshore resource
exploitation there as well. With the
continuing diplomatic impasse over
the Falklands, it seems unlikely that
major international oil companies
would make a sustained financial
commitment to exploration and
exploitation of offshore oil, even
though the potential appears
promising. Rational exploitation of
the Falklands' fisheries has likewise
been complicated by the ongoing
diplomatic confrontation with
Argentina. Argentina also has been
concerned that a continued British
presence in the Falklands would be
economically strengthened through
exploitation of living and nonliving
offshore resources, in addition to
allegedly depriving Argentina of its
rightful patrimony.
Southern Cone fisheries are
important both regionally and
globally. Chile and Peru are the Latin
American leaders in fisheries, with
catches of about 4 million tons each
in 1983 placing these two nations
among the 10 leading fishing
countries of the world. Mexico and
Brazil are the third and fourth largest
fishing states in the region, followed
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by Argentina, which has caught less
than 600,000 tons annually in recent
years. In the case of Argentina,
estimates of the maximum
sustainable yield are well over 2
million metric tons annually, so the
current yield may be as little as one-
third of the potential. Moreover,
these estimates of sustainable yield
do not include the krill fishery in
Antarctic waters, which Argentina
and Chile are well situated to
participate in because of large krill
concentrations in the vicinity of the
Antarctic peninsula (Figure 1).
The 1984 Treaty
After six years of bilateral
negotiations and with the mediation
of the Pope, Argentina and Chile
signed the Treaty of Peace and
Friendship on November 29, 1984.
Since Argentina has been under
civilian democratic rule from late
1983, approval of the treaty required
protracted debates and involvement
of both the executive and legislative
branches of government. The
electorate was involved through a
referendum. A large majority of those
voting (77%) approved the treaty,
and the treaty also has been
approved by both houses of the
Argentine Congress, which
completes the ratification process. In
April 1985, the Chilean military junta
ratified the treaty as well.
Articles 1 through 6 of this
new treaty attempt to consolidate,
formalize, and extend political
understanding between Argentina
and Chile. The two parties pledge to
resolve their disputes amicably and
to abstain from the use or threat of
force in their bilateral relations.
Elaborate conflict resolution
measures are outlined in the treaty's
Annex No. 1.
Articles 7 through 9 specify
the complicated provisions regarding
the maritime delimitation in the
Beagle Channel area (Figure 2), and
Article 10 contains the compromise
reached between the two parties
about the eastern mouth of the Strait
of Magellan, in which Argentina
implicitly denounces previous claims
to participate in managing the strait
and also pledges guaranteed access
to all flags through its waters to and
from the Strait of Magellan. For its
part in the compromise, Chile is
prevented from gaining a territorial
sea and EEZ to the east of the Strait's
mouth, to which it might otherwise
have been entitled.
Article 12 covers the creation
of a permanent binational
commission for intensifying
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Figure 2. The 1 984 treaty establishes a firm boundary across the mouth of the Strait
of Magellan, and a firm maritime boundary (A through F) in the Beagle Channel
region.
economic cooperation and physical
integration. These cooperative
measures are to include the overall
economies of both nations and not
just the extreme south.
Implications of the 1984 Treaty
While the 1881 Boundary Limit
Treaty resolved then pressing
boundary disputes, it could not help
settle conflicts that arose afterwards.
The Beagle Channel issue became
increasingly acrimonious, and
contending bilateral claims to
Antarctica later arose. The Strait of
Magellan was a pillar of stability
embedded in treaty law. However,
bilateral differences threatened to
unravel the 1881 settlement and
undermine the stability of the Strait's
position. In essence, the 1984 treaty
aspires to reinforce the stability of the
longstanding legal pillar and to erect
a new one, the Beagle Channel area,
to complement the Strait of
Magellan, replacing a somewhat
shaky legal pillar with two sound
ones.
The comprehensive nature of
the treaty offers a framework for
resolving past problems and moving
toward greater cooperation, but the
troubled history of Argentine-Chilean
relations makes it difficult to be
optimistic about relations between
the two countries. The treaty's future
will be enhanced if the initial steps
taken toward economic integration
gather momentum. Indeed the
economic and political conditions
appear as propitious as any in recent
memory for longlasting improvement
in bilateral relations.
The treaty does not purport
to resolve the conflicting Antarctic
claims of the two parties. However,
the treaty may help isolate and lessen
the importance of the Argentine-
Chilean dispute involving Antarctica.
The elaborate conflict resolution
procedures of the treaty are to
encompass bilateral differences over
Antarctica. Some of the navigational
provisions of Annex No. 2 involve
navigation to and from Antarctica and
could help reassure both parties that
their access will not be threatened.
Nonetheless, resolution of the Beagle
Channel dispute had been
complicated because both parties
feared that any settlement there
would prejudice their respective
Antarctic claims. While the treaty is
not to affect Antarctic claims, the
Cape Horn meridian (line E-F of
Figure 2), if extended to the South
Pole, would cut through the Antarctic
peninsula where Argentine and
Chilean claims overlap. Even were
the conflict resolution procedures of
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the treaty to help resolve bilateral
differences over Antarctica,
Argentine and Chilean disputes with
other nations, including Britain, over
claims to Antarctic territories, would
remain.
The 1984 treaty may also
affect the Falkland/Malvinas Islands,
although there is no mention
whatsoever of the islands in the
treaty. Adolfo Gass, President of the
Argentine Senate's Committee on
Foreign Relations, explicitly linked
the treaty to the Falklands/Malvinas
issue. He declared that resolution of
boundary disputes with Chile would
"free the hands of Argentina" to
concentrate on regaining sovereignty
over the Malvinas Islands from
Britain. Just prior to signing the treaty,
Argentine President Alfonsin likewise
declared that the treaty between
Argentina and Chile would "open the
definitive possibility of working
together for Argentine sovereignty
over the Malvinas Islands." Chile,
however, has maintained good
relations with Britain and will surely
wish to continue this relationship in
the post-treaty setting. Post-treaty
frustration in this respect for
Argentina might trigger a new round
of accusations, similar to those during
the 1982 Falklands war, about
Chilean collaboration with Britain.
At the same time, the new
atmosphere of political entente and
economic cooperation between
Argentina and Chile presents Chile
with an incentive to distance itself
from the British presence in the
Falklands. British expectations that
Chile will lend important political and
economic support for the British
presence in the islands may be as
misplaced as counterpart Argentine
expectations.
One important positive
development is that the new
democratic government in Argentina,
while reaffirming Argentine
sovereignty over the Falklands, has
emphasized that it will rely
exclusively on peaceful methods of
resolving the conflict. Herein lies an
opportunity for new Anglo-Argentine
negotiations and reconciliation of the
interests of all concerned.
Some broader implications
claimed for the treaty should be
noted, although only time will tell if
the flush of optimism following
signature of the treaty will be
warranted. Whether justified or not,
new hope has been inspired for the
peaceful resolution of some other
Latin American conflicts. A popular
impression throughout the continent
is that since this intransigent dispute
could be resolved peacefully, so too
can other regional disputes. A related
view is that papal mediation, having
assisted conclusion of the 1984
treaty, now constitutes an important
new method for resolving regional
disputes.
Caution should temper such
expectations. Argentina and Chile
very nearly went to war in 1978 over
the Beagle Channel issue, and it was
only as an outgrowth of this scare
that the current negotiations were
undertaken. Similarly, only the failure
of all conventional negotiating
methods led to involvement of the
Pope, and the 1984 treaty is the only
successful example of papal
mediation in modern times. Hence,
papal mediation may not be
successfully replicated in other
circumstances, particularly since
mediation depends on the good will
of the states involved, which is
conspicuously absent in numerous
regional disputes.
Even the elaborate conflict
resolution system contained in the
treaty may not work in practice.
Previous Argentine-Chilean conflict
resolution procedures have appeared
even more promising (for example,
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the provisions in 1902 for binding
arbitration with a pre-established
tribunal and in 1972 for binding
judicial settlement through the
International Court of Justice). Yet,
these measures did not prove
effective in resolving specific
disputes. Similarly, there is a plethora
of legal mechanisms for resolving
Latin American disputes, but disputes
continue to proliferate.
Important implications for
arms proliferation and use may be
associated with the treaty as well.
Both Argentina and Chile have been
prominent in the ongoing Latin
American arms buildup and both
have recently experienced military
confrontation (with each other in
1978) or war (Argentina with Britain
in 1982). Immediately before, during,
and after the 1982 Malvinas war,
Argentina under a military
dictatorship has been the largest
military spender in Latin America. In
contrast, democratically-elected
President Alfonsin has relied on the
treaty to complement his campaign
for cutting military expenditures. The
weaker party, Chile, while still under
a military government, has welcomed
a less tense military situation with
Argentina because of internal
problems and continuing disputes on
its northern borders. In a strategic
part of the continent, the treaty may
therefore help curb arms proliferation
and use. In a continent where
disputes tend to be interlocking, a
contagion effect for peace could
occur, just as the 1982 Falklands/
Malvinas war heightened tension
throughout the continent, the 1984
treaty could play a significant role in
easing regional tension.
Michael A. Morris,
Senior Fellow,
Marine Policy and Ocean
Management Center,
Woods Hole Oceanographic
Institution
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oThe Hunt for Red October by Tom Clancy. 1984. The
United States Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland.
J87 pp. $14.95.
Fhis novel, the first for the author and the first published by
:he U.S. Naval Institute Press, is an exciting modern sea
/am based on the complexities of antisubmarine warfare.
Fhe reader there have been some 150,000 to date over
several printings is brought to the brink of a nuclear
?xchange by a plot that turns on a top Soviet naval officer's
attempt to defect to the United States in a new ballistic
nissile submarine called a "boomer" in Navy parlance.
The Soviet sub Red October is equipped with a
lew propulsion system that allows it to run so silently as to
3e almost undetectable acoustically. The novel thus will be
ippreciated by those of the high tech persuasion as well as
hose interested in the underwater aspects of military
itrategy. Nearly the entire Soviet Atlantic fleet is ordered to
ind and destroy Red October, while the U.S. fleet's orders
ire to find the sub and bring it safely to port. The hunt lasts
18 days and covers more than 4,000 miles of ocean.
When I was at this year's meeting of the U.S. Naval
nstitute (held in April at the War College in Newport, R.I.),
ligh-ranking naval officers commended the author for his
'plausible scenario." Tom Clancy was depicted as a married
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insurance salesman from Delaware with three children. He
had never been in a submarine until after submitting his
manuscript to the editors of the Naval Institute Press. Hard
to believe, although one of his editors said Clancy was
"helped" with some details in the interest of authenticity.
One always wonders with this type of book if it is fiction
based on imagination or on fact.
The Woods Hole Oceanographic "Institute" [sic]
and its deep submergence research vehicle Sea Cliff
[pseudonym] play a small role in the scenario. These
passages will undoubtedly bring smiles to the lips of those
here at the Institution reading this work.
Probably the most disturbing aspect of this novel is
that when you put it down you are left with the uneasy
feeling that a miscalculation or mistake in the real world of
antisubmarine warfare could lead to thermonuclear war.
The novel makes the point that these naval systems are
very elaborate and complex, and that the time available to
respond to a crisis is almost always dictated by the other
side.
The weakest sections of Red October are the parts
in which the author engages in propaganda, crowing over
the virtues of the American society as compared to the
Soviet. These passages, for my part, could have been
eliminated; they were inferable from the rest of the text.
Their omission would, I think, have made the work
stronger, more believable. The ending, too, was somewhat
melodramatic. These are small criticisms though. In general,
I found the novel interesting on several levels that of a
general reader looking for a fast moving, entertaining sea
yarn, that of a person concerned about the repercussions of
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advanced technology, and that of an individual seeking a
glimpse into the highly specialized world of antisubmarine
warfare.
Paul R. Ryan,
Editor, Oceanos
A second example of the book's inadequacy in
terms of the legal and administrative history of Georges
Bank development is MacLeish's treatment of California v.
Watt. This case dealt with the ability of a state to block a
federal activity if the activity was directly affecting its coastal
zone in a manner contrary to that state's coastal zone
management plan. The decision reached by the U. S.
Supreme Court is truly a landmark against which all future
offshore oil and gas development will be checked. In
essence, the Supreme Court decision declares that a lease
Oil and Wafer: The Struggle for Georges Bank by William
H. MacLeish. 1985. The Atlantic Monthly Press, Boston,
Mass. 304 pp. + xv. $19.95.
This book examines the conflict between users of two
different resources that exist in the same place. The
resources are fish and oil; the locale is Georges Bank. It
should be noted that the existence of the oil is
"theoretical," and estimates of the resource are reduced
yearly. The author, who is a former editor of Oceanus,
characterizes this conflict as a "resource revolt," with the
fishermen identified as the insurrectionists and the oil men
identified as the loyalists.
William H. MacLeish uses two strategies or
approaches to examine this conflict. First, he provides short
historical accounts of the important landmark events that
have occurred vis-a-vis attempts by the federal government
to initiate oil and gas development on Georges Bank. These
events have been political (for example, the election of
Edward King to the governorship of Massachusetts),
administrative/regulatory (example, the acceleration and
expansion of the federal offshore leasing program by
Secretaries of the Interior Andrus and Watt), and legal (the
issuance of injunctions against the Georges Bank lease sales
by federal court justices). Second, MacLeish provides us
with verbal snapshots on several of the main actors or
groups involved in the "resource revolt" over Georges
Bank. To acquire these snapshots, MacLeish has played the
role of participant/observer/interviewer on fishing vessels,
research vessels, Coast Guard surveillance helicopters, and
offshore oil rigs. He also attended public hearings, court
proceedings, and lease sales, and augmented his
knowledge with visits to the offices of state and federal
bureaucrats and corporate executives. To provide
continuity to his story, MacLeish has interwoven the
historical episodes with the anecdotal material from his
stints as "fisherman," "oil man," "research scientist," and so
forth.
Unfortunately, at least for this reader, the
interweaving of the history with the "work biographies"
does not succeed, even though MacLeish's descriptions of
the motivations and feelings of the participants are
unparalleled. My negative appraisal stems from the history
of oil and gas development on Georges Bank presented by
the book. All of the events are there, all of the key
decisions are described, but too summarily. Important
aspects of the battle for the resource future of Georges
Bank are dealt with almost as asides or afterthoughts. An
example of this is the description of Rhode Island's position
on the issue of oil and gas development. MacLeish only
commits a few sentences to the fact that Rhode Island has
vigorously supported federal efforts to develop oil and gas
resources on Georges Bank. The state has done so in the
hope that the depressed economy of southern Rhode
Island would prosper as an onshore support area for the
offshore activities. Could it be that in setting up a discussion
of federal-state conflict over Georges Bank, MacLeish has
opted to ignore instances of federal-state cooperation?
sale does not fall under the "consistency provisions" of the
federal Coastal Zone Management Act. The ramifications of
this decision, not only for Georges Bank, but for the entire
U.S. outer continental shelf, are many. MacLeish certainly
should have devoted more than two sentences to the final
outcome of California v. Watt.
If I had been MacLeish's editor, I would have
suggested abandoning the historical material; the length of
the book does not allow for a full treatment of it. Further,
there are many other superior sources on the historical
aspects, but none on the people.
Thus, a short introductory chapter would have
sufficed to set the background for the real strengths of this
volume. The principals in MacLeish's vignettes are
interesting, informative, and humorous. The anecdotes
provide fresh insight into the nature of those who have
invested time and money in Georges Bank and its
resources. That is the real story of Oil and Water. What
MacLeish has done, through years of intimate observation,
is to provide us all with a better understanding of the
people behind the headlines, court orders, and Federal
Register regulations. And when all is said and done,
perhaps an enhanced appreciation of the human beings
involved is more important than full knowledge of the legal,
economic, and scientific issues.
What MacLeish clearly demonstrates with his "work
biographies" is that Georges Bank is not inhabited by
"insurrectionists" and
"loyalists." Rather, the individuals
involved in the resource conflict are dedicated and sincere;
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they are interested in Georges Bank because it is important
to their livelihoods and ways of life.
Although I have found fault with this book's
treatment of the legal and political aspects of Georges Bank
oil and gas development, it cannot be faulted for its
treatment of the human aspects. I can, therefore,
recommend it to anyone with an interest in the ocean and
its resources and the people who exploit, protect, study,
and manage those resources.
Maynard Silva,
Research Specialist,
Marine Policy and Ocean Management Center,
Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution,
Woods Hole, Mass.
Design and Construction of Mounds for Breakwaters and
Coastal Protection. Per Bruun, ed. 1985. Elsevier Science
Publishing Co., New York, N.Y. 938 pp. + xxiv. $92.75.
On average, relative sea levels worldwide have been rising
for the past century, and will continue to rise for the
predictable future. Accompanying this sea-level rise has
been widespread coastal change, with erosion surpassing
accretion. In an attempt to slow this erosion, and to allow
man to continue his encroachment onto the coastal zone,
various structural engineering alternatives have been
formulated to stem the forces of the ocean. These
structures, including breakwaters, jetties, revetments,
seawalls, groins, and other mounds of various
nomenclature, have been designed through empirical
means over the last century or so, to retard the ocean's
encroachment onto land and to provide protected ports
and harbors. Advancing through trial and error, this
approach has suffered many failures, which in turn have
guided the way toward improvements in coastal protection.
Today, the coastal engineer continues to use empiricism to
design structures in the coastal zone, with varying degrees
of success.
The present text, edited by Per Bruun, is an attempt
to collate the more recent quantitative advances in design
and construction of "mounds" for coastal protection works,
to emphasize the science rather than the art of coastal
protection design. Recent advances in theoretical
hydrodynamics, analysis and design of structures, and
construction techniques have improved the potential
success rate of coastal structures in resolving coastal erosion
and transportation problems. This book attempts to provide
this information to the coastal engineer on all levels, making
the diversity of engineering advances and expertise
available in a single volume.
Written by a number of international experts in the
field of coastal engineering (whose individual contributions
generally are impossible to determine, unfortunately,
because of the editing), the major headings include basic
parameters for design, in which wave and structures
concepts are reviewed; design, incorporating theory and
empiricism; construction, discussing techniques,
equipment, and various other considerations; examples of
mound breakwaters, including failures; coastal protection
structures from design to construction; and finally a section
on alternative designs of mounds using bituminous
materials. Most sections include not only engineering
analyses, but also techniques for risk analysis, economic
design, and factors affecting duration and cost of projects.
Given the list of contributors, these sections offer some
insightful material of general interest to the coastal
engineer.
The utility of the book is hampered by several
factors, decreasing its appeal to the engineering audience.
The organization of the book is weak, with related subjects
scattered throughout the volume, instead of placed under a
single heading. This is partly the result of having many
authors, I would suspect. The layout is unappealing, with
little effort placed on identifying major and minor headings
within the book. Consequently, it is difficult to identify the
structure of the book when reading, leading to some
confusion. Perhaps even more harmful, however, is the
poor quality of print, which varies throughout the book.
Differences in type and density of print detract from the
readability of the book, and compound the problems of
disorganization. The book includes many figures, many of
which have symbols that are undefined in the caption as
well as the text itself. Some figures are of poor quality, hard
to read, and inappropriately laid out. Other figures (and
tables) are included without adding significantly to the
subject.
One of the major drawbacks of the text is the lack
of an appendix defining all mathematical symbols used in
the book. Symbols are not standardized, and are often used
but not defined in a particular section. This means that one
has to search long and hard (given the organizational
problems) to pin down the meaning of many symbols. A
simple appendix defining each symbol would be helpful,
and standardizing (which is an editorial job) would increase
the readability even more.
There are several sections in the book that are only
marginally germane to the subject material, but which are
included in their entirety, leading to a significant loss of
continuity. Examples are a discussion by O. G. Houmb on
wave statistics, and a section by Dagfin Brodtkorb on a
microwave sensor for the ocean. These digressions severely
impact on the organization of the book, rather than making
the book more complete, as I suspect the original intent
may have been.
In summary, Per Bruun has edited a book that has
much information of widespread utility to coastal engineers
throughout the world, but whose presentation will probably
prevent it from being a widely used reference text. The
niche for a well-written design text covering coastal
structural design and construction therefore remains open,
leading to the hope that another editor will be able to
provide a more useful volume, or that Per Bruun will edit
the present text more seriously to remove its many faults.
Sea level will continue to rise, and coastal erosion will
continue in the future. Although a purely structural solution
to resolve these sea level/erosional problems is unwise,
structural measures will continue to be a valuable
alternative in our arsenal of means to mitigate rising sea
levels and resultant coastal change. Coastal engineers must
continually strive to improve their knowledge and
implementation of these structural measures. For this, the
engineers need updated, readable, well-written texts to
keep them abreast of advances, all areas in which the
present text falls short.
David G. Aubrey,
Associate Scientist,
Geology and Geophysics Department,
Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution,
Woods Hole, Mass.
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Books Received
Biology
1 1th International Seaweed
Symposium, C. \. Bird and M. A.
Ragan, eds. Developments in
Hydrobiology 22. 1984. Dr W. Junk
Publishers, Kluwer Boston, Boston,
Mass. 621 pp. + xxxi. $128.50.
88.95.
Held in Qingdao, People's Republic
of China, in June 1983, this
symposium was a large affair with
many international participants. The
resulting book contains five opening
addresses, and is divided into three
parts. Part One contains three
plenary lectures. Part Two
(minisymposia special topic
sessions) contains 29 papers under
these headings: taxonomy of
Gracilaria; cultivation biology of
Cracilaha; utilization of seaweeds and
their products; production and
utilization of microalgae; algae in
medicine and pharmacology;
chemistry of agars and carigeenans;
and biology of Acetabu/an'a. Part
Three (contributed papers) contains
91 papers under these headings:
morphology, taxonomy and life
histories, cultivation, resources and
management, ecology, fouling
organisms and pathology, physiology,
chemical composition and
properties, and chemical structure
and characterization.
Sea Otters: A Natural History and
Guide by Roy Nickerson. Chronicle
Books, San Francisco, Calif. 110 pp.
$7.95.
A small book sprinkled with full-page,
black-and-white photos. The natural
history of sea otters is the theme,
including their near extinction in the
earlier part of this century. Sea otters
are playful, comic creatures who
seem to get enjoyment from life.
Although they have recovered in
numbers somewhat, their future is
still uncertain because of commercial
fishermen's dislike for them. This
book explains it all, and suggests
good places to go to observe sea
otters along the west coast of the
U.S. Judging by the picture captions,
Monterey, California, is a good bet.
Shorebirds: Breeding Behavior and
Populations and Shorebirds:
Migration and Foraging Behavior,
Joanna Burger and Bori L. Olla, eds.
1984. Volumes 5 and 6 of Behavior
of Marine Animals, Plenum Press,
New York, N.Y. Vol. 5: 437 pp. + xv.
$59.50. Vol. 6: 329 pp. + xiv. $49.50.
Shorebirds are closely related
taxonomically, but exhibit great
diversity in behavior and ecology.
This makes them good subjects for
studies of behavior, ecology, and
evolution. In the last 20 years many
such studies have been conducted;
these two volumes provide a
selection of current research in the
field. In Volume 5, the first two
chapters introduce both books,
discussing shorebird classification
and the concept of shorebirds as
marine animals. Chapters 3 through 9
focus on aspects of shorebird
breeding behavior, including topics
such as breeding site fidelity,
polyandrous mating systems, and
communications. Population
dynamics and conservation of
shorebirds also are covered in
Volume 5. The six chapters of
Volume 6 are primarily on behavior
patterns of shorebirds during the
non-breeding season, including
migration patterns and influences,
foraging and activity patterns, and the
spacing behavior of non-breeding
shorebirds.
Skin Diver Magazine's Book of Fishes
by Hillary Mauser. 1984. Pisces
Books, New York, NY. 192 pp.
$24.95.
The fishes in this book are presented
phyletically, beginning with the more
primitive and proceeding to the more
complex. The book evolved out of
the "Fish of the Month" column in
Skin Diver. Each two-page spread is
illustrated with a full-page color
photograph and a line drawing. Each
fish family is identified by its
common name or names, with the
scientific name printed underneath.
General remarks, range and habitats,
life cycle and diet, and physical
characteristics (or some variation on
this outline) are given for each group.
Some descriptions have a map
depicting the fish's general range.
There are at least 49 kinds of fish
represented, from tarpons and
ladyfishes to puffers, porcupine
fishes, and molas.
Biotechnology in the Marine
Sciences: Proceedings of the First
Annual MIT Sea Grant Lecture and
Seminar, Rita R. Colwell, Anthony ).
Sinskey, and E. Ray Pariser, eds.
1984. John Wiley & Sons, New York,
N.Y. 293 pp. + xvii. $37.50.
This book contains papers from a
conference on new ideas for
increasing and diversifying marine
food products and Pharmaceuticals
and protecting against pollution and
marine fouling, by incorporating
genetic research, biochemistry, and
ocean engineering. The book begins
with an introduction to
biotechnology in the marine
sciences, then has four parts
comprising papers from the seminars
at the conference. The general topics
are: aquaculture; marine
Pharmaceuticals and bioproducts;
marine biofouling; and marine
pollution control.
A Functional Biology of Sticklebacks
by R. J. Wootton. 1984. University of
California Press, Berkeley and Los
Angeles, Calif. 265 pp. $29.75.
By examining how the stickleback
makes use of its habitat, food supply,
and time, and its patterns of growth,
survivorship, and reproduction, the
author demonstrates that, in ecology
and evolutionary biology, a
theoretical framework can be used to
illuminate the ways in which animals
function and to show that
knowledge obtainable only through
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detailed study of a taxon is required
to test such a theoretical framework.
A Functional Biology of Free-Living
Protozoa by Johanna Laybourn-
Parry. 1984. University of California
Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles,
Calif. 218 pp. + viii. $27.50.
All the life-sustaining processes
carried out in the metazoa by tissues
and organs are performed in the
protozoa by organelles. This book
examines how ciliates, sarcodines,
and flagellates acquire energy, and
discusses how they perform various
physiological processes (growth,
reproduction, osmo-regulation, and
such). The important integration of
physiology and ecology among the
protozoa is detailed.
Watching Fishes: Life and Behavior
on Coral Reefs by Roberta Wilson
and lames Q. Wilson. 1985. Harper
& Row, New York, N.Y. 275 pp.
$25.00.
Written for general readers, this book
discusses in easy terms scientific
knowledge of coral reefs and the
behavior of fishes found there. The
authors describe and explain coral
reefs, then devote most of the book
to the fishes, explaining their
swimming, eating, sensory
perception, social life, and more.
Two inserts of color plates and many
sketches by R. Wilson illustrate the
book. A glossary is included, along
with an extensive reference list for
those wishing to delve further into
the subject.
Chemistry
Organic Chemicals in Natural
Waters: Applied Monitoring and
Impact Assessment by James W.
Moore and S. Ramamoorthy. 1984.
Springer-Verlag, New York, N.Y.
289 pp. + xi. $39.80.
This is the second of two volumes
reviewing data, methods, and
principles of potential use in
environmental management and
research. The book covers the
organic chemicals outlined in the
EPA's priority pollutants list and
Canada's Environmental Contaminant
Act. Most of the chemicals aliphatic
and aromatic compounds,
chlorinated pesticides, petroleum
hydrocarbons, etcetera are
widespread in the environment and
are toxic to humans and fish.
Included for each chemical are
reviews of the chemistry, production,
uses, discharges, behavior in natural
waters, uptake, and toxicity. Also
included are description criteria for
prioritizing chemical hazards posed
to users of aquatic resources. There
are four appendices to aid readers:
chemical formulae, physical and
chemical terms, common and
scientific names of fishes, and
equations for evaluating physico-
chemical fate processes.
Geochemistry of Organic Matter in
the Ocean by Evgenii A. Romankevich.
1984. Springer-Verlag, New York,
N.Y. (Originally published in Russian
by Vestnic Academii Nauk SSSR,
1978.) 334 pp. + xv. $59.00.
Using a systems-analysis approach,
this book covers the distribution,
composition, transformation,
interrelations, balance, and fate of
organic matter in the oceans-
including living, dissolved, colloid,
and suspended organic matter in
both bottom sediments and in
interstitial waters. There are nine
chapters about organic matter in the
ocean. The chapters are on sources,
the carbon of dissolved and
particulate organic matter, organic
carbon of Late Quaternary sediments
in seas and oceans, nitrogen and
phosphorus in the process of
sedimentogenesis, proteinaceous
compounds and amino acids,
carbohydrates, and more.
Environment/Ecology
The Estuary as a Filter, Victor S.
Kennedy, ed. 1984. Academic Press,
Orlando, Fla. 51 1 pp. $39.50; E30.50.
Occupying less than one percent of
our planet's surface, estuaries
illustrate that the "sum is greater
than the parts" they are unique,
complex, and very important to the
total environment. The papers in this
volume are grouped as they were
presented at the seventh biennial
conference of the Estuarine Research
Federation, held in Virginia Beach,
Virginia, October 1983. There are
five sections: physical processes,
chemical processes, chemical-
geochemical processes, biological
processes, and management
implications. There are 23 papers
altogether, each of which somehow
addresses the idea of estuaries as
filters traps for materials.
External Costs of Coastal Beach
Pollution: An Hedonic Approach by
Elizabeth A. Wilman. 1984.
Resources for the Future,
Washington, D.C. 194 pp. + xiii.
$15.00.
What would a major oil spill on
Georges Bank (off the coast of
Massachusetts) cost in beach
recreational services? In this book,
the author develops a method for
estimating such a loss monetarily,
combining oil-spill risk analysis with a
model of tourist pricing on Cape Cod
and Martha's Vineyard. To do this
requires eight chapters and five
appendices. After introducing the
problem by discussing management
needs and "economic valuation of
externalities," the author introduces
the case study, presents the hedonic
pricing model and the oil-spill risk-
analysis model, discusses risk and
uncertainty in decisionmaking,
presents an econometric analysis of
the hedonic model, combines the
results, and presents conclusions and
recommendations. The appendices
present various data and lists of
information relevant to the work.
The Antarctic Circumpolar Ocean by
George Deacon. 1984. Studies in
Polar Research, Cambridge
University Press, New York, N.Y.
180pp. + viii. $24.95.
This small, informative book is
illustrated with black-and-white
diagrams and photos. Though it's
intended for students going into
oceanography or polar research, it is
suitable for other readers as well. The
author means to show how present
knowledge grew from earlier
findings; the first part of the book
discusses early ideas and evidence of
a great southern continent, the
history of Antarctic exploration,
whaling and sealing in the Southern
Ocean through the early 20th
century, and the systematic studies of
oceanographic expeditions. The
second part of the book examines
Antarctic water movements,
biological productivity, distributions
of marine plants and animals, climate,
and ice cover.
Estuarine Ecology of the
Southeastern United States and Gulf
of Mexico by Robert R. Stickney.
1984. Texas A & M University Press,
College Station, Texas. 310 pp. + xii.
$24.50.
An examination of the physical,
chemical, geological, and biological
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characteristics of estuaries. Many
Americans live in cities located near
estuaries coastal regions where
fresh and salt water mingle but few
of us understand estuaries or their
contribution to the quality of life. All
that can be rectified by reading this
book, which, though it concentrates
on estuaries of the southern U.S.,
contains information relevant to most
U.S. estuaries. The 1 1 chapters are
extensively referenced, and despite
the voluminous data presented, the
book is written so as to be accessible
to any interested reader. Topics
covered are: marine and estuarine
science, freshwater inflow,
sedimentary processes, physical
relationships, estuarine chemistry,
primary producers, decomposers and
detritus, zooplankton, benthos,
fishes, higher vertebrates, and man's
impact on estuaries.
Coastal and Sedimentary
Environments, Richard A. Davis, jr.,
ed. 1985. Second edition. Springer-
Verlag, New York, N.Y. 716 pp. +
xvii. $39.80.
Bays, estuaries, deltas, marshes,
dunes, beaches: many environments
make up the coastal zone, where
land and sea meet. To utilize this
area well, yet not plunder it, we
need extensive knowledge of its
complexities. This book is designed
to provide appropriate background
knowledge for geologists, engineers,
oceanographers, coastal managers,
and others concerned with the
coastal zone. Each of the nine
chapters is on one coastal
environment, covering occurrence
and distribution, formation, and
various physical processes. The 10th
chapter, "Modelling Coastal
Environments," covers various kinds
of coastal models statistical,
deterministic, storm, and so forth.
Diving and Marine Biology: The
Ecology of the Sublittoral by George
F. Warner. 1984. Cambridge Studies
in Modern Biology 3. Cambridge
University Press, New York, N.Y.
210pp. + xii. $39.50.
This book is intended for divers
and non-divers, describing the
environment with which divers are
most familiar (from low tide down to
about 60 meters). Scuba diving has
made a special contribution to
marine biology, because scuba
permits marine biologists to explore
the seabed in person. This book has
four parts: hard substrates (with
chapters on physical factors and
communities, adaptations of
organisms to the movement of water,
and biological interactions); kelp
forests (plants and fauna); coral reefs
(reef structure and environment,
nutrition and growth of reef corals,
biological interactions with reef
corals, and reef fish); and level
substrates.
Lake Biwa, Shoji Horie, ed. 1984.
Monographiae Biologicae Volume
54, Dr W. Junk Publishers, Kluwer
Boston, Boston, Mass. 654 pp. + xi.
$145.00; 88.95.
The limnology of the biggest lake in
Japan, thought to be five million
years old (making it one of the oldest
lakes on Earth). After considering the
general features of Lake Biwa, this
compendium of 37 papers covers the
lake's geological features, modern
limnology, paleolimnology,
biogeography, and the influence of
human activities on the lake.
Fundamentals of Aquatic Toxicology:
Methods and Applications, Gary M.
Rand and Sam R. Petrocelli, eds.
1985. Hemisphere Publishing
Corporation, New York, N.Y.
Distributed outside the United States
by McGraw-Hill International Book
Company, London, England. 666 pp.
+ xviii. $69.95.
Useful as a text and reference for
students and workers in aquatic
toxicology, this book has information
about aquatic biology and ecology,
invertebrate and fisheries biology,
and environmental and pollution
biology. The 23 chapters are divided
into five parts: toxicity testing
(concepts and methods); sublethal
effects; specific chemical effects;
chemical distribution/fate; and
hazard evaluation. Specific laws and
regulatory agencies are identified,
and a glossary of terms is included.
Offshore and Coastal Modelling,
P. P. G. Dyke, A. O. Moscardini, and
E. H. Robson, eds. 1985. Lecture
Notes on Coastal and Estuarine
Studies 12, Springer-Verlag, New
York, N.Y. 399 pp. + ix. $32.80.
The papers published in this book
are from the seventh Polymodel
Conference, held in May of 1984.
Polymodel is the NorthEast of
England Polytechnic's Mathematical
Modelling and Computer Simulation
Group. The volume's 18 chapters are
in four parts: Chapters on tides,
storm surges and coastal circulations;
chapters on coastal engineering
modelling, discussing phenomena
like beach erosion and non-linear
waves; chapters on offshore
structures, including connections
between structures; and two chapters
on offshore corrosion problems.
Concepts in Marine Pollution
Measurements, Harris H. White, ed.
1984. Maryland Sea Grant
Publications, University of Maryland,
College Park, Md. 743 pp. + xii.
$12.50.
Techniques for measuring marine
pollution and marine pollution's
effects. The 41 papers in this volume
were culled from those given at a
workshop on "Meaningful Measures
of Marine Pollution Effects" held in
Pensacola, Florida, in 1982. The
authors were asked to elaborate on
the strong features and weak points
of whole categories of techniques.
The resulting papers are organized
into these groups: toxicity tests,
laboratory microcosms, community
parameters and measures of
community impact, bioaccumulation
tests, chemical measurements and
effects criteria, anomalies in field
specimens, mesocosms and field
systems, and field monitoring
programs. Each section has an
introductory paper; a summary
chapter ends the book.
Fisheries
Fishery Management by J. L.
McHugh. 1984. Lecture Notes on
Coastal and Estuarine Studies 10,
Springer-Verlag, New York, N.Y.
207pp. $17.00.
This text evolved out of the course
on fishery management that the
author teaches at the State University
of New York, Stony Brook. An
introduction to world fisheries begins
the book; there are chapters on
marine fishery research and a general
chapter on fisheries of the United
States. Case studies of the oyster,
blue crab, Pacific sardine and Atlantic
menhaden, marine sport fisheries,
and various compacts and
conventions make up the bulk
of the book.
Evolution of Fish Species Flocks,
Anthony A. Echelle and Irv Kornfield,
eds. 1984. University of Maine at
Orono Press, Orono, Maine. 257 pp.
+ x. $28.95 (hardcover); $20.95
(paperback).
Common descent and coexistence in
the same lake characterize lacustrine
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species flocks. This book includes 18
papers by 27 contributors to a
symposium that addressed the
following questions: Can the
presence of scores, if not hundreds,
of closely related species in a single
lake be explained by allopatric
speciation? Do these species flocks
refute the principle of competitive
exclusion? Partial answers were
obtained, and the remaining
problems clarified. For those still
confused about what a species flock
is, the first paper addresses just that.
Other topics include: Semionotid
fishes from the Mesozoic Great Lakes
of North America; African Cichilids
and evolutionary theories; and much
more. A final chapter, "Who's
Tending the Flock?" by the book's
editors, discusses natural and
anthropogenic aspects of extinction
in fish species flocks, stressing the
need for scientists' active
involvement in species flocks'
conservation.
Exploitation of Marine Communities,
R. M. May, ed. 1984. Springer-
Verlag, New York, N.Y. 366 pp. + x.
$20.00.
The report of the Dahlem Workshop
on exploitation of marine
communities held in Berlin in April,
1984. This volume surveys our
understanding of the dynamics of
multispecies marine ecosystems and
explores implications for fisheries
management, with background
papers and rapporteurs' reports of
group discussions. The book begins
with biological accounts of the
genetics and dynamics of single
populations and of multispecies
systems, then moves on to discuss
management under uncertainty and
the biological, economic, and social
factors that roil together in the
management of multispecies systems.
Throughout, the emphasis is on
identifying questions and potentially
fruitful areas of new research.
Complete with four group
photographs, 42 figures, 14 tables,
and a minimum of equations, this
book should appeal to a wide
readership.
General Reading
A Scientist at the Seashore by James
Trefil. 1984. Charles Scribner's Sons,
New York, N.Y. 208 pp. + ix. $16.95.
In this conversationally written book,
the author guides the reader on a
stroll along the seashore, pointing out
a few interesting phenomena along
the way. In the process, Trefil makes
side excursions to Pluto, Venus, and
other solar systems. By examining
common mysteries encountered on
trips to the beach such as the
dynamics of tides, skipping stones,
dunes, and waves, and the saltiness
of the water the author illuminates
some complicated aspects of physics
in a readable manner.
The Printer's Catch: An Artist's Guide
to Pacific Coast Edible Marine
Animals by Christopher M. Dewees.
1984. Sea Challengers, Monterey,
Calif. 112pp. $26.95.
The Printer's Cald)
Ap Artist's Guide To
Pacific Coa?l
Edible Mariije
Aijirrial?
Chrislopher M Dewees
This book combines art with nature.
People who enjoy gyotaku (fish
prints) often want to know more
about fish, and this book provides
just that summaries of the natural
histories of fishes from sharks and
rays to shrimp, all illustrated by fish
prints. There are more than 30 types
offish represented, including
surfperch, barracudas, scallops, and
oysters, with 63 color plates of prints.
A knowledge of fish natural history is
important for making good fish prints,
and the prints themselves can be
helpful to biologists. A beautiful
book, by a fishery biologist, equally
suitable for those interested in fish
and those interested in art. The book
includes directions for making prints,
a glossary, and illustrations of fishing
gear.
Shallow Waters: A Year on Cape
Cod's Pleasant Bay by William
Sargent. 1985. Parnassus Imprints
(paperback edition; original
hardcover published 1981 by
Houghton Mifflin), Orleans, Mass.
138pp. + xix. $12.95.
A season-by-season chronicle of life
in this bay, located behind Nauset
Beach on the Atlantic Ocean side of
Cape Cod. The author spent
boyhood and manhood summers on
Pleasant Bay, which he calls a
microcosm of the universe. The book
is illustrated with plenty of black-and-
white photographs and a six-page
color insert. Each of the four sections
(Spring, Summer, Fall, and Winter) is
subdivided into essays on individual
topics, five or six to a section,
excepting Winter which has only
two. Perhaps this is a subtle hint
about the duration of winters on
Cape Cod.
Geology
The Shape & Form of Puget Sound
by Robert Burns. 1985. Puget Sound
Books, Washington Sea Grant,
Seattle, Wash. 100 pp. $8.95.
Although geological studies of
specific areas are usually of limited
interest, this book may prove an
exception. The author uses geologic
terms well, making them
understandable without burdening
the text with definitions.
Furthermore, in the course of
explaining the geology of Puget
Sound and adjoining waters, he
elucidates many general geologic
processes. The reader learns geologic
concepts and immediately is able to
apply them to an interesting case
study a truly enlightened way to
write a book!
Marine Policy
The Oslo and Paris Commissions:
The First Decade International
Cooperation in Protecting Our
Marine Environment. 1984. Oslo and
Paris Commissions, London, England.
377 pp. + x. Price unknown.
Last year marked the 10th
anniversary of the Convention for the
Prevention of Marine Pollution by
Dumping from Ships and Aircraft (the
Oslo Convention), which was
followed by the Paris Convention for
the Prevention of Marine Pollution
from Land-Based Sources. This
volume describes some of the
progress made in the name of these
two conventions. Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Federal Republic of
Germany, Iceland, Ireland,
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Sweden, and England contracting
parties to the conventions have
provided summaries of their national
policies toward waste control. Each
summary contains a brief, general
introduction to the nation, with a
statement on the waste problem and
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waste disposal policy of that nation;
a section on the organizational
framework for waste disposal in that
country, covering the legal basis and
administrative structure; a section on
the waste problem, covering
municipal, industrial, and agricultural
wastes and dredged materials; a
section on waste treatment and
disposal methods (on land, to the
atmosphere, into waters, recycling
and reuse, and reduction at source);
a section considering special
problems (radioactive waste); and
sections on monitoring and
surveillance and present and future
policy. The book ends with an
outline of the events in 1971 that led
to the Oslo Convention, a history of
the Oslo and Paris Commissions to
1984, an outline of pertinent
information on the European
Economic Community, a list of
general conclusions, and a look at the
future of the two conventions.
Living with Long Island's South Shore
by Larry R. McCormick, Orrin H.
Pilkey, Jr., William |. Neal, and
Orrin H. Pilkey, Sr. 1984. Duke
University Press, Durham, N.C.
157 pp. + xiii. $22.75 (hardcover);
$9.75 (paperback).
This book should be required reading
in every home on Long Island. Part of
the extremely useful Living with the
Shore series put out by Duke
University Press, Living with Long
Island's South Shore delineates those
areas of Long Island most threatened
by erosion and storm damage and
explains why. Additional information
shows how man affects the shoreline,
how to evaluate the safety of a
particular beach house, and some
construction techniques to consider
in building or renovating a house on
the shore.
Coasts: Institutional Arrangements
for Management of Coastal
Resources by Jens C. Sorensen, Scott
T. McCreary, and Marc ). Hershman.
1984. Research Planning Institute,
Columbia, S.C. 165 pp. + xiv. $21.00.
This fairly technical work on coastal
planning is likely to be of great
interest to those actively involved
with the subject, and of little interest
to lay readers. The authors analyze
strategies common around the world
for managing coastal zones, and
devote a chapter to defining terms
that crop up repeatedly in both this
book and much other planning
literature. Another quite useful
chapter outlines criteria that help
assure success in coastal
management.
Consensus and Confrontation: The
United States and the Law of the Sea
Convention, Jon M. Van Dyke, ed.
1985. Workshop of the Law of the
Sea Institute, University of Hawaii,
Honolulu, Hawaii. 576 pp. + x.
$29.50.
Consensus and Confrontation:
The United States and the
Law of the Sea Convention
Edited by
Jon M. Van Dyke
Persistent doubts about the U.S.
decision not to sign the Law of the
Sea Convention, and a desire to look
at the benefits and costs of the
convention as a whole, led to the
holding of a week-long workshop in
Honolulu in January 1984, to analyze
all aspects of the convention.
Representatives of the Reagan
Administration, diplomats from the
Asia-Pacific region (developing
nations, Pacific island nations, the
Soviet Union, and China), and the
U.S. mining industry presented their
concerns. U.S. academicians in
attendence analyzed the competing
positions of all sides; discussions
followed. The papers and discussions
in this book were organized and
edited to suit the publication,
grouping materials by topic.
Ships and Sailing
Battleships in Transition: The
Creation of the Steam Battlefleet
1815-1860 by Andrew Lambert.
1984. Naval Institute Press,
Annapolis, Md. 161 pp. $18.95.
The history of warship development
includes a bizarre intermediary, the
steam line-of-battle ship, that was
used in the mid-1 9th century. This
wooden sailing ship with steam
engine preceded the ironclad in
history. Lambert's book is a study of
the evolution and active service of
the wooden steam battleship,
discussing both historical and
physical particulars, with emphasis
on the steam line-of-battle snip's
contribution to developing naval
technology, and the factors that
caused the ship's sudden demise.
The author considers both political
and administrative decisions that
determined design, fleet size, and
other details.
Oregon Shipwrecks by Don Marshall.
1984. Binford & Mort Publishing,
Portland, Ore. 235 pp. + ix. $24.95.
In 200 years, the Oregon coast has
claimed hundreds of ships and
human lives. This book outlines the
shipwrecks, from the earliest
recorded (about 1705) to 1955. The
author describes the events of
various wrecks in a speculative
manner, intertwining facts specific to
individual wrecks with quotations
from witnesses, diaries, and letters.
LAW OF THE SEA INSTITUTE
19th ANNUAL
CONFERENCE
CARDIFF, WALES
The U.N.
Convention on the
Law of the Sea:
Impact and
Implementation
July 24-27, 1985
Co-sponsor: Centre for Marine Law
and Policy, University of Wales
Institute of Science
and Technology
Chairs: E. D. Brown, Thomas A.
Clingan, and Albert W. Koers
Law of the Sea Institute, William S.
Richardson School of Law,
University of Hawaii at Manoa,
2515 Dole Street, Honolulu,
Hawaii 96822
(808)941-8500, 948-6750
Telex 7431895 (SEALAW) (ITT)
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Marine Archaeology, Vol. 28:1, Spring 1985 Details of a rapidly expanding discipline, with articles on prehistoric
man on the continental shelf, Atlantis and catastrophe theory, marine archaeology in Israel, and legal and technical issues.
The Exclusive Economic Zone, Vol. 27:4, Winter 1984/85 An assessment of the options open to the United
States in developing its new Exclusive Economic Zone.
Deep-Sea Hot Springs and Cold Seeps, Vol. 27:3, Fall 1984 The biology, geology, and chemistry of
hydrothermal vents and sulfide seeps. Other articles on the exploration of vent sites and the funding of oceanographic research.
El NinO, Vol. 27:2, Summer, 1984 A comprehensive exploration of the El Nino phenomenon, the oceanic temperature
anomaly blamed for abnormal weather worldwide during 1982 and 1983. Articles cover the ocean/atmosphere connection,
positive effects of El Nino, its effects on the Earth's rotation, and much more.
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energy alternatives, and natural petroleum seeps.
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ice zone experiment, career opportunities in oceanography, and concerns about the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone.
Deep Ocean Mining, Vol. 25:3, Fall 1982 The science and politics of mining the deep ocean floor.
Summer ISSUe, Vol. 25:2, Summer 1982 How Reagan Administration policies will affect coastal resource management,
an acoustic technique for measuring ocean processes, ocean hot springs research, planning aquaculture projects in the Third
World, public response to a plan to bury high-level radioactive waste in the seabed, and a toxic marine organism that could
prove useful in medical research.
Summer ISSUe, Vol. 24:2, Summer 1981 The U.S. oceanographic experience in China, ventilation of aquatic plants,
seabirds at sea, the origin of petroleum, the Panamanian sea-level canal, oil and gas exploration in the Gulf of Mexico, and the
links between oceanography and prehistoric archaeology.
The Oceans As Waste Space, Vol. 24:1, Spring 1981 A debate over the appropriateness of ocean disposal.
Senses Of the Sea, Vol. 23:3, Fall I960 A look at the complex sensory systems of marine animals.
Summer ISSUe, Vol. 23:2, Summer, 1980 Plankton distribution, El Nino and African fisheries, hot springs in the Pacific,
Georges Bank, and more.
A Decade Of Big Ocean Science, Vol. 23:1, Spring 1980 As it has in other major branches of research, the
team approach has become a powerful force in oceanography.
Ocean Energy, Vol. 22:4, Winter 1979/80 How much new energy can the oceans supply?
Ocean/Continent Boundaries, Vol. 22:3, Fall 1979 Continental margins are being studied for oil and gas
prospects as well as for plate tectonics data.
The Deep Sea, Vol. 21:1, Winter 1978 Over the last decade, scientists have become increasingly interested in the
deep waters and sediments of the abyss.
Sound in the Sea, Vol. 20:2, Spring 1977 The use of acoustics in navigation and oceanography.
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